Category: EGI

More Genetic Structure and DifferInt Analysis

An important topic.

I have been looking a bit more at the DifferInt program (currently unable to find anything better), testing some model genotypes to better understand the relationship between different levels of integration with respect to the amount of differentiation.  One finding which is clear that it is when genetic differentiation – at the lowest genepool level – between groups is shallow is when the program is scalable at the level of the highest level of integration.

A test model was devised with two populations of eleven individuals each.  Six loci were considered.  Initially, the two populations were constructed to be genetically identical. Four individuals of the second population had alleles at one lock rearranged so that four heterozygotes were made into four homozygotes (two of each type), without changing the total number of each allele type for that locus in that population.  After this change, the genepool differentiation was 0.0303, but the multilocus genotype neglecting elementary genic differences (MGNEGD) was 0.3636 – a twelve-fold increase in differentiation.  In this simple model of shallow genetic difference, a discrete representation of genetic structure (MGNEGD) is seen to exhibit sharply increased (and quantitatively scalable) differentiation with even a small change in allele structuring in genetically similar (model) populations.

However, when differentiation at the genepool level is already fairly high, then MGNEGD rises to complete differentiation quickly, and the ability to evaluate genetic structure becomes non-scalable using this program.  It could be that the SNP database I utilized for my initial human study was enriched in SNPs that sharply differentiate between ethnies and so all levels of differentiation were high in the analysis; perhaps completely random SNPs would be better? On the other hand, we are most concerned about the distinctive genome (with respect to EGI).  

In a more realistic model of human genetic differentiation, two populations were set up, each consisting of ten individuals, each assayed over 100 loci.  90 of these loci were absolutely identical between the two populations and 10 loci differed between the populations with respect to the frequencies of alleles at the loci.  In some cases, it was 100%  of one allele pair compared to 100% of another; in other cases it was more subtle – for example one population having 20% AA, 60% AT, and 20% TT while the other population was 20% AA, 50% AT, and 30% TT for the same locus.  The genepool differentiation between the two populations was 0.0370; the MGNEGD was 1.000 – complete differentiation.  This again shows that with enough loci studied and differentiated populations, analysis of discrete sets of multilocus genotypes (see my definition of genetic structure below) will reach complete differentiation.  The implications for genetic interests should be obvious.

It might be a good idea to review my idea of genetic structure again here.

Genetic structure as per my definition can be viewed as a form of linkage disequilibrium of alleles over all the loci in the genome, or this distinctive genome, of at least whatever number of loci that were assayed.  Each specific permutation of multilocus genotypes is a discrete entity, so that one would expect, of course, district genetic structures between any set of individuals who are not identical twins; there would be differences in genetic structure within families, never mind within ethnies.

However – and this is the key point that separates my idea from the run-of-the mill evaluations of genetic structure – I envision genetic structure to be defined by specific ranges of multilocus genotypes.  Therefore, while there is going to be, naturally, individual variation of discrete multilocus genotypes within families, there will be a family-specific range of multilocus genotypes, a range within which all the individual genotypes, of that family will fall within.  Likewise, there will be ethny-specific ranges of multilocus genotypes, so that members of an ethny will exhibit genotypes that – while they differ on an individual level – will fall within a range, a set, of genotypes characteristic of that ethny.  

It then follows, that while multilocus genotypes will be differentiated from each other, the extent of that differentiation will differ.  Different families will exhibit different ranges, or sets, of possible multilocus genotypes, but families belonging to the same ethny will exhibit ranges that are more similar to each other than that of families of different ethnies (the same goes for individuals of course, across families or across ethnies).  Ethnies belonging to the same continental population group (i.e., intra-racial) will exhibit more similar ranges of possibilities of multilocus genotypes than that of inter-racial comparisons.  One could think of it also as frequency distributions of multilocus genotypes, of all the alleles possibilities at all the relevant loci considered together as a discrete entity, and one can compare how similar the frequency distributions are, with more overlap from those more similar.  

One would also expect a solid correlation, or association, between the differentiation as measured by an allele-by-allele genepool/beanbag approach, single locus genotypes, and multilocus genotypes. The relative extent of differences should correlate in at least a qualitative sense between these levels of “genetic integration.”  Hence, as previously noted at this blog, “complete differentiation” at the multilocus genotype level should differ in extent dependent upon how similar or different the genotypes are from each other.  One should in theory be able to quantitate this in a continuous fashion, rather than just having a binary yes/no undifferentiated/completely differentiated choice.

This is obviously an important topic.  If we are to make decisions based on genetic interests, don’t we need to have a better understanding about what those interests actually are, quantitatively speaking?

It’s true that we know enough right now to justify taking action in defense of genetic interests; even at the lowest levels of genetic integration, and even with estimates of child equivalents based on Fst, we already know that mass migration of alien peoples is genocide.

So, yes, I’m sympathetic to the argument that in general, qualitatively speaking, it is more important to actualize a defense of the interests we already know about than to fine-tune our understanding of these interests. But why not both?  Nothing stops us from both organizing on a political and metapolitical level while at the same time continuing to refine our understanding of this topic.  While most of my work now concerns the political and metapolitical implications of defending EGI and of actualizing a High Culture, surely there is also a place for a better understanding of EGI and for a better understanding of Spenglerian cycles and how to control them foe civilizational benefit.

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Preliminary Quantitation of Genetic Structure

Genetic differentiation increases with higher levels of genetic integration.

Ted Sallis

Introduction

I have finally performed some preliminary analyses of genetic structure – which I (predominantly) define as the association of alleles at different loci, an association that differs between individuals, between families, and between ethnies. The lack of genetic structure calculations is one of the two major genetics-based weaknesses of On Genetic Interests, the other being the reliance on Fst – which is not a real measure of genetic differentiation – rather than on genetic kinship data.  I’m not going to directly get into genetic kinship here (but note that the “genepool” level of analysis of DifferInt does give sort of a measure of genetic kinship, if the numbers are “crunched” appropriately), but since I’ve been discussing genetic structure for so long, here I present a minimal proof-of-principle of genetic structure quantitation with some human SNP data. This is not an optimal study, which needs to be performed by those with the time, expertise, databases, and computational resources do it well and efficiently (the same goes for global genetic kinship assays). Also, the methodology itself is not optimal and doesn’t cover the entirety of the genetic structure concept, but it does at least cover the underlying core principle.  

Methods

The DifferInt program dealing with genetic integration (1-3) – based on the work of Gillet and Gregorius on “genetic integration” (2) – was utilized, as well as some lists of human SNPs and publicly available HapMap population SNP frequency data. Thus, HapMap populations were analyzed. Europeans (EURO) included CEU (Utah residents of Northern and Western European ancestry) and TSI Tuscans, East Asians (EASIA) included CHB and CHD Chinese and JPT Japanese as well as a separate set of Chinese samples previously named HCB (instead of CHB), South Asians (SOUTH ASIAN) included GIH Gujarati Indians, Negroes (AFRICA) includes YRI Nigerians and ASW SE USA African ancestry and LKK and MKK Kenyans, and there also was Mex (MEXICAN: Mexican ancestry). I also produced a CEU-YRI hybrid by taking ~ ½ the alleles from CEU and ~ ½ from YRI – obviously, this is NOT how real admixture would take place (there would be mixing of both alleles at single loci as well as multiple loci, as well as other important differences consequent to sexual reproduction) – this is merely a very crude proof-of-principle.

Ideally, DifferInt populations would be ethnic groups and within each population there would be the individuals of that population, each with their distinct genotypes.  Due to the limitations of this study, the design was somewhat different and at a broader level of analysis. Here, the populations are continental population groups (races) and the “individuals’ within the populations are the ethnic groups themselves – actually the consensus genotypes at each locus for that ethnic group.  Therefore, the entire set of consensus genotypes for an ethnic group is what is being called a single “individual” here.  The consensus genotypes are such that for each gene locus, the most frequent genotype at that locus for the ethnic group was chosen.  So, for example, if a locus has AA – 0.2, AG – 0.3, GG – 0.5, then GG was the genotype chosen in this case.  This results in a “model” individual of a consensus ethnic genotype set.  This is sub-optimal for three related reasons: it doesn’t cover the intra-ethnic group variation; it doesn’t cover the frequency distributions of genotype per locus that are, of course, very important; and there are cases where the most frequent genotype is only slightly more frequent than the second most frequent genotype.  SNPs used are those for which I found genotype data for all twelve ethnic groups evaluated; the SNPs were taken from publicly available information sources.  51 SNPs of my initial list fit the requirements.

Whenever there were two genotypes listed as being of equal frequency at a given locus for any group, I chose the genotype that was the same as to the majority of the other groups.  In other words, I was conservative, and when there was a choice, I always chose the option that minimized differences between the greatest number of groups. That serves two purposes: first, to ensure that whatever differences that are observed are definitive, and not merely in part the result of cherry picking of genotypes; second, to obviate claims of a “racist agenda” in attempting to maximize group differences.  

The three levels of analysis are the genepool (i.e., individual allele “bean-bag” genetics), single locus genotypes (association of alleles at one gene locus – i.e., from the two homologous chromosomes), and, most importantly and consistent with my general basic idea about genetic structure, the multilocus genotypes (the association of all the different single locus genotypes together, how genetic variants at multiple loci are associated with each other).  

Each of these levels can be analyzed with “elementary genic differences” or “neglecting elementary genic differences.”  Considering elementary genic differences is an analysis of the number of individual genes that differ in the types of alleles; from the DifferInt manual: “The genic difference between genetic types at the same level of integration is basically determined by the number of their individual genes that differ in allelic type.”

Neglecting elementary genic differences is a discrete differentiation in which 0 is identity of all alleles of all loci and 1.0 being if the types “differ by at least one allele at one locus” – also from the manual: “By replacing the elementary genic difference between genetic types by the discrete difference, the measures…are based only on relative frequencies of the genetic types of the individuals in the population.”  Differentiation is higher when measured with the second, discrete analysis as compared to the first one. Keep in mind that in my crude model the “individuals” are consensus genotypes based on SNP frequency data from ethnic data sets; thus it would make sense that measuring the “discrete difference” would work best for such coarse-grained, “single-point” distinct and discrete pooled samples. Just measuring the numbers of individual genes that differ by allelic type (elementary genic differences) is not measuring (in my opinion) genetic structure (as I define it) per se; measuring the relative frequencies (neglecting elementary genic differences) is somewhat closer to my conception, so I used that for my analysis.

Differentiation is at a scale of 0 (exactly alike, no differentiation) to 1.0 (completely differentiated).

A major flaw in my study is using consensus genotypes, as opposed to actually listing all the individual samples or being able to use allele frequency data (which DifferInt does not do) since, ultimately, we want a range of ethny-specific genotypes characteristic of each group; it would not be a single, fixed consensus genotype.  Using fixed consensus genotypes also makes it even more imperative to look at the discrete DifferInt metrics that neglect the “elementary genic differences.”

Results

(w/o EGD = without [neglecting] elementary genic differences – see above)

Genepool:

EURO/EASIA: 0.3603, EURO/AFRICA: 0.4779, EURO/SOUTH ASIAN: 0.1765, EURO/MEXICAN: 0.1863, EASIAN/AFRICAN: 0.4240, EASIA:/SOUTH ASIAN: 0.2868, EASIA/MEXICAN: 0.2475, AFRICA/SOUTH ASIAN: 0.3922, AFRICA/MEXICAN: 0.4265, SOUTH ASIAN/MEXICAN: 0.2157

Note that the relative differentiation between groups at the genepool level is consistent with what is expected from standard population genetics studies.

Single-locus (w/o EGD):

EURO/EASIA: 0.5784, EURO/AFRICA: 0.8235, EURO/SOUTH ASIAN: 0.3039, EURO/MEXICAN: 0.3529, EASIAN/AFRICAN: 0.7026, EASIA:/SOUTH ASIAN: 0.4951, EASIA/MEXICAN: 0.4461, AFRICA/SOUTH ASIAN: 0.6765, AFRICA/MEXICAN: 0.7108, SOUTH ASIAN/MEXICAN: 0.4118

There is a considerable increase in differentiation considering association of alleles at single loci.  This makes sense, particularly since in many cases differences between ethnies are at the level of whether alleles at the relevant loci are homozygous or heterozygous (which would also have obvious implications for traits affected in a dominant/recessive fashion by the SNP differences, or by gene sequences linked to such differences).

Multiple-locus (w/o EGD):

Was 1.0000 for all comparisons: complete differentiation.

That is not surprising, as combinations of alleles are going to be relatively specific in an ethny-dependent fashion, and the more loci looked at the greater the proneness to distinctiveness.  Of course, with the relatively blunt instrument of combining DifferInt with consensus genotype data, one would expect complete differentiation (with enough loci looked at) at almost any level of genetic difference. The problem here is that while this is informative in a qualitative sense, it doesn’t help gauge relative differences in the degree of “complete differentiation.”  For example, the “complete differentiation” comparing Europeans and South Asians when considering multiple loci is expected to be less than that between, say, Europeans and Africans.  The closer two groups are at the genepool level, the less “complete differentiation” should be expected at the multiple-locus level.  Note that single-locus differences (above) track well with the genepool differences, so the same should be expected at the multiple-locus level if a more scalable metric could be designed.

This lack of scalability at the multiple-locus level may be due to DifferInt itself and/or the type of crude, consensus, discrete SNP data I am using  If it were possible to include allele frequency data – which could be done with this program by actually separately listing each individual with their own genotype rather than a consensus – that would likely help.  Or, if the program itself was changed so that one could just directly include the frequency data for each allelic type rather than having to actually enter each individual as such (although with the proper computational resources and programs I presume listing the individuals would be easy, but I formatted everything by hand, which was tedious).  Alternatively, one could look at relative genetic structure by looking at SNP permutations (not the same type of permutation analysis that DifferInt can do).  One could ask, to what degree are different permutations of allelic types more similar or different? That would be very informative for EGI purposes, if properly designed.

In any case, at least for the data used here, DifferInt was reasonably quantitatively scalable for genepool and single-locus analyses, while multiple-locus analyses were more qualitative.

Also let us look at the CEU/TSI intra-EURO comparison:

Genepool: 0.0392, Single-locus (w/o EGD): 0.0784, Multiple-locus (w/o EGD): 1.0000

Not surprisingly, the intra-European comparison exhibits little differentiation at the genepool level, which is doubled for single-locus integration.  Multiple-locus again shows complete differentiation.  On the one hand, this multiple-locus finding is expected, and makes sense, since the overall genetic structures of CEU and TSI are different.  However, we once again observe the problem of scalability.  EURO/AFRICAN and CEU/TSI both exhibit complete differentiation at the multiple-locus level, but the two are not obviously equivalent. The combinations of alleles at multiple loci for CEU vs TSI are going to be more similar than that for EURO vs. AFRICAN, even if both cases exhibit complete differentiation.  Again, this is a problem with the type of data I used as input, but I suspect as well it is a feature of the program itself. Consider that EURO/AFRICAN differentiation at the genepool level was already at the level of 0.4779 and the maximum possible is 1.0000.  So, it is obvious that the differences are not properly scalable, and likely would not be even with optimal data.  In a properly scalable analytical system, the maximal possible differentiation with multiple-locus analysis should be many-fold greater than that of genepool (and associated with the number of loci examined).  It is at the multiple-locus level that I find this program weakest, which is unfortunate since that is the most important level of analysis.


What the program considers is not perfectly aligned with my conception of genetic structure, but it is not orthogonal either.  There is considerable conceptual overlap; thus utilizing the program at least for a proof-of-principle demonstration is useful.  

The hybrid model (26 loci from CEU, 25 from YRI) is below.  This is, admittedly, highly artificial and not biologically realistic, but makes the general point (real admixture actually would be expected to cause even more differentiation than shown here):

Genepool: 

CEU/YRI: 0.5090, CEU/Hybrid: 0.2640, YRI/Hybrid: 0.2450

As CEU would be expected to be a bit more differentiated from YRI (and other Africans) as are TSI, the CEU/YRI genepool differentiation is slightly higher than the more general EURO/AFRICA, although another possibility is that the non-YRI Africans are closer to Europeans than are YRI. Hybrid values are in between CEU and YRI.

Single-locus (w/o EGD): 

CEU/YRI: 0.8341, CEU/Hybrid: 0.4510, YRI/Hybrid: 0.3922

This increases as expected.

Multiple-locus (w/o EGD): 1.0000 for all comparisons.

Complete differentiation, as expected, but again flawed by lack of scale.  The “complete differentiation”: between CEU/YRI would be expected to be larger than that between CEU/Hybrid, bit that cannot be distinguished in this analysis.  Nevertheless, this shows that merely increasing production of hybrid offspring cannot compensate for foregone parental kinship at the multiple-locus level.

Discussion

The findings (even with the limitations of the analysis) strongly support and extend the EGI concept; ethnies are more genetically differentiated at the level of higher genetic integration than at the mere “beanbag” genepool approach of individual alleles.

However, the gulf between family and ethny is also likely to be increased when genetic structure is taken into account, so one must be prudent in balancing investments.  However, keep in mind two things.  First, the typical ethny is larger than the typical extended family by five to eight orders of magnitude, so the ethny-ethny differences are of greater relative import than the family-ethny differences.  Second, differences will be expected to increase with genetic integration at every level of genetic interest – not only ethny-ethny and family-ethny, but also, for example, between self and family. But the family is needed for the self to have genetic continuity (although one can argue that the larger extended family could be dispensed with as long as the nuclear family is intact, or even that a human male just “spreads his seed” sans family structures), and one can argue that the family needs some sort of ethny, some sort of national culture, for secure familial genetic continuity.  Families mixed beyond wide racial lines are characterized by a deficit of genetic interests for the divergent members of such families, so the fact that those families are less dependent on national ethnies need not concern us, in any reasonable quest to maximize net genetic interests. So, in summary, when all is said and done, the findings here actually INCREASE the validity of ethnic genetic interests (with “ethnic” meaning ethny, which can include race). 

In the future, I may perform some additional analyses with this program and with these (and other) data; but the main point has already been established. Or, better yet, if I can think of other methods of analyzing the data to yield more useful results that would be more optimal.  It would be helpful if others, with more time and computational resources (including better data sets, can generate additional DifferInt data as well as designing better methods for assaying genetic structure (or finding other existing programs; I will search for such as well).

This was a crude analysis, yet very useful I think to “break the ice” on the topic, especially since I can’t help but notice that no one else has been doing it (insofar as I know).  Do you have the time and resources to do better?  Great: Go to it.


Final Conclusions


1. Although the analysis has limitations, it demonstrates that human genetic differentiation increases as genetic structure is considered.


2. A considerable amount of this increase in genetic differentiation is at the single-locus level, which I had not previously considered as being that important.


3. Most importantly, the multiple-locus analysis shows complete differentiation.


4. A problem in this analysis is with the scalability of the multiple-locus determinations, and the program is unable to evaluate the entire genetic structure concept; better methods, analyzed with better data, are required.  In the meantime, it would be useful to even just have more in-depth analyses using DifferInt.


5. When all is said and done, this analysis, even with its limitations, extends the EGI concept.


References

2. Gillet, E.M., Gregorius, H.-R. (2008) Measuring differentiation among populations at different levels of genetic integration. BMC Genetics 9, 60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2156-9-60

3. Gillet, E.M. (2013) DifferInt: Compositional differentiation among populations at three levels of genetic integration. Molecular Ecology Resources 13, 953-964. http://dx.doi.org/10. 1111/1755-0998.12145

McCain: Genocidal Lunatic

Note to a lunatic.

 

Note to John McCain: Those who do not care about “blood and soil” will be replaced by those who do.  And those new people could care less about your “ideals.”

From the perspective of European EGI, McCain is a monster.  Optimally, he should be put on trial for crimes against humanity for both his anti-White genocidal politics (e.g., immigration) as well as his relentless warmongering. The man simply cannot be allowed to die from his disease with dignity; instead he must end his life in disgrace, humiliated and ruined.

Rosit on the Penman Hypothesis

Biohistorical speculations.

I really don’t have much to add to Rosit’s fine analysis, except to note that culture is a proximate interest, albeit the most important proximate interest, and one that – as I have written about extensively – affects our ultimate (genetic) interests.  But, any complete analysis of the decline of the West must put EGI first and foremost.  That would, as a matter of necessity, bring forth, directly, the race issue, the inability to deal with fully and honestly being, as Rosit suggests, a flaw in Penman’s hypothesis. Also, while epigenetic modifications are may in particular contexts be important, there are many, on both the Right and the Left, with an axe to grind against “genetic determinism” that overrate the importance of epigenetics with regards to the final phenotype.  

A reasonable analogy would be that the body is the hardware (computer), the genes are the software, and epigenetics may in part determine whether a particular software program is turned on or off.  That’s important, no doubt, but without the underlying software, there’s nothing to tun on or off, without the software, the hardware is merely a paperweight, and  – and this is crucial – not all computers are running the same software.  If one computer has a particularly powerful program and the other does not, all the “turning on or off” in the world won’t make up the difference.  Epigenetics has become an over-rated meme.

Penman’s grim prognosis is more or less correct, and having the pathetic “movement” as the major vehicle for preventing the racial-cultural disaster that is unfolding is part of the problem.

We need to start rebuilding now, before the collapse, and Der Movement is hardly capable of doing so.

The Ethics of EGI

The ethics of pursuing genetic interests.

In On Genetic Interests (OGI), Salter devotes the last third of the book to a discussion of the ethics of pursuing genetic interests, including ethnic genetic interests (EGI).  This has been the most ignored, and undervalued, section of the book by both “friend” and foe alike.  The “movement” is unsurprisingly relatively uninterested in ethics so they ignore it; while the anti-EGI mainstream pretend that Salter proposes wild ideas of rapine and pillage, so any acknowledgment that there is serious and morally sound ethical discussion there is ignored because it conflicts with the mendacious narratives of the left.

We on the other hand can look at this section of the book, consider the arguments, and take those arguments seriously (whether we agree with them or not).  In my previous writings, I had first concentrated on the population genetics aspect (first third of OGI) – of which there is not much more to say until if and when we get global genetic kinship data and data on human genetic structure/integration (at which point there will be much new to say – and then, more recently, have started evaluating the political aspects (second third of OGI), of which no doubt there will always be more to say, but I have relatively neglected ethics, a deficit I will now begin to correct.

Salter defines “adaptive utilitarianism” as the paradigm in which “a good act is one that increases or protects the fitness of the greater number.”  Salter then examines this in the light of different ethical schemes and in the context of individual and group rights.  What can we make of all of this?

Salter stresses that genetic continuity is certainly compatible with peace between ethnies and with equality of opportunity within ethnies, but not with equality of fitness outcomes, since the latter is evolutionarily unstable.  One cannot “force” equal outcomes with respect to biological fitness, there should be no “affirmative action” with respect to equal genetic representation across generations (*).  Evolution is about unequal fitness outcomes, selection, and, contrary to those who misread Salter, he is NOT calling for any sort of “genetic stasis” – there is, and should be, unequal outcomes in the biological sense, but that does not mean that entire groups should have their fitness radically lowered. Unequal outcomes can be tempered with preservation of genetic diversity (which is good for those preserved but also good for us all, since we cannot predict when this genetic diversity may one day be need/useful for the entire humanity).  Thus, just like competition between individuals in society has its limits – one is not allowed to murder one’s rivals to increase one’s personal fitness – so too does the completive struggles between ethnies have limits in which every group is assured its genetic continuity, but not necessarily at predetermined perfectly equal outcomes assured by some sort of powerful genetic arbiter.

Talking about ethics – what do we mean?  In other words, what are the major types of ethical frameworks from which to view EGI?

Teleological ethics – also known as consequentialist ethics – judge an act right depending on its effects; as Salter points out, circular reasoning (e.g., “an act is moral because it increases moral behavior”) is avoided by examining the non-moral consequences of the act, such as increasing well-being.  Utilitarianism – the greatest benefit for the greatest number – is therefore teleological.   Deontological ethics ae those that are judged based on its “intrinsic characteristics”- as established by “intuition or religion” – rather on its consequences.  It is more “rule based.”  Note that as Salter rightly points out, teleological ethics have a deontological components, since some consequence (e.g. increased well-being) is judged to be more based on an intrinsic understanding of the worth of that consequence.

Of course, one can judge pursuit as EGI as both teleological as well as deontological.  It is definitely teleological if we consider the consequence of enhancing fitness for the greatest number (at least of our on ethny); however, it is deontological to the extent that – if we eschew the “is/ought problem” – we are defining adaptive behavior as an intrinsically good moral value (and others may disagree).  So, it is a teleological ethic with strong deontological undertone, as many (all?) teleological ethics are. Note that when I above specify “our own ethny” this implies that teleological ethics must consider exactly who we are talking about – whose well-being are we concerned with?  Or as Sailer would harp on: who? Whom? 

One can therefore view pursuit of EGI as fundamentally being, at its core, teleological, with possibly – or possibly not, depending on how this pursuit is actualized – some deontological aspects as well.  It is utilitarian in that sense. 

We can ask though – should pursuit of EGI, and of genetic interests in general, actually be the focus of any utilitarian teleological ethic?  How about “happiness?”

If utilitarianism is about “maximizing the greatest good,” then what should the “greatest good” mean?  Happiness?  Salter points put that people in objectively bad conditions (drug addicts getting a “fix”) may be “happy,” the mentally deranged may be “happy,” and then we have the problem: does utilitarian benefit have to be based on conscious preferences?  If someone is unaware of an interest, does that mean it does not exist?  A muskrat has, from the biological perspective, an interest in its own genetic continuity, and will behave from instinct to preserve itself, and presumably a mother muskrat will protect is young using the same instinctive impulse, but there is no conscious preference involved.  The muskrat does not so act because acting in this way “makes it happy.”  Looking at how evolution works, looking at the innate instincts of life, we as evolved organisms may decide – and this is admittedly a conscious preference, but the interests remain whether or not we are aware of them – that adaptive behavior can be a criterion for utilitarian benefit.  Is this the naturalistic fallacy them?

There is the Is/ought problem, of which the naturalistic fallacy is a part – “something is good because it exists, because it is found in nature” (anti-Salterians accuse Salter of this, although he is clear that making adaptive fitness a desirable goal is a conscious choice for humans); on the other hand, the moralistic fallacy (often characteristic of leftist thinking) – “something must be true and exist in reality/nature because it is good” – is typically more prevalent in today’s society, but typically never identified as such (perhaps because it is so widespread none of the hypocrites who ant about the “naturalist fallacy” are aware of their own logical inconsistencies).

So, no, we are not saying we MUST accept adaptiveness as the criterion; however, if we decide that genetic continuity is better than not, that existence is better than non-existence, ten adaptive utilitarianism is a prudent choice – note it is a choice, a scientifically informed choice, but still a choice.  We are not “mandated” by nature to choose to act adaptively (although I note that those who act adaptively will replace those that do not, whether you consider that as a “naturalistic fallacy” is a topic for the philosophers). The point is that we can decide to pick the adaptiveness criterion, it has many arguments in its favor, it is self-perpetuating in the sense that those who so choose will be more likely to have continuity of their existence, but, once identified as a legitimate interest by anyone (and this has obviously already occurred!), we can state that the interest exists for all humans (indeed, for all evolve life forms) whether they are aware of it or not.  This seems to be a rather long-winded and complicated argument in favor of a somewhat obvious point, but it is necessary, since enemies of White survival engage in the most outrageous sophistry, and denial of objective fact and clear logic, as well as basic fairness and fundamental human rights, to deny Whites their rights of existence, preservation, and group interests. [I’ll pass over Salter’s arguments about Singer and “animal liberation.”  The targeted readers of this essay hopefully not only value their genetic interests over that of other humans, but over non-human animals as well].

So what we have is: adaptive utilitarianism: we choose to value adaptive fitness as the good to be maximized.

But should the pursuit of EGI (and genetic interests in general) be purely teleological?  Should we engage in pure adaptive utilitarianism in pursuit of genetic interests – concerned with ends only, with no concern for means whatsoever?  Do rights and justice count for nothing?

Salter provides a hypothetical example illustrating the limits of pure utilitarianism from the standpoint of standard notions of justice.  I’ll paraphrase a bit.  Consider a town, with an economy heavily based on tourism and its image as a “good” place.  Some horrific (and we can assume heavily publicized) murder takes place there, endangering the town’s image.  A vagabond petty thief – a constant troublemaker who has been harming the town’s image and damaging its tourist industry – is suspected of the murder.  The townspeople are howling for “justice” – they want the vagabond tried, convicted, and hanged, and their town’s reputation restored.  However, the sheriff discovers the vagabond is innocent – the murder was actually committed by the town’s mayor, a person of previously impeccable character and high standing, the very image of the town ad its “goodness.“ Further, this murder was a “one-time crime of passion” – it is almost certain that the mayor would never do anything like this again.  Arresting the mayor for the murder would, as Salter rightly points out, ravage the town’s social order, ruin its image, harm its tourist industry, and damage its economy, putting people out of work.  A pure utilitarian view – the greatest benefit for the greatest number – would suggest letting the vagabond hang and letting the mayor go free.  But Salter points out this would offend our sense of justice, a common weakness for pure utilitarian schemes.  Even if you would be willing to bend the rules here, what if this scenario was extended and expanded to a decision involving millions of people?  Entire ethnies?  Nations?  Is justice so easily foregone?  The “hard men” of the “movement” may bluster that they would sacrifice everything for their EGI, and who knows maybe they are right, but Whites in general, with their intense sense of Universalist justice, would be unlikely to go along.  Utilitarianism must be tempered by fairness and justice to create a long-term, evolutionarily stable system amenable to Whites.  Thus, one must introduce concepts of justice – procedural justice according to establish protocols – based on the concepts of fairness, morality, and individual rights, all of which have a strong deontological component and which conflict with the “pure ethic” of unrestrained (teleological) utilitarianism.  In this specific case, the vagabond is set free, and the mayor is arrested, “consequences be damned.”  Note there is no utilitarian justification for this, unless one invokes as a possible teleological argument that the concept of justice benefits everyone since who knows when any individual will one day be faced with a situation similar to the vagabond.  Although justice for the individual in the face of “greater good utilitarian arguments would seem to be pure deontological argumentation, of one argues that, since we are all individuals, a doctrine of individual rights benefits the greatest number (all of us) in the greatest number of possible circumstances (almost infinite), then we come full circle and are faced in a sense by conflicting utilitarianisms: the greatest good for the greatest number, with “number”  as viewed as a collective vs. the greatest good for the greatest number, with “number” viewed as a collection of autonomous individuals.  Collectivists may favor the first, individualists, the second; a “mixed ethic” favors both, by weighing the relative merits of each case (in a manner inevitably deontological).

Salter therefore supports a form of adaptive utilitarianism restrained by a respect for individual rights and for the rights of other ethnies to have the same preservationist opportunities (‘the mixed ethic”) – which is consistent with “universal nationalism”.  Some Nutzi types – who fantasize about “nature red in tooth and claw” and pine away for visions of genocide of “the other” mock Salter’s mixed ethic and claim it is inconsistent with the logical conclusions of EGI (anti-Salterians make similar arguments from an anti-White perspective).  But, Salter I think understands the difference between gross and net genetic interests, and that attempts to maximize genetic interest to an extreme extent (gross calculations) will backfire and end up costing more than any potential benefit (net loss of genetic interest).  The mixed ethic is likely more stable over time, less risky, less of a gamble of an ethny’s precious genetic interest.  One need not “go for broke” with respect to genetic interests.  At times, prudent restraint yields the greatest payoff over time.

Salter admits the possibility of “incoherence” with the mixed ethic – one that interjects rights into the adaptive utilitarian scheme – bit I have argued against it by pointing out that since we are all “others” to someone else, we all benefit by putting limits to the extent that both we  and that someone else can pursue their adaptive interests.  I note that Salter himself makes a similar argument, more on individual and family lines, in that the rule of law provides the stability for everyone to “raise a family and acquire resources” as opposed to an arbitrary law free-for-all where every hand is raised against another.  Thus, the mixed ethnic allows for competition and the core pursuit of genetic interests (equal opportunity but not equal outcomes), but puts limits on this pursuit through a “mantle of rights” that would restrain excesses.  Salter also points out the problem of “bounded rationality” (**) for “classic utilitarianism” – how can we really know, really predict, the ultimate consequences of our acts?  Getting back to my previously states (in other posts) principle of net vs. gross genetic interests, how do we know that a “free-for-all” grasping for maximizing gross genetic interests wouldn’t backfire and harm ourselves, diminishing the final, net accounting of genetic interests?  One could invoke the Hitler case here.  The mixed ethic, by retraining adaptive utilitarianism within reasonable limits, would reduce the risk of wild gambles that place net genetic interests in extreme jeopardy.  Salter’s Table 9.1 summarizes some of these differences. Both pure adaptive utilitarianism and the mixed ethic consider EGI to be morally good, while a rights-centered ethic has no opinion on the subject.  Do ends justify the means for EGI?  The pure adaptive ethnic says yes, the mixed says yes, BUT “constrained by rights,” and the ethic concerned only by rights says no.

It should be clear that I generally support the mixed ethic, and make my own argument in its favor (a variation of Salter’s argument) above.  That said, I am a bit more toward the “pure” side of the spectrum than is Salter. The mixed ethic is good in the vast majority of circumstances, but if one is faced with an existential crisis of genetic interests, then rights must go out the window and the pure ethic applied (whether the current racial crisis for Whites currently merits designation as such an existential crisis I will for now leave to the reader to decide).  Now, one can point out a problem here; going back to my “we’re all in the same boat” argument, what if another group decides that they are in an existential racial genetic interest crisis, and then applies the pure ethic in competition against us Whites?  Two replies.  First, we should always be prepared to defend ourselves against any eventuality (realistically, apart from ourselves and our own tendencies for self-destruction, including ethnonationalist lunacies, the only real long-term threat comes from certain Asiatics); second, if we practice universal nationalism, then we shouldn’t provoke other groups into viewing us as pushing them into an existential crisis (these other groups should have equal awareness not to push us, but they do not seem to have that awareness, taking advantage of current White [mental] weakness to bully our genetic interests).

Let us move on. Salter then considers three important questions, the answers to which are summarized in his Table 9.2, and can thus be discussed with equal brevity here.  Can it be moral for EGI to frustrate other interests?  The pure adaptive utilitarian ethic says yes.  The mixed ethic says yes, but only in defense of EGI or in a competitive expansion that preserves the existence and the genetic continuity of the competitor.  The rights-centered ethic says no.  Should genetic interests, including EGI have absolute priority? The pure ethic: yes. Mixed: no, if EGI conflicts with individual rights (here a compromise needs to be made; this does not mean foregoing EGI, but pursuing EGI, and other genetic interests, in a manner reasonably constrained by other considerations).  The rights ethic: no (only “means” matter, not the consequences). What is the right action when genetic interests conflict?  Pure adaptive utilitarianism: compete within adaptive limits; tights can be ignored, but do not engage in conflict that would destroy yourself as well (net genetic interests!).  Mixed ethic: compete but respect rights. “Live and let live.”  Rights: stop competing, because you are causing harm.  Salter then considers freedom and EGI: the ultimate freedom is that of being allowed to pursue genetic interests, including EGI, equal opportunity, not equal outcomes.  This last part is important, as, again, some of Salter’s critics lie about his alleged support for “genetic stasis” – here Salter agrees with Hamilton’s blunt statement that equality of fitness is impossible.  That of course does not entail genocide against others, or allowing genocide to your own group, or engaging in wild transhumanist schemes to radically change genomes over short time periods, but some genetic change, including eugenics, is consistent with EGI, and completion between groups, constrained by adaptive limits and by basic right, is also legitimate.  If we then accept adaptive utilitarianism, we must accept competition, unequal outcomes, and the fact that, unlike some utopian and non-biological versions of utilitarianism, we realize that “not all utilities are in harmony.”

But we must have the freedom to pursue genetic interests, including EGI, and resist those who would deny us that freedom.  After all, it’s ethical to so pursue, and it is ethical to resist those who would prevent that pursuit.

Notes:

*Likewise, a fair society would have equality of opportunity for education and career advancement, but should not force equality of outcome (which racial and sexual affirmative action attempts); this attempt at social engineering is incompatible with real social and technical progress.  The same principle applies, in evolutionary terms, with attempts to engineer equal fitness outcomes.

**While Salter frames his arguments within the framework of rationality and the Anglosphere empiricist tradition, he also approvingly quotes D.S. Wilson, who concludes:

“It is the person who elevates factual truth above practical truth who must be accused of mental weakness from an evolutionary perspective.”  

That comes after Wilson stated: “Adaption is the gold standard against which rationality must be judged, along with all other forms of thought.”

Indeed, if “irrational’ calls to “national greatness,” palingenetic ultra-nationalism, or Yockey’s “actualizing a High Culture” and Imperium idea motivates for defense of EGI, so be it.  We cannot at the same time praise Wilson’s comments and then, for example, criticize aspects of “fascism” for not always following “objective truths” in ever nitpicking detail.

EGI and National Socialism, Part II

Further analysis of this issue.

In On Genetic Interests, Salter makes some comments about National Socialism, and fascism more generally, from the standpoint of EGI.  It’s worth looking at those.

Salter has some positive things to say about National Socialism: “…a revitalized social policy, full employment, rapid economic growth, an egalitarian class structure, and the salvaging of national pride…” as well as “economic and health benefits” that flowed from its “biological orientation.” But the “crimes” of National Socialism are such that OGI suggests that “an ethnicised constitution” should be abandoned if it necessarily led to such “crimes.”

National Socialism is criticized by Salter for having a sort of “mystical” conception of ethnic and racial differences, a non-scientific and non-statistical belief of completely disjunctive ethnic distinctions – considering (closely related) groups akin to different species.  Thus, Germans are Aryan supermen while Poles are subhumans, even though, particularly on the global scale, these two groups are actually quite similar (albeit not identical, there are differences at the group level – albeit with individual overlap).  Salter instead suggests a “demystified set of propositions based on objective truths revealed by science, truths concerning group identity and group interests, equally valid for all ethnies”  While I essentially agree with Salter, three points: (1) the “movement” as it currently exists really does not care much for such scientific “objective truths;” (2) related to point one, people are often motivated to act – including in their genetic interest  by more irrational ideals; and (3) noting stops an enlightened fascism from incorporating scientific objective truths, if it has the right leadership (although irrational emotion may also be used to motivate the masses…and perhaps the elites as well).

Salter criticizes fascism in general had having defective political institutions, which failed to prevent elite free-riding or constrained ethnic mobilization.  Thus, fascist elites used the escalation of ethnic and national tensions to consolidate their own power, selfishly putting the long-term genetic continuity and social stability of their people at risk for personal gain – or so Salter asserts. That fascist – especially National Socialist – regimes perhaps went too far with ethnic mobilization, overshooting the mark and starting wars with genetically similar neighboring ethnies, is a historical fact.  Salter considers fascism to be a “mass strategic blunder” – a “misdirected and overblown investment by citizens in their ethnies that forced other nations to unite against them.”  There’s some truth to that, but it’s really particularly rue only of Hitler’s Germany, not of fascist movements in general. Salter criticizes Hitler’s quixotic and destructive military adventures, to steal land from others to recreate some sort of Aryan medieval peasant society; without, as Salter asserts, democratic restraints, Hitler was able to force through his vision to the long-term detriment of his own people (and closely related European ethnies).

Essentially, Hitler’s regime was, according to Salter, a genetic interest over-inflated “bubble” (just like an over-heated stock market “bubble”) that burst, leaving Germans (and all other Europeans) worse off than before.  Salter writes: “an economic analogy is the speculative bubble, which can occur anywhere in the fitness portfolio, though risk rises steeply as fitness concentration declines.”  Salter identifies the historic manifestations of fascism in Germany and Italy as such bubbles: “Fascism is an over-investment in national interests at the cost of individual and foreign group interests.”

Salter’s graphs of alternative fitness portfolios shows National Socialism as sacrificing individual and human interests for an inflated investment in ethny; radial Christianity and communism sacrifice all for “humanity” – while of course we know that multiculturalism sacrifices the majority for minority interests.

Thus, while Salter criticizes fascism, he of course has perhaps even more harsh words for Marxism, which sacrificed the blood of its peoples not even to pursue group ethnic interests, but in the service of an anti-biological crazed humanism gone beyond any sane and reasonable limits.  It’s that same impulse that is destroying the West and tis peoples today.  And of course Salter would disapprove of a radical Christianity that ignores EGI; his opposition to multiculturalism as it is practiced by the System is of course well known.

There is some truth to Salter’s criticisms.  However, there is more to “fascism” than the bellicose policies of a Hitler or Mussolini. Other fascisms were more concentrated on improving native interests on the home front, without grant military adventuress abroad.  One could cite Codreanu’s movement in Romania, or fascist manifestations in, say, Spain, Ireland, Hungary, Norway, and the Baltic States.  Even the fascist movements of France and Britain more, at most, concerned with preserving already existing empire built by non-fascist (and even democratic) regimes; those fascisms had no grand schemes of fresh foreign conquests, particularly not against closely related European ethnies.  Thus, one need not correlate fascism with any speculative bubble defined by over-investment in narrow ethny resulting in individual sacrifices in wars to despoil other peoples.  I also note that democracies are not shy about mobilizing individuals to fight for the greater glory of both “principles” (typically humanistic) as well as the class interests of the wealthy.  One can find speculative bubbles in many ideologies, and, indeed as Salter states, throughout the fitness portfolio.

One could easily envision “fascism” that is scientifically accurate, based on objective truths (perhaps spiced up with some mass-mobilizing “irrationality”), so that’s not a major impediment to actualizing such regimes in a manner consistent with long term stability of genetic interests.  More to the point is the problem of defective political institutions, manifested in elite free-riding and runaway ethnic mobilization unrestrained by so-called “democratic checks and balances.”

Democratic institutions, which are favored in OGI, are hardly immune to some of the other defects attributed to fascist regimes.  Elite free-riding is a permanent fixture in liberal democracies, and is in fact one major driving force for the dispossession of Western peoples.  The elite Right globalists want cheap labor at the expense of the majority ethny, while the Left globalists essentially want to “elect a new people” based on mass immigration, so as to consolidate their own hold on power. In multicultural democracies, minority groups free ride on the majority; in more homogenous democratic nations, elite free-riding is both political and socioeconomic.  Runaway ethnic mobilization?  Certainly for minorities in multicultural states.  When the same elites – both native and alien – control all major political parties and control all the major levers of power, then “democratic institutions” are useless.  One could speculate that an “ethnic constitution” could obviate some of these difficulties – but good luck getting that done in the current “democratic” System.  Even so, if there is something fundamentally corrupt about democracy that causes elite free-riding (mendaciously masked as “free elections”), then perhaps an “ethnic constitution” or an “ethnic culture” (another option in OGI) would not be sufficient.

Getting back to national socialist-style fascist regimes, one can ask: can the problem of defective political institutions be solved?  I think yes, if we presume that the “fuhrer principle” is not an essential feature of such regimes.  One could them consider authoritarian/totalitarian political structures that can have checks and balances (e.g. the Soviet regime had power split between Party, KGB, and Army –with Stalin being an aberration) and be responsive to the (properly informed) will of the people.  I have always been intrigued by Fest’s talk of “totalitarian democracy” in his book on Hitler; point is, we can consider “fascism” broadly conceived as a flexible, living ideology and not as a fossilized, history artifact.  In this way, national socialist political structures can be envisioned that can control elite free-riders and constrain ethnic mobilization within reasonable limits. One need not resort to democracy – which has been discredited with the destructive evil of multiculturalism and mass migration – to ensure the stability of any future EGI-based regime.

EGI and National Socialism, Part I

Several definitions and an analysis.

Defining national socialism (small “n” small “s”): A collectivist authoritarian system centered on a race-based palingenetic ultranationalism.

In other words: racial fascism.


A more modern definition: An authoritarian political system that utilizes collectivist organization to promote the ethnic genetic interests of the population, in the context of palingenetic ultranationalism.


Note that, contrary to those who misread Salter’s work, a pursuit of genetic interests is wholly compatible with eugenics (which is traditionally important in national socialism), since a population’s fitness can be enhanced by replacing maladaptive, or even merely less adaptive, alleles with those more optimal. They key in preserving genetic interests in a manner compatible with eugenics is to avoid unnecessarily large and rapid genetic changes; when directed (eugenic) change occurs it should be “just enough” to get achieve the desired goal (and no further)  Superfluous changes and, certainly, large-scale genetic replacement, must be avoided.


In On Genetic Interests, Salter is critical of historical National Socialism and Fascism as vehicles for genetic interests, and his criticisms have some validity.  In particular, Hitler was a reckless gambler with the genetic interests of the German people, endangering long-term stability in a quixotic quest to colonize Eastern Europe and set up a Germanic archaeo-futurist peasant society on the lands of Russia and Ukraine.


However, the historical actualization , in a given place in a given time, by flawed leadership, of particular political philosophies does not logically lead one to conclude that the underlying political philosophy itself is either good or bad for a specific purpose. What political philosophy extant since WWII has proven itself capable of preserving Western genetic interests?  None.  One can also point out that certain inter-war fascisms, such as Condreanu’s Legionary movement, were not based in a foundation of hegemonic militarism, but were rather focused on internal renewal and thus did not characterize reckless gambling with national genetic interests.  So to my mind national socialism/fascism, correctly implemented, are still “in the running” as political systems capable of promoting EGI.

What about the argument that these “extreme” political philosophies are unrealistic, that “the average White person won’t accept them.”   Let’s be realistic, and not the crazed dreamers mocked by Roger Griffin in his works on fascism.  The most minimal objectives of racial nationalism – even stringent ethnonationalism – are today completely unrealistic and would be rejected by the large majority of Whites.  However, if – and that is a big if – these objectives could ever be realized, it would be during and after a period of extreme crisis, a collapse (slow or fast, partial or complete) of the System, a situation in which Whites driven to the wall by dispossession and the hostility of the now-decaying System, would be willing to listen to reason.  At this time, the sheeple will be considerably less picky about what forms of government they would, or would not, be willing to accept.  Also keep in mind Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other name” admonition – if the tenets of national socialism are actualized under some other name, fine, if it’s called Futurist Collectivism or Western Patriotism or Klassen’s Racial Socialism, or something else entirely, all well and good.  And if the lemmings are at such a condition they would not care if they rallied behind overtly named national socialism, all well and good as well.


This discussion will most likely continue in future posts.