Category: child equivalents

New Fst and Kinship Estimators

And a statement on Identity.

In all cases, emphasis added.

The abstract:

Kinship coefficients and FST, which measure genetic relatedness and the overall population structure, respectively, have important biomedical applications. However, existing estimators are only accurate under restrictive conditions that most natural population structures do not satisfy. We recently derived new kinship and FST estimators for arbitrary population structures [1, 2]. Our estimates on human datasets reveal a complex population structure driven by founder effects due to dispersal from Africa and admixture. Notably, our new approach estimates larger FST values of 26% for native worldwide human populations and 23% for admixed Hispanic individuals, whereas the existing approach estimates 9.8% and 2.6%, respectively. While previous work correctly measured FST between subpopulation pairs, our generalized FST measures genetic distances among all individuals and their most recent common ancestor (MRCA) population, revealing that genetic differentiation is greater than previously appreciated. This analysis demonstrates that estimating kinship and FST under more realistic assumptions is important for modern population genetic analysis.

I’m not a fan of Fst for genetic distance estimates for reasons discussed at this blog, and based on peer-reviewed literature, but it is used for that by many, so let’s see what this paper says.

From the main text:

However, the most commonly-used standard kinship estimator [9, 10, 13–19] is accurate only in the absence of population structure [2, 20]. Likewise, current FST estimators assume that individuals are partitioned into statistically-independent subpopulations [4, 5, 21–23], which does not hold for human and other complex population structures.

About Hispanics:

In particular, since differentiation increases from AFR to EUR to AMR (Fig. 3), the greatest kinship is between individuals with higher AMR ancestry, and the lowest kinship is between individuals with higher AFR ancestry (Fig. 4B and C).

So, it would seem that Hispanics like Mexicans and Peruvians have greater kinship among them than do the Caribbean-type Hispanics who stress Negro admixture to a greater extent.  Genetic differentiation (and kinship) seems highest among Amerindians and Pacific Islanders.

Fst between populations may be “substantially larger” than previously determined:

Remarkably, our estimated FST of 0.260 is substantially larger than estimates around 0.098 from existing approaches (Fig. 3) and previous measurements based on FST [30, 45] or related variance component models [31, 46, 47] — except for some AMOVA  ST estimates [48] (pairwise FST estimates [23, 49– 52] are not generally comparable to our estimate). Existing approaches underestimate FST because they assume zero kinship between subpopulations, clearly incorrect as seen in Fig. 1C, whereas our new approach models arbitrary kinship between individuals and leverages kinship to estimate FST.

Consistent with the “genes follow geography” paradigm, with genetic variation being both clinal and discontinuous.

We typically see that each ancestry cluster is concentrated in a certain geographical region, and this ancestry is also present to a lesser extent in neighboring regions and diminishes with geographical distance from its point of greatest concentration. This again argues for a complex population structure where relatedness at the population level falls on a continuum rather than taking on discrete values. The most notable geographic discontinuities in ancestry were observed for cluster 3, which is roughly West Eurasian ancestry.

And within West Eurasians?

Among West Eurasians, kinship is higher within Europe, reflecting another bottleneck.

So much for those that have denied any differences among West Eurasians.

It would be useful to use the new kinship estimator to get quantitative data for groups and transform those into child equivalents as well. That would be important for biopolitical considerations, an important component, but not the only component, of biopolitical identity. Identity – particularly from the general Yockeyian perspective I espouse – has multiple components.

Interestingly, he authors of this paper take a similar perspective; thus:

This partition into subpopulation is based on geography, history, language families, and our kinship estimates.

If “history” includes cultural/civilizational components, which are the major proximate interests, then this tracks well with my idea of Identity, composed both from the key ultimate interest (genetic kinship) and the major proximate interests. These different sets of interests synergize to form sharp discontinuities which are not present when only one interest is considered in isolation.

Now, I do not agree with the authors including the Ashkenazim in the European subpopulation, but that does not mean their approach is wrong – they are simply following the same simplistic mindset reflected by the testing companies that “they are found in Europe so they are European,” ignoring the history of the Ashkenazim as a Diaspora group akin to the Roma.

But, that’s a minor detail. The major approach of synergistic Identity is sound.

Racialist Expected Value, Process, and Results

Economic-based analysis.

Listening to some financial podcasts about ‘wealth building” I noticed some analogies to racial activism (perhaps not surprising since child equivalents of EGI can be transformed into financial impacts based on estimated “values” of a human life, e.g., for insurance purposes).

One point made was that calculating probabilities is not sufficient; one must also estimate the potential value obtained from each outcome.  Thus, outcome A may be more probable than outcome B, but if the payoff of B is far greater than that of A, it would be most prudent to invest in B rather than in A, since the “expected value” of B-oriented scenarios is greater than that for scenarios oriented around pursuing A.

This is one of the points I’ve previously made about Breezy’s “citizenism.” Yes, it may be that civic nationalism is more probable as an achievable outcome than racial nationalism (see: Trump, Donald J. as an example). Nevertheless, the potential outcome of racial nationalism is so far superior to anything achievable from civic nationalism (perhaps infinitely greater if one supposes that civic nationalism in America following current demographic trends would result in the White race replacement that racial nationalism would prevent), then it is obviously more prudent, form a cost/benefit ratio to pursue approaches leading to racial nationalist outcomes.

Another point made by financial analysts and advisers is to be process-driven rather than merely results-driven.  An example given is to imagine a process in which there is 55% probability of success and 45% probability of failure, with equal relative outcomes of gain/loss respectively (and assume there are no other approaches that would give a higher expected value than pursuing this 55:45 advantage).  A person who is purely results-driven, if they had lost after the first try, would give up, saying: I tried it and lost.  A process-driven person would realize that, over time, this approach would yield value, given a sufficient sample size of attempts.

That’s very simplistic of course, and is not an argument against considering results – after all, if you attempted this approach 1,000 times and kept on losing, those results would inform you that the process was flawed.  After all, you need feedback to judge whether the process is as effective as you originally thought.  Further, you may not have the resources to keep on losing waiting for the process to work; there are many considerations where results are important.  So, perhaps it is best to say that you should be BOTH process-driven and results-driven, not one or the other.  At the beginning, it is best to emphasize process over results, to generate sufficient sample size so that the results become relevant.  Later, the importance of a results-driven approach increases, but should never rise to the level of completely excluding process.  Indeed, process can be refined based upon results (and of course results are driven by process, modified by probability).

I’m critical of Der Movement from the basis of BOTH process (which I find stupid and wrong-headed) as well as results (decades of failure represent a sufficient sample size to judge the lack of efficacy of process).

Behold the Parasite

Jews and net EGI.

Of course, Jews are neither wasps nor fungi, nor do they stand in the same relationship to us as do the parasitic wasps and fungi to their hosts just mentioned. Jews are either a closely related species to us, or are a subspecies of the same species. In either case, as repulsive as are parasites, and as loathe as we may be to admit it, Jews are genetically quite similar to us and are in fact extensively cross-bred with us. Doesn’t this effectively rule out their being biological parasites upon us? 

No, not at all. In fact, it makes it even more likely. In 1909, an Italian entomologist named Carlo Emery discovered what is now known as Emery’s Rule. The rule states that that social parasites (that is, parasites of social species — and Homo sapiens is certainly a social species) tend to be parasites of species or genera to which they are closely related. Matt Johnston of the University of Arizona states that, “One explanation for the apparently close relationship between social parasites and their hosts is that in order to get past the hosts’ defenses, the parasite needs to have evolved communication systems similar to the host. This may be more likely if the two share a close evolutionary history.”

This is why I talk about the importance of net genetic interests (not that anyone listens). If all you care about are gross genetic interests, then you would simply measure the genetic distances involved, calculate the child equivalents, and conclude that since Jews are genetically quite similar to, and cross-bred with, Europeans, then their presence in Western societies does not exert much of an EGI cost at all. However, Jews are a highly specialized, evolved parasitic ethny with interests that are incompatible with that of Europeans, and as such Jewish behavior exerts a significant fitness cost on Europeans, so that the net effect on European EGI is enormous. Therefore, net EGI takes into account all factors that affect the genetic interests of an ethny, and provides a final tally of the outcome. If Jews promote mass alien immigration, desegregation, miscegenation, and overall societal degeneration (that imposes severe costs on, among other things, family stability and reproductive success), then their presence is extremely destructive to host EGI regardless of what the relative genetic distances are between Jews and White Gentiles. Further, if Jews consider themselves a different group than are White Gentiles, and pursue a group evolutionary strategy of their own, they would not care that their behavior damages the interests of an ethny relatively genetically similar to their own. Of course, Identity is based upon more than just genetic distances, and issues of Identity, by influencing behavior, directly affect genetic interests.

For Our German Readers: Your Genetic Loss in American Dollars

The cost of “Merkel’s Boner.”

We hear much about “Germany taking in 800,000 migrants this year.”  We also hear idiots even trying to make the case that the influx will “boost the German economy” by “providing needed workers” and “dynamic immigrants.’

So, let us look at the influx with an economic twist. I will use the crude but useful “coarse-graining” approach outlined here, which has some caveats, but is nevertheless a good approximation of what we are considering.

Assume 800,000 non-European Caucasian (NEC) immigrants, with every 8.5 immigrants imposing the loss of one child equivalent (as per On Genetic Interests), and an estimate of $5 million for the economic cost of a human life.

A quick calculation tells us that each and every German citizen of ethnic German descent will incur a loss of ~ $470.6 billion from these 800,000 migrants.  That, my friends, is more than four hundred seventy billion American dollars for each individual (ethnic) German citizen.  If you wish, you can multiply that by the total number of ethnic Germans in Germany to get the bizarrely enormous sum cost for the entire German nation.

I am sort of dubious that any sort of “economic growth” from even productive immigrants – never mind Third World brutes – can in any way even try to approach breaking even for those sums within multiple orders of magnitude.

Well, then, we will be told there is a “moral dimension” – that Germans have some sort of “moral obligation” because of their WWII “blood guilt.”  Really? Is that worth $470.6 billion apiece? I really wonder if your typical German citizen would rather “feel good about themselves” than have $470.6 billion. And if you wanted to do good, wouldn’t those billions allow you to do so, rather than having hordes of young healthy NEC men lounging around Berlin cafes parasitizing off of your society?

True, we are not talking about actual sums of money.  But consider the demographic equivalent. If Germans “want to do good for the world” they’d be in much better position to do so as an intact demographically secure German nation, with the well-known intelligence, discipline, productivity, and efficiency of the German people, than as some sort of Arabic-Turkic wasteland in the middle of what used to be Europe.  The $470.6 billion per German represents a biological investment in the Germany ethny that can yield positive results for human progress. On the other hand, the loss of the German ethny would be an irreplaceable loss for humanity.

Therefore, Germans – and Europeans as a whole – owe it to humanity, and not only to themselves, to ensure their own demographic survival.