To oppose HBD-Nordicist theories about “Hajnal lines” and “high trust northern hunter gatherers” (I suppose these days “steppe ancestry” is even more important to these types than is WHG), I suggest a new theoretical paradigm for intra-European differences in ethnocentrism – Racial Proximity Theory.
Consistent with my Occam’s Razor ideal that one should not over-complexify theories, and should instead aim for the most direct and simple ideas that have sufficient explanatory power (*), Racial Proximity Theory is indeed more simple than its competitors.
Thus, I suggest that European groups whose ethnogenesis took place farther away from non-Whites, i.e., a greater geographic distance from Afro-Asia, would tend to exhibit relatively less inter-racial hostility but relatively greater intra-racial hostility; in contrast, European groups whose ethnogenesis took place closer to, or at, the periphery of Europe, geographically close to Afro-Asia, would tend to exhibit greater inter-racial hostility than intra-racial hostility.
Thus, Northwest Europeans had an ethnogenesis relatively more isolated from contact with non-European groups and in their case hostile contact with outgroups were for the most part with other Europeans. Here, we would suppose that Northwest Europeans would tend to have a weakened negative response to non-White, non-European, peoples, since there has been little selective pressure and adaptive value in identifying and opposing radically different peoples. On the other hand, therehasbeen selective pressure in identifying and opposing peoples who are similar but distinct.
On the other hand, Southern and Eastern Europeans have been, historically, on the “front lines” in conflicts with Afro-Asia, and thus there has been selective pressure for identifying and opposing radically different peoples. There was also selective pressure for identifying and opposing similar but distinct peoples as well, since Southern and Eastern Europe had conflicts with other Europeans as well as with the Global South. So, there may be relatively greater overall ethnocentrism in Southern and Eastern Europe, but with most of it targeted toward non-Whites. In contrast, the relatively lesser ethnocentrism of Northwest Europeans is disproportionately targeted against other Europeans; hence in Northwest Europe we observe tearful welcomes for Afro-Asiatic migrant invaders coupled to sneering contempt for the “greasy wogs” of Europe’s South and East.
Thus, Racial Proximity Theory is asscoated with the relative amount of ethnocentric hostility toward racial (and sub-racial and ethnic) outgroups in nearest geographic and historical proximity. Another example would be the (“Outer Hajnal”) Irish, who seem relatively ethnocentric for Northwest Europeans, but who reserve their primary animus toward the English (and Scots-Irish) with whom they’ve feuded for centuries. Here, with Ireland in Europe’s extreme northwest, and with virtually no historic contact with non-Whites or even with many other more distant European groups, Irish hostility is primarily aimed at (“Inner Hajnal”) Northwest Europeans. The more isolated a group’s ethnogenesis, the more likely that their ethnocentrism is targeted to their closest immediate neighbors. The behavior of the (Irish) Kennedy family in America is instructive as well – “sticking it to the Anglos” with mass immigration, thus favoring non-Whites.
It is theoretically possible that the opposite is true – one could suggest that those evolving closer to more alien groups would be more “resistant” to them and would be less “triggered.” But that is not consistent with actual ethnic behavior. And we must distinguish between simple “fear/threat” responses (such as amygdala activation), and triggers of more complex and actualized ethnocentric responses (or the lack thereof). It may well be that Northwest Europeans do have a larger “fear” trigger response to non-Whites than do Southern or Eastern Europeans, but if the former still exhibit xenophilia to non-Whites, then the “fear” response is not what we should be measuring here. We need to instead look more for markers of ingroup/outgroup identification, complex behavioral responses to outgroups, etc. We are therefore considering pathological altruism vs. ethnocentrism rather than “fear” triggers per se.
Another possible objection to this theory is that ingroup vs. outgroup is more “digital” and discrete than “analog” and continuous, more of an “all or nothing” response. This objection would assert that Northwest Europeans are simply less ethnocentric in general and that the identity of the outgroup doesn’t matter. This, however, doesn’t match actual ethnic behavior – the welcoming attitude of Northwest Europeans to the Global South contrasted to their sneering hostility toward other Europeans. One could, for example, contrast German hyper-xenophilia for Afro-Asiatic migrants, Turks, etc. with their contemptuous hostility toward, e.g., Greeks during the debt crisis. That is just one example of many. There is a very strong “narcissism of small differences” behavioral pattern among ethnies that enthusiastically welcome the most alien of peoples but who at the same time shun fellow Europeans. “Polish plumbers” led to Brexit, but Rotherham leads to more Commonwealth immigration. The enthusiasm of some Nordicists for Asians may fit this pattern as well.
If we assume that this is an inborn trait and not merely cultural, one could evaluate differences in behavior and/or brain activity in psychometric testing scenarios exposing persons (including children) of different ethnies to various outgroup “threat” subjects. But the details of actual testing of the theory is beyond the scope of this post (a post that is theoretical in nature) and it is not my area of expertise. Others would be better suited to devise legitimate tests of the hypothesis.
*This is where clueless critics of Occam’s Razor go wrong when they complain that “the simplest ideas are not always correct” – implying that Occam’s Razor is about always going for the simplest theory in every possible context. No, it is instead about not multiplying entities beyond necessity – emphasis on the word necessity. If theory A is more complex than theory B, but A effectively describes the phenomenon and B does not, then obviously we should go with A. But if A and C both explain the phenomenon, but C is much more complex than A, with all sorts of superfluous add-ons, then this suggests that A is more likely (not definitively, but more likely) to be the better explanation. The more parsimonious explanation that can explain the phenomenon is more likely to be true compared to one that is unnecessarily complex.