Category: beanbag genetics

Genetic Interests vs. Inclusive Fitness

A distinction.

In On Genetic Interests, Salter makes a careful distinction between genetic interests and inclusive fitness:

Genetic interest is not inclusive fitness…

Genetic interests are:

…the numbers of copies of an individual’s distinctive genes.

I would rephrase that a bit to “distinctive genetic information” so as to include genetic structure, genetic integration, etc. – higher levels of genetic information as opposed to the “beanbag” genetics counting of gene copies. In contrast, inclusive fitness is:

 …the effect of an individual’s behavior on the reproduction of his distinctive genes in himself and others (usually kin and fellow ethnics).

Genetic interests are innate while inclusive fitness depends upon behavior and choices made.  A person always has a certain amount of genetic interests but if they act to promote those interests than their inclusive fitness is positive, if they do nothing their inclusive fitness is zero, and if they act against their genetic interests then their inclusive fitness would be negative.

Salter gives examples of this in his book; I’m not going to repeat that here. You should have the book and look it up yourself. What I want to do here is link these concepts to my idea of gross vs. net genetic interests.

The “raw” genetic interests, as defined by Salter, are in a sense the “gross genetic interests” but the actual final outcome of genetic interests, the net genetic interests, is influenced by inclusive fitness and any other factors affecting genetic interests. Thus:

Net genetic interests = gross genetic interests +/- inclusive fitness possibilities and other factors affecting genetic interests.

Net genetic interests are the end result of what the genetic interests are when all factors are considered that influence the gain or loss of genetic interests. Gross genetic interests would be the innate, theoretically (but not practically) maximally possible, optimal level of genetic interests, independent of real world influences and independent of costs/benefit considerations leading to decisions on how to actualize inclusive fitness in pursuit of genetic interests.  

A lack of understanding of gross vs. net genetic interests can lead to problems. This can take place even within a narrow ethny.  An English nationalist may become obsessed with the very minor genetic differences between East and West England and/or North and South England and believe that full maximization of ethnic genetic interests would be to separate England and the English people along those lines and to focus only on that area most aligned to your genetics. One can easily see how this attempt to maximize gross genetic interests by pursuing tiny diminishing returns of genetic distinctiveness can be damaging at the level of net genetic interests. Such an absurd pursuit of genetic interests would divide the English people against themselves, destroying the organic solidarity of the nation, weakening them, and making them all more vulnerable to outsiders who are more genetically divergent. In this case, the narrow pursuit of optimal gross genetic interests would constitute a negative inclusive fitness, decreasing net genetic interests, while taking a more practical approach in supporting the entire English ethny would be a positive inclusive fitness, leading to increased net genetic interests. When genetic distinctiveness is very small and especially in the context of competition with more genetically divergent others, one maximizes the net payoff of genetic interests by ignoring tiny differences and realizing that, in contrast to more alien peoples, you have significant genetic interests in closely related groups, and cooperation with such closely related groups can also enhance the well-being of even your most narrow group.

Likewise, in a global context, petty nationalist ethnonationalism may seem a way to maximize ethnic genetic interests by investing all of your higher-level (e.g., ethny-level) inclusive fitness efforts only on your specific ethnic group. But if the well-being of that group is, in the long term, best served by inclusion in a race-based nationalism (e.g. pan-European White nationalism), then the narrow focus on ethnonationalism could actually be detrimental to ethnic genetic interests and reflective of a negative inclusive fitness. Add to that the reality that distinctive genetic information exists on the racial, as well as the ethnic, level, then focusing on ethnonationalism excludes the genetic interests at a higher group level and is again reflective of negative inclusive fitness. We can then add to the equation the possibility of kinship overlap between members of closely related ethnies belonging to the same race and once again a strict petty nationalist focus can be maladaptive. In these cases, net genetic interests are best served by adding racial nationalism to ethnic nationalism, while the gross genetic interests would be the theoretical maximization of genetic interests by focusing on a narrower unit (putting aside the problem of kinship overlap and of deciding what narrower unit is actually the one you should genetically identify with). The overall factors favor inclusive fitness serving net genetic interests; such inclusive fitness is positive while those that do not serve net genetic interests are zero or are negative. Thus, positive inclusive fitness serving net genetic interests for Whites is represented by pan-Europeanism, while zero or negative inclusive fitness is represented by petty nationalist ethnonationalism.

Fst vs. Genetic Kinship

A comparison.

I would like to provide a crude, very simplified, but useful, explanation of Fst vs direct measures of genetic kinship, and again state my preference for the latter.

Let us start with Fst, which is a measure of how to divide genetic variation within or between groups. Consider two populations A and B (these each can also be considered subpopulations of the entire A+B total population).  We can consider the total genetic variation of A+B, at whatever alleles evaluated, and then ask how much of that is due to genetic variation within each (sub)population and how much is due to genetic differences between these (sub)populations.  Thus, the total genetic variation can be apportioned to the within vs. between components, and the between component is the Fst.  It stands to reason that if A and B are genetically similar then the between fraction will be small and hence Fst low, since very little of the total genetic variation of A+B is due to A vs.B. On the other hand, if A and B are more genetically distant then a greater proportion of the total genetic variation is explained by the differences of A vs. B and hence Fst will be higher. We can see that Fst is therefore a direct measure of relative genetic variation but an indirect measure of genetic differentiation and distance.

Genetic kinship asks something somewhat different. Here we are determining how many of the gene sequences of A and B, at whatever alleles evaluated, are the same and how many are different.  This is a direct measure of genetic similarity (and differentiation/distance) – thus a direct measure of genetic kinship between the genomes studied. The genetic kinship can be measured relative to some background level and/or to various other groups, and one could then ascertain relative levels of genetic kinship, whether it is greater than background (a positive value) or less (a negative value).  One could also rank groups, and compare individuals to groups (or to each other), and measure genetic kinship for all of these comparisons.  It is genetic kinship that is directly related to ethnic genetic interests and thus genetic kinship is biopolitically relevant.

Harpending demonstrated the relationship between Fst and genetic kinship and how the former could be used to get some sort of measure of the latter.  However, just measuring genetic kinship directly is best, without needing to go through the Fst intermediary and dealing with issues affecting the Fst measures, such as the dependence of Fst on subpopulation (e.g., A vs. B) heterozygosity (and of course which (sub) populations are chosen for the comparison).

Further, the relationship, such as it is, between Fst and genetic kinship is likely only relevant at the lowest level of genetic integration, at the level of allele by allele “beanbag genetics” analysis (considering elementary genic differences).  If one looks at higher levels of genetic integration, the relationship may break down. It is always best to just look directly at genetic kinship – how similar are gene sequences (lowest level of genetic integration) or how similar are genetic structures (e.g., correlations of genetic sequences) (higher levels of genetic integration).  

Direct measures of genetic kinship tell us what we really want to know – how similar or different we are to others, genetically speaking, who is more or less our genetic kin.  Yes, you can do a “work around” with Fst or other measures, but why should we need to do that, with all of the possible problems and limitations that may ensue?  Just measure genetic kinship.

Genetic Structure and Altruistic Self-Sacrifice

A more precise accounting is required.

We are all aware of Haldane’s oft-quoted assertion that he would lay down his life for two brothers or eight cousins, the genetic payoff of such altruistic self-sacrifice being the equivalence – as measured by ”bean-bag” genetics – of the numbers of gene copies between these sets of relatives.

In general, I am in broad agreement with the sentiment, although as we shall see, it requires modification.  Even more broadly, those on the Far Right invoke this paradigm to support the idea of altruistic self-sacrifice in favor of larger numbers of an ethny, in defense if ethnic genetic interests.  Likewise, I support that as well, with the proper modifications as with the smaller-scale examples of familial relatives.

Even though at first glance, Haldane’s reasoning seems sound, likely most people would be hesitant to follow that advice.  In large part, this is the natural impulse of self-preservation, but there are other reasonable objections that can be made.

One could argue, all else being equal, that judging between two sets of equivalent genetics, it’s better to preserve yourself for reasons of control.  A person concerned enough with genetic continuity that they would consider such altruistic self-sacrifice is someone likely to start a family, care for children, and properly actualize the continuity. Can you be sure your two brothers would do the same?  Why are they in the position that they need your sacrifice to begin with?  Are they stupid?  Reckless? Are you sure they’ll act in support of your (in this case indirect) genetic continuity with the same vigor you would do for yourself?  So, to be safe, maybe you need to raise the bar for self-sacrifice to three brothers or ten cousins?

A more important reason, and one that may be intuitively sensed by most people even though they wouldn’t be able to explain it, or likely even articulate their feeling about it, is that there is more about kinship than mere numbers of gene copies.  Genetic structure is important – what genes are coinherited and, to the layman’s eye, what phenotypic traits (derived from those genes) are inherited together.  Of course, family is going to be more similar here than (co-ethnic) strangers, but similarity is not identity.  Even with siblings (apart from identical twins, which are a special case), recombination and independent assortment will ensure that your brothers will have a distinct genetic stricture from you.  Now, granted, these same processed, even with a co-ethnic mate, will ensure that your children will also have a different genetic structure than you, but, all else being equal, your brothers’ children will be more unlike you, with respect to genetic structure, than your own children, as the “starting point” (you vs. your brothers) is already different. So, when genetic structure is taken into account, two brothers are not really your genetic equivalent.  Apart from an identical twin, you have no genetic equivalent, just degrees of relative similarity and difference, even after numbers of gene copies are accounted for.  Then how many brothers are sufficient for self-sacrifice?  This requires a more rigorous analysis, which will be dependent upon accurate measures of genetic structure, and that’s not something we can expect SJW population geneticists are likely to do. However, while the overall Haldane argument – and its Salterian extension – makes sense the numbers given based on “bean bag” genetics is going to be an underestimation of where you need to draw the line in sacrificing yourself for others.  On the other hand, the reverse is true – if you have to choose between your brothers and strangers, or between co-ethnics and non-ethnics, taking genetic structure into account means that helping your brothers and your co-ethnics is even more important than before, because in comparison to more genetically alien peoples, genetic structure amplifies how much more close you are to your brothers and your co-ethnics.  It’s a double-edged sword: it makes your own preservation a bit more important, but it also makes the preservation of those more similar to you more important than those more distant.

Now, one can argue that after several generations of recombination and independent assortment – even assuming endogamous mating within the ethny – genetic structures derived from your posterity and those of your brothers will be more or less the same, converging on the common pool of ethny-specific genetic structures.  So, while in the first generation, your offspring and that of your brothers may be distinct with respect to genetic structure, that difference would be attenuated over time and, as long as endogamous mating is maintained, your posterity and theirs would reflect similar genetic structures.  But there are problems here.  First, a rigorous analysis is required; perhaps some differences would continue over at least several generations; even if these differences are small, they nevertheless would need to be accounted for.  Second, if it is true that familial genetic strictures would tend, over time, to converge on more generalized ethny-specific structures, then why bother favoring two brothers over two random co-ethnics?  The brothers would share more of your genes, yes, and be more similar as far as genetic structure, but if one invokes “long term intergenerational effects” with respect to questioning the need to account for structure in modifying Haldane’s argument, then one can use the same “intergenerational effect” to directly question Haldane’s original premise.  The answer I believe is that one must do the best they can at a given time in maximizing their genetic payoff, and hope that subsequent generations do the same. In the absence of the required analysis, one can simply argue that looking to the next generation, differences in genetic structure are important and, hence, two brothers are not quite the genetic equivalence of yourself.  Your structure is different from theirs and the genetic payoff of your reproduction is greater for your than both of theirs combined.  So, maybe you need to hold out and sacrifice for three (or more) brothers instead, including for the other reason outlined above. Note that these fine points deal with very close genetic similarity.  When we are talking about racially alien peoples, the genetic distance becomes even more amplified with genetic structure, and in the absence of panmixia, ethny-specific patterns of genetic structure are broadly stable over evolutionary time (we can see that the Iceman is genetically more similar to Europeans than to, say, Asians  of Africans, as one example).

In the absence of the sort of careful quantitative analysis that population geneticists won’t do, from a qualitative standpoint, it would be prudent to require more of a genetic payoff before engaging in Haldane-style altruistic self-sacrifice.  On the other hand, when considering a choice in investing between two genetic entities, picking the group genetically closer to you is even more important when considering genetic structure.  So, when the choice is between self vs. family or family vs. ethny, genetic structure will require a larger genetic payoff before agreeing to sacrifice the interests of the former for the latter. However, when considering a relative choice between ethny one vs. ethny two, genetic structure means that choosing the more similar-to-you ethny is even more important than with “bean-bag” genetics.  

The overall Salterian imperative remains the same as before, once these adjustments are made.