Category: Salter

The Salterian Ethics of Imperium

Analyzing the worldview of Francis Parker Yockey through the prism of Salterian ethics.

Previously, I discussed the ethics of EGI and of genetic interests in general (“Salterian ethics”) and would now like to discuss how those ethics can be utilized to judge a proposed biopolitical project – Francis Parker Yockey’s  idea of Imperium (a pan-European empire), as outlined in his book by that name. I had, some years ago, attempted to synthesize the world views of Salter and Yockey with respect to the genetic/biological and political considerations – essentially tracking with the first two sections of Salter’s On Genetic Interests, and now I will focus on ethical considerations, which was the topic of the last third of Salter’s book.

In my previous TOQ essay focusing on Salter and Yockey, I explained the difference between gross and net genetic interests, although I did not use those terms:

Alternatively, consider the possibility that a future, very finely grained, autosomal genetic analysis would show a clear distinctiveness between East and West England. A very narrow pursuit of ethnic genetic interest may suggest that the East and West English separate to form new ethnostates and that members of those groups should consider themselves distinct ethnies, not intermarry, etc. However, the costs of such a scenario need to be balanced against the relatively small extra gain in raw genetic interest obtained. This pursuit of narrow regional intra-national genetic interest would result in a disruption of the organic solidarity of the English nation and people; if this disruption makes the English—all of them, East and West—more vulnerable to foreign interests and intrusive demographic expansions, then the costs would outweigh the benefits. Likewise, the legitimate pursuit of intra-Western genetic interests and particularisms needs to be balanced against the possible costs incurred by not presenting a united front against other civilizational concentrations of genetic interest.

The “…very narrow pursuit of ethnic genetic interest” that “may suggest that the East and West English separate to form new ethnostates” would be an example of a pursuit of gross genetic interests – a naïve attempt to maximize EGI without consideration of costs vs. benefits. Taking a broader view, and considering that larger entities may be able to better defend the genetic interests of the populace can lead to optimization of net genetic interests – maximization of EGI when costs and benefits are balanced out.

Yockey’s words…in Imperium are relevant here:

The touching of this racial-frontier case of the Negro, however, shows to Europe a very important fact—that race-difference between White men, which means Western men, is vanishingly small in view of their common mission of actualizing a High Culture. In Europe, where hitherto the race difference between, say, Frenchman and Italian has been magnified to great dimensions, there has been no sufficient reminder of the race-differences outside the Western Civilization. Adequate instruction along this line would apparently have to take the form of occupation of all Europe, instead of only part of it, by Negroes from America and Africa, by Mongols and Turkestan! from the Russian Empire . . .

If any Westerner thinks that the barbarian makes nice distinctions between the former nations of the West, he is incapable of understanding the feelings of populations outside a High Culture toward that culture . . .

. . . But the greatest opposition of all has not yet been named, the conflict which will take up all the others into itself. This is the battle of the Idea of the Unity of the West against the nationalism of the 19th century. Here stand opposed the ideas of Empire and petty-stateism, large-space thinking and political provincialism. Here find themselves opposed the miserable collection of yesterday-patriots and the custodians of the Future. The yesterdaynationalists are nothing but the puppets of the extra-European forces who conquer Europe by dividing it. To the enemies of Europe, there must be no rapprochement, no understanding, no union of the old units of Europe into a new unit, capable of carrying on 20th century politics . . .

. . . Against a united Europe, they could never have made their way in, and only against a divided Europe can they maintain themselves. Split! divide! distinguish!—this is the technique of conquest. Resurrect old ideas, old slogans, now quite dead, in the battle to turn European against European.

Yockey argues that dividing Europeans against themselves, which in the context of an EGI perspective would be an unfettered pursuit of gross genetic interests regardless of the costs, would benefit only the enemies of Europe (and of Europeans) – hence, again from an EGI perspective, net genetic interests would be damaged. Thus, even though Yockey was arguing form a High Culture (and geopolitical) perspective, his comments can be reinterpreted as being consistent with a concern for net EGI as opposed to a blind pursuit of gross EGI.  From the standpoint of Salterian ethics, a focus on net EGI is reasonable, particularly from a “mixed ethic” perspective that also includes concerns for proximate interests (e.g., actualizing a High Culture).

See this for more on Yockey’s racial views, a topic that is relevant to the current analysis. Yockey’s views on race, taken at literal face value, are not very compatible with EGI. If, however, we interpret Yockey as being concerned with eschewing overly disjunctive divisions among (Western) Europeans, and if we view that in the context of preservation of net generic interests by fostering pan-European solidarity vs. outside threats, the seemingly stark incompatibility between Yockey and EGI essentially vanishes.  

My concept of “The EGI Firewall” is useful in these discussions. The firewall establishes the “floor” – the minimum acceptable EGI (or genetic interests more generally) consideration that absolutely must be incorporated into any sociopolitical scenario.  Thus, there is an absolute boundary beyond which one cannot cross without so seriously compromising EGI that the relevant proposal must be rejected.  For example, any scheme that would flood Europe with large numbers of non-Europeans would be completely unacceptable from any reasonable scenario that considers EGI as important and that incorporates Salterian ethics.  There has to be some foundation of EGI for any political project. The question is – where should this boundary be? There is of course no purely objective answer to that question, although the scenario just given does provide an example where most adaptively-minded Europeans would agree that the boundary has clearly been crossed. Of course, the scenario given is precisely the situation being actualized into reality today with the globalist EU and mass migration; it is certainly not merely some theoretical exercise.

From my essay on Salterian ethics:

Salter compares three ethics – pure adaptive utilitarianism (PAU), mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU), and the rights-centered ethic (RCE).

Obviously, the RCE would reject both Yockeyism and a biopolitical system based on EGI as damaging “individual rights.”  But the focus of this essay is to evaluate how Yockeyism can be incorporated into Salterian ethics (and vice versa), so the RCE, which is incompatible with Salterian ethics, is irrelevant. We are therefore left with the PAU and MAU ethics.

We can now consider the PAU and MAU.  From the perspective of gross genetic interests, one may question the appropriateness of Yockeyism for the PAU, as the PAU would lead one to favor “smaller is better” micro-states, independent of the effects of that choice on the long term stability of the genetic continuity of the peoples involved.  However, from the perspective of net genetic interests, if Yockeyism maximizes the power of the peoples involved through the establishment of a European Imperium, thus protecting these peoples from outside threats, then Yockeyism could be compatible with PAU. That would hold IF the system set up can safeguard the uniqueness of its constituent peoples. This safeguarding could be accomplished via the acceptance of a degree of local sovereignty (that Yockey agreed with) and the preservation of borders, with the Imperium being a confederation of nations and regions, each preserving their particular biological and cultural characteristics. One would in this case reject a single borderless state in which national and regional identities are erased and in which ethnic distinctiveness is lost via panmixia.  In order for this scenario to be stable long term, this characteristic of the Imperium – the preservation of the unique characteristics of its constituent parts – would need to be considered an absolutely fundamental and unalterable keystone of the state’s raison d’etre.  This is the EGI Firewall discussed above – a minimum absolute requirement for preservation of EGI, even at “lower” levels, as part of any political and social projects that are actualized.  I note that civilizational blocs are proposed by Salter in his book as one approach for protecting EGI, so the idea is not by its nature incompatible with EGI; it is a question of implementation.

Thus, Yockeyism could be compatible with PAU ethics under conditions such as described above, and with a firm understanding of net vs. gross genetic interests.

If Yockeyism could be compatible with the PAU, then it certainly can be compatible with the MAU, since the latter allows for other (proximate) interests, besides the ultimate interests of genetic interests, to be considered and actualized into policy, as long as the fundamental rights of genetic continuity are not abrogated. Here we see that an enlightened PAU that considers net genetic interests begins to converge onto the MAU, if the proximate interests under consideration are such that could actually contribute to EGI in some manner (e.g., actualizing a High Culture, as opposed to a mere concern for “individual rights).

So Yockeyism, with the proper caveats, and from the net genetic interests respective, could indeed be compatible with Salterian ethics.


Where to Donate?

A thought experiment.

Imagine an extremely wealthy White individual who wanted to donate money to causes that promoted the interests of European-derived peoples.

Where could they donate so that the money would be effectively used?

Apart from helping out with Salter’s research, always a noble cause, I cannot think of a single activity, group, blog, political party, or “movement leader” worth investing in, either here in America or abroad.  Not one. The moderately wealthy Regnery has funded certain activities, but, I myself do not see any of those activities as worthy.

There is nothing, absolutely nothing, a terrible indictment of Der Movement and its failed leadership.

Are we then surprised that some individuals, in desperation, likely feeling abandoned by the Quota Queen Tin Cup Brigade and their shameless panhandling for “D’Nations,” destroy themselves with foolish activities?

So, this thought experiment confirms what this blog has been saying for a long time – Der Movement is a pathetic failure and a complete waste, and, hence, there is currently nothing in the “movement” really worth investing in. Supporting certain aspects of relevant academic research would be good, as mentioned above, but as regards direct political and metapolitical activism, there is nothing.


Building the ideal activist.

Imagine trying to build the ideal White racial nationalist out of the attributes of different individuals, akin to how the Frankenstein monster was built out of the body parts of different individuals. We can call this creation Frankennutzi.

We can mix the pan-Europeanism of Francis Parker Yockey, Oswald Mosley, Norman Lowell, and Ted Sallis; the futurism of Marinetti; the radicalism of William Pierce; the intelligence of Kevin Strom; the optics of Jared Taylor; the gravitas and seriousness of Revilo Oliver; the scientific understanding of Ted Sallis; the ethnological insights of Frank Salter; the prescience and judgment of Ted Sallis; the JQ attitude of MacDonald; and the sexual realism of Roger Devlin.

We can also consider the reverse.


The humility of Richard Spencer; the tolerance of criticism, ethnonationalism, judgment, and traditionalism of Greg Johnson; the class, elegance, and sexual restraint of Donald Trump; the trustworthiness of Silver; the rampant masculinity of James O’Meara, the fiscal responsibility of David Duke; the maturity and optics of Anglin, TRS, and the cosplay crowd; the science of Greg Cochran and Richard Lynn; the Nordicism of Hans Gunther, William Pierce, and Richard McCulloch; the gravitas of Parrott and Heimbach; the racial science of Durocher; the seriousness of Roissy; the attitude toward Asians of Majority Rights; the intelligence of the current crop of Counter-Currents writers; the racial loyalty of John Derbyshire; the JQ attitude of Zman; and, well, you get the picture.

Salterian Ethics

“We charge you in the name of God, take heed.”

This essay is about the oft-ignored and much-neglected final third of Dr. Frank Salter’s classic work On Genetic Interests, a book that, in my opinion, is of such import that Salter should win a Nobel Prize for this work.

The book is divided into three major sections. The first described what genetic interests and ethnic genetic interests (EGI) are, how they can be measured, and what their import is, and how some objections to these concepts can be answered. The second section studies the political and social ramifications of genetic interests and the EGI concept, and how these concepts could be incorporated into practical biopolitics. The last third of the book deals with the ethics of pursuing genetic interests in opposition to the genetic interests of others and in opposition to the proximate interests (genetic interests being ultimate interests for evolved organisms) of others.

The ethical component of Salter’s work has been ignored by a Left that presents a defamatory strawman representation of EGI as promoting “genocide and rape.”  Obviously then, Salter’s careful arguments, and his advocacy of a “mixed ethic” that incorporates individual rights, is anathema to mendacious trash who wish to misrepresent the contents of Salter’s book. Some on the Far Right either ignore or mock this section of Salter’s book because these people actually do advocate genocide and rape (or at least the former) and they characterize the ethical section of the book as an unnecessary politically correct add-on, something purely subjective, and in some cases they engage in some defamation of their own by characterizing Salter’s ethical concerns as “squid ink” to hide the true “nature red in tooth and claw” agenda of On Genetic Interests (projection, perhaps).

I myself have not paid enough attention to this section of the book.  As a STEM person with an interest in population genetics and in empirical determinations of ethnic and racial interests, obviously I found the first part of the book riveting; as a White nationalist who wants to achieve certain political objectives based on EGI, it is equally obvious that the second part of the book was also of extreme interest to me.  Philosophy and ethics are not my strong suit and although I agree with most of what Salter wrote in that section of the book (unlike some of his foaming-at-the-mouth Nutzi critics), I have heretofore not given that section sufficient attention.  I hope to begin the process of rectifying that error here.

As Salter emphasizes, morality is basically an approach for adjudicating conflicts of interests. E.O. Wilson described human behavior as “…the circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been and will be kept intact.” In relation to that goal, he asserted: “Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate function.”  This is in accord with the view – promoted by Salter and myself – that genetic interests are ultimate interests. How could it be otherwise for evolved organisms whose reproduction – indeed, whose representation among the informational content of reality – is essentially dependent upon and constituted by “genetic material?”  Or more basically by the information encoded in that “genetic material?”

At this point, a brief detour is in order to distinguish “factual truth” from practical truth.” According to D.S. Wilson: “It is the person who elevates factual truth above practical truth who must be accused of mental weakness from an evolutionary perspective.”  As a man of science, I have been trained to value factual truth, and that is part of the Western tradition; indeed, it has antecedents in the Classical Civilization of Europe.  However, there is truth (both factual and practical!) in D.S. Wilson’s comment.  If we merge the assertions of the two Wilsons together, we can say that practical truth is evolutionarily paramount if and when it acts to promote the ultimate interest of genetic continuity.  

An example from “movement activism” can clarify how an example of hypocritical racial cant confuses factual and practical truth, and further, how adherence to the genetic interests of racial aliens uses a denial of factual truth to also impede practical truth. A certain “activist” (*) wrote: “Individual and ethnic amour-propre is a powerful motivator in the face of emotionally hurtful facts and hypotheses.”  But that criticism falls flat if the motivation in question reflects the practical truths that promote ultimate interests.  This individual himself is proof of this, given his reticence to extend his alleged interest in “emotionally hurtful facts and hypotheses” to those ethnies he values and identifies with.  As a Nordicist HBDer who distorts racial science and racial history for his transparent agendas, he is as guilty as anyone else in utilizing practical truth and dismissing factual truth. However, any European-derived person who promotes HBD is acting against, not for, their ultimate interests, as they instead promote the ultimate interests of Jews and Asians. In this case, practical truth is used in the service of someone else’s ultimate interests. Why such genetic treason is practiced is for the traitor to explain. Whatever the reason, this agenda is the denial of factual truth (i.e., dishonesty) in the service of the denial of practical truth for Europeans (i.e., race treason).  

Now we will begin to consider the main points of Salter’s arguments about the ethics of EGI. Salter wrote:

…we make moral judgements of great consequence, and must do so if we are to decide conflicts of interests.  Choices are also forced in the game of life, every day genetic interests being won or squandered. A commentator who fails to advise people on how to defend their most precious assets is, by default, advocating the status quo, with its winner and losers.

One can contrast teleological or consequentialist ethics such as utilitarianism with deontological ethics.  In the former, an act is morally right dependent upon its outcome; thus we ask – are its effects desirable?  In the later, acts are moral based on some defined rules or traditions; here the act is considered good or bad in and of itself, independent of its effects.  Teleological ethics are best suited for consideration of EGI, since we need to judge the consequences of various outcomes derived from conflicts involving genetic interests (e.g., competing genetic interests, genetic interests vs. proximate interests, or the specialized case of the latter of genetic interests vs. individual rights).

Obviously, and as Salter rightly points out, teleological ethnics have to have at some point a deontological component; after all, to label an outcome as “desirable” means that this consequence, this effect, has to be judged as morally right, as morally good, on its own merits.  Here we are evaluating the merits of the consequence itself, not the act that led to the consequence.  Thus, at some point in the analysis, a value judgement has to be made. Salter discusses various options for what this morally good consequence should be, including Mill’s idea of the morally optimal act being one that maximizes happiness for the greatest number.  However, “happiness” is a proximate interest that may not be in the best interests of an individual, group, or society; thus, maladaptive acts such as drug use leading to addiction may result in (at least short-term) happiness. Is that morally good?  Genetic interests are ultimate interests, and fitness can be an objective measure of a consequence that an evolutionarily informed individual (or society) can consider morally good.  

Obviously, this is a matter of values, and Salter has always admitted that “who cares?” is a riposte to genetic interests that cannot be refuted without addressing values. I’d like to point out though that those interested in promoting their genetic interests will outcompete and replace those who are not. In the long-term, disinterest in genetic interests is not evolutionarily stable. So, such a disinterest would be a quite strange “morally good ethic” in that it dooms itself to extinction. If someone has a value system in which self-destructive values are prized then that is their prerogative; others who value continuity of both their bioculture and their values would be well served to promote their genetic interests.  Salter also notes that proximate interests are best optimized rather than maximized; for example, a person who is “too happy” may become less prudent, jeopardizing well-being.  On the other hand, ultimate interests are different; these interests are adaptive when maximized (note: maximized in the net sense).  Thus, Salter states: “One cannot be too well adapted.” 

Careful readers may believe that quote is inconsistent with my distinction between gross and net genetic interests, and my comments (here and previously) that a too-aggressive pursuit of ever-diminishing returns of genetic interest can be counter-productive.  But there is no inconsistency because Salter’s quote makes being adapted the primary issue, not the mechanisms used to pursue that goal. Adaptiveness here is in terms of net genetic interests. In other words, maximizing adaptiveness is good, but attempting to maximize the pursuit of genetic interests, in every circumstance and regardless of context, can result in sub-optimal adaptiveness if that attempt backfires.  Note that in his book Salter describes certain ultra-nationalist states, like Nazi Germany, as being over-investments in genetic interests that ended up harming the adaptive interests of those states’ ethnies.  Hitler’s attempt to maximize German EGI backfired; look at Germany in 1945, and, worse, look at Germany today. German adaptiveness, their net EGI, would have been maximized by a more prudent, and less aggressive, pursuit of genetic interests. While in many – likely most – cases, maximizing genetic interests would maximize adaptiveness, that is not always the case. 

Note also that a person’s conscious preferences may not lead to adaptive outcomes; this can be from a hyper-investment in genetic interests as with Hitler or, more likely today, in globalist “anonymous mass societies,” people do not understand their genetic interests and thus under-invest in them.  While we cannot force values on people, we can educate them about genetic interests so that their choice of values will be an informed choice.

However, a pure utilitarian ethic – promoting adaptive fitness for the greatest number as the only consideration – has some problems.

Salter rightfully criticizes the pure utilitarian ethic from the standpoint of justice.  He provides a theoretical example that I can paraphrase here. Imagine a murder committed in a town, and the local vagrant is suspected.  The police chief then discovers the vagrant is innocent and that the murder was committed by the mayor, who has been an upstanding citizen and a long-standing important member of the town community.  The crime was one of passion and will be unlikely to ever be repeated, while the vagrant is a constant troublemaker. Convicting the vagrant on the basis of partial or invented evidence would be best for the long-term well-being of the town, while arresting and convicting the mayor would cause social upheaval in the town, damage the town’s nascent tourist industry, and cause widespread economic dislocation and hardship for residents.  A purely utilitarian reading of the situation is to let the vagrant hang and let the mayor off Scott-free, but, as Salter notes, this offends our sense of justice (for most of us anyway).  That being so, the utilitarian ethic needs to be balanced by individual rights, and by certain normative values. Pure utility is not sufficient for a truly just ethic.

Salter notes that “bounded rationality” – our inability to ever know everything necessary about a problem or issue – is a good reason not to advocate for the pure ethic of unbridled pursuit of genetic interests. This is because we may be in error about what those genetic interests actually are and about how best to achieve them.  In the absence of unbounded rationality, in the absence of absolute certainty, a degree of prudence and restraint is called for, and is likely to be more adaptive in the long run. I have always distinguished gross genetic interests from net – the former being a naïve attempt to maximize a perceived set of genetic interests to the ultimate degree possible, while the latter takes into account costs and benefits and attempts to ascertain what the long-term genetic interest net benefit will be after all the varied costs are accounted for.  It may be that a less radical pursuit of (ever-diminishing) genetic interest returns would be most beneficial; the marginal gains of genetic interests inherent in an “all or nothing” approach toward adaptive behavior may not be worth the costs incurred. For example, dividing a larger nation into smaller micro-states of more concentrated kinship may be seen as maximizing EGI, but if this division weakens the ability of the populations involved to defend their interests against aggressors (or achieve some other beneficial goal that requires a certain size threshold), then net adaptive interests would suffer. Maximizing EGI, trying to squeeze every last drop of genetic interest from a situation, may backfire. In addition, the possibility of kinship overlap between populations is another reason not to be too radical in the pursuit of EGI, particularly within continents, since some people on “their side” may be more genetically similar to you than those on “your side.”  Even if that degree of kinship overlap is not the case, if the two sides are relatively genetically similar to each other, then he costs of conflict may outweigh the benefits.  The bounded rationality problem, coupled to the possibility of kinship overlap, therefore suggests that a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of EGI is optimal, since errors in interpreting kinship and the best methods for pursuing adaptiveness may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests. Prudence and restraint are therefore warranted to constrain reckless behavior in support of (assumed) genetic interests.

Thus, Salter asserts that is prudent to eschew the pure ethic – where maximizing genetic interests would always take precedence in every circumstance – in favor of a “mixed ethic” where the pursuit of adaptiveness is tempered by a concern for individual rights and minority group rights – or even the rights of other majority groups of other nations that your group may be in conflict with. 

Salter pre-emptively answers some of his Far Right critics by asking whether adding a concern for such rights “threatens incoherence” of an adaptive ethic. Thus, those critics complained that a concern for rights was a subjective “add-on” to EGI that does not logically derive from Salter’s arguments. However, the comments about bounded rationality and kinship overlap, as well as the possibility of maladaptive over-investment in EGI, point in the direction of a mixed ethic actually being coherent and probably more adaptive in the net sense. In addition, given the reality of White behavior, getting large numbers of Whites to agree with the value of EGI would necessitate flexibility about adaptive behavior, so as to include appropriate consideration of (potentially) non-adaptive values such as individual rights.

Note that in my view, proximate interests that temper the pursuit of genetic interests need not be limited to individual (or minority group) rights, but can (and should) include such things as a Yockeyian interest in “actualizing a High Culture” and other civilizational and political pursuits that may not always be perfectly congruent with a single-minded pursuit of genetic interests. But even here, I can argue that such a tempering may have long-term adaptive value.  The groups constituting the Yockeyian view are all European; hence, there will be at least some kinship overlap (at least at the global level).  

Salter compares three ethics – pure adaptive utilitarianism (PAU), mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU), and the rights-centered ethic (RCE).  The PAU holds EGI as morally good and also holds that adaptive interests must be maximized regardless of means. MAU also holds that EGI is morally good, but that the pursuit of adaptive interests must be constrained by rights.  The RCE does not assert that EGI is either morally good or bad, but this ethic is not teleological like the preceding two, but is deontological; thus, in the RCE the “rightness of means [are] unrelated to consequences.”  Then Salter asks certain questions for each of these ethics. First, can it moral for EGI to frustrate other interests? The PAU says yes, unconditionally; while the MAU also says yes, but only in defense of ethnic interests or in (limited) expansion that preserves the existence of the (defeated) competitor. Since Salter supports the MAU, it puts to lie the accusation that he supports genocide. What about the RCE? This ethic says that it is not moral for EGI to frustrate other interests, because such frustration of other interests causes harm. Should genetic interests have absolute priority?  The PAU says yes, the MAU says no when such interests “conflict with individual rights,” and the RCE says no, “since only means matter” – and only means consistent with individual rights are allowed in RCE.  What to do when genetic interests conflict?  The PAU says “compete within adaptive limits” (I suppose this means net genetic interests), the MAU says “compete but respect rights,” and the RCE says “stop competing, since it entails harm.”

I’d like to say at this point that the RCE is, practical terms, not really followed by anyone in the multicultural ex-West. Those who claim to support the RCE essentially support it only for Whites, while non-Whites are allowed to essentially follow a PAU ethics.  Consider – do supporters of the RCE really take an agnostic view of EGI independent of rights?  Or is the very idea of White EGI anathema?  I suppose the argument would be that any expression of White genetic interests harms the rights of non-Whites, so consideration of White EGI independent of rights is not possible.  That being so, the fact that non-White PAU harms White EGI is a feature, not a bug, of modern RCE hypocrisy.

Salter further discusses the ethics of the PAU and MAU approaches, making analogies between ethny and family.  If we allow people to favor their families, then why shouldn’t ethnocentrism be tolerated, or even celebrated (I’m talking about Whites here; as we all know, non-White ethnocentrism is already strongly promoted by the System)?  Salter goes further – if parents have a duty to care for their children, then perhaps people “have a similar duty to nurture” their ethnies.  Indeed, perhaps one rationale for race-denial propaganda is to prevent (White) people from making these “dangerous” (but accurate) analogies between ethny and family. Salter states that tribal feelings and ethnic identification are both necessary to produce “feelings of ethnic obligation” – so it should be no surprise to us that those two elements are attacked by the System with respect to Whites (but promoted for non-Whites).  

Salter discusses methods used to undermine these components of ethnic obligations, including “fictive ethnicity” (e.g., civic nationalism) and/or fictive non-ethnicity (e.g., race-denial).  Thus, Whites in America, for example, are told that their racial group does not exist, and that they should simply identify as “Americans,” considering any featherless biped infesting American territory as their civic “kin.” If protecting one’s genetic survival is a fundamental right (and it should be so for evolved organisms like humans), then these methods are immoral and unethical. Further, holding that genetic continuity is a fundamental right brings the MAU closer to the PAU, thus undermining Salter’s critics on the Far Right. Indeed, further undermining those rightist critics, Salter puts forth that advancement, and not merely defense, of genetic interests can be moral and ethical. The idea, consistent with the MAU, is to allow for the continued existence of the (defeated) competitor, albeit with reduced (but not fatally diminished) resources.

Salter then briefly discusses altruism and morality, citing one so-called “leading evolutionary theorist” who claims “that only non-fitness-enhancing behavior can be moral.”  Amusingly, Salter then mentions that a healthier theorist made the comment that these types of ideas are such “that this is an unconsciously self-serving moral sentiment that, when expressed, influences some susceptible individuals to show indiscriminate altruism that benefits the moralist.” Indeed, calls for universalism and pathological altruism can be a competitive tactic; thus, non-Whites manipulate White behavior so that Whites sacrifice their own interests to promote those of others. This is of course maladaptive for Whites; indeed, evolved organisms are not expected to be, and should not be, purely disinterested in their morals and ethics (including altruism).  And, sometimes, ultimate and proximate interests converge and the distinctions are blurred (as I often state)l however, when distinctions between the two sets of interests are clear, the ultimate should usually be given precedence over the proximate (note: a precedence constrained by a concern for rights).

Salter notes that people “who do not consider peaceful genetic replacement to be a moral issue will have no moral objection to their own painless genetic extinction.” Well, there are Whites with pathological altruism who do not personally reproduce as as to “save the planet” (and who advocate the same to other Whites, but typically not to non-Whites), but typically the situation is that of a targeted attack against White interests. Especially, non-White activists will be among those who attempt to convince Whites to accept genetic extinction, while these non-Whites themselves continue their own genetic lines.  

And if people genuinely do not care about genetic interests, then why do many of them so strenuously argue against those who do so care?  I wrote about this previously:

The only real critique possible is one of values – i.e., genetic interests are real, but, who cares?  However, I find the values argument hypocritical and mendacious as well. Imagine two co-ethnics, Jim and Mark. Jim highly values his genetic interests, genetic continuity, and racial survival. Mark is indifferent to all of that, he “doesn’t care” about it. Very well. But if Jim cares deeply and Mark not at all, then common sense and fundamental ethics tell us that Mark, who asserts he doesn’t care one way or the other, should let Jim have his way. Why not?  If one believes Mark then he’s fine either way – the race prospers or it does not. Mark’s indifference should then make way for Jim’s deep concern and concentrated activism. Of course, Mark may be a liar, he may have other interests which conflict with Jim’s concerns with race and EGI; if so, Mark should be honest about these interests. If Jim and Mark are of different ethnies, and if Mark opposes Jim’s pursuit of EGI, Jim should be wary of Mark’s claims to be a disinterested commentator.  Mark’s interests do not bestow upon him the right to delegitimize Jim’s pursuit of his ultimate interests through the misuse of pseudoscientific sophistry.  

Getting back to the issue of values, it is indeed amusing when people who claim “they do not care” about race get so upset with scenarios in which Europeans survive and prosper. If race is “irrelevant” then it should be “irrelevant” if non-Europeans become extinct and an expanding European population colonizes the entire Earth. Why not?  “Nothing matters.”  Except of course, in reality, it all matters. Attacks against “Salterism” are not disinterested science, but hyper-interested ethnic activism and/or political ideology.

A few concluding comments are appropriate at this point.  Salter believes that “evolved organisms” will not for long accept a “social order that weeds out their lineages.” Well, so far, Whites have been generally accepting of such a social order; we shall see how things evolve (no pun intended).  It is part of the proper ethics of EGI to educate people on the important of adaptive behavior; one can view Salter’s book, and my current post, as part of such efforts.

Salter also discusses “socially imposed monogamy” as an effective method for resolving conflicting genetic interests in societies, and this leads us to the idea that atomized individuals are unlikely to be able to effectively strategize and act on behalf of their genetic interests; collective action, including state power, is necessary. Salter mentions the ethical implications of having a state that is an interested promoter of national interests in the global arena, but “a disinterested arbiter of family interests within the nation.”  [Note that socially imposed monogamy may be an exception to the latter, depending upon your point of view]. There are different levels of genetic interests that would need to be handled in different manners.  Just solutions to conflicts of genetic interests, those that appeal to the universal human interest in genetic continuity and adaptiveness (whether consciously recognized or not), would be more stable than unjust and unreasonable approaches.  It is in the interests of any adaptively-minded state to promote such just solutions to conflicts of genetic interests,

Finally, while the MAU puts limits on the degree to which genetic interests can be pursued, people and ethnies must still have the freedom to advance (not merely defend) their interests within reasonable bounds. We cannot expect equal fitness outcomes as enforced equalized fitness would lead to an increased mutation load and would be so totalitarian in its application as to be unpalatable to reasonable people. Salter argues that the ultimate freedom is the freedom to defend (and advance) one’s genetic interests, which are ultimate interests. That this can be done via the MAU has been argued in Salter’s book and also in my comments above; I would promote a rather aggressive version of the MAU, but one that still incorporates limits and which respects certain proximate interests. However, in my case, I would value society-wide proximate interests, such as Yockey’s call to actualize a High Culture, over mere individual rights, although, certainly, individual rights are important and should be respected.

Let us finish with the following Shakespearean quote that Salter includes in this section of his book, with respect to conflicts between sets of genetic interests:


Therefore take heed how you impawn our person,

How you awake our sleeping sword of war.

We charge you in the name of God, take heed,

For never two such kingdoms did contend

Without much fall of blood, whose guiltless drops

Are every one a woe, a sore complaint

‘Gainst him whose wrong gives edge unto the swords

That make such waste in brief mortality.

May I with right and conscience make this claim?

Shakespeare, Henry V, 1500, Act I, Scene I


*I want this post to emphasize ideas and theory, not personal feuding, so I’m not going to mention such people by name here.

The Homosexual Question, Part I

Delving into a subject usually not discussed at this blog.

My general attitude toward homosexuality in the “movement” has been one of “live and let live” – not considering it a major issue or concern, as long as people were discreet. Perhaps I should have known better given some of my experiences back in the early days of Yahoo discussion groups.  I was aware of one homosexual WN group forming and I thought, well, if they want to do their own thing, but are sincere activists and concentrate on promoting White interests, fine.  Then one day I decided to go and read the posts at the group (at that time freely accessible to non-members) to better determine what was going on there. I found it to be a disgusting cesspool of campy Nazi play-acting, “leather Nazis” engaging in S and M, advertising sex acts to each other (“U piss, I drink”), etc.  I was, honestly, completely disgusted and at that time thought Pierce showed wisdom banning homosexuals from being members of the National Alliance.  Several years later, Salter’s On Genetic Interests came out, and that book, which had a profound influence on me, had a short section on homosexuals, essentially promoting a tolerant line – homosexuals actually should have even more invested in ethny (and of course extended family) since most have no children of their own, and has long as homosexuals support EGI, ethnic-based natalism, and traditional family formation then they should expect toleration of their sexual expression. So, one could (naively) think of the Yahoo experience as an aberration, and hope that the On Genetic Interests paradigm could serve as a way of going forward.

However, two other things occurred at around the same time, the early 2000s, of relevance. First, a (heterosexual) person of some importance in the “movement” at that time  – and who shall remain nameless here – warned me about a “homosexual clique” that had seriously undermined him. Somewhat later, another activist of long-standing informed me that a prominent “movement” personage – a “Mr. X” as we’ll refer to him here – was a homosexual, although one “in the closet” as Mr. X had made an effort to hide his inclinations (if the accusation was true).  Although I never heard anything else ever again about Mr. X in this regard, certain more recent incidents suggest to me that the accusation may have been correct, and that Mr. X may be involved, at least peripherally, in the aforementioned clique. These are obviously issues of concern – homosexual cliques undermining straight activists to replace those activists with homosexual counterparts, august personages “in the closet” with who knows what hidden agenda, etc. But, truth be told, I didn’t think much of it at the time.  My focus was solely on race and my own ideas and I didn’t care too much about what I perceived as peripheral issues.  And, after all, perhaps some of these accusations were mistaken, I thought at the time, or, irrelevant to the “movement” as a whole.  That was, of course, short-sighted on my part.

To further analyze this subject, let’s look at a more recent Salter essay.

A remarkable feature of the same-sex marriage movement, that has helped make it a juggernaut, is the solidarity of its disparate parts. Lesbian activists don’t mock gays before the general public, gay activists don’t ridicule bisexuals, bisexuals don’t disrespect the transgendered, and so on, presumably down the growing list of non-traditional sexual and gender orientations.

As an example of a pro-gay marriage piece from the “movement,” see this.  My riposte is here.  Note that while I oppose the main theme of that piece equating non-reproductive heterosexual relations with homosexuality, I take a generally tolerant position about homosexuality, a subject that I claimed at the time I had little interest in.  Thus I wrote:

I also agree that when considering homosexuality (a subject that in general I have little interest in), a “give and take” attitude can be constructive.  A degree of tolerance can be given to gays, in exchange for them to stop allying with the Left to wreck race and civilization, and an admission from their part that they are abnormal, analogous to a disability.  For example, I don’t hate people who are deaf, but if they attempt to declare deafness as normal, desirable, the same as hearing, if they also declare a “deaf culture” (and some do) and refuse treatments for themselves and (especially) their children (if deaf as well), then I do have a problem. The same goes for the blind, and also considers that accommodation can only go so far: we cannot have blind brain surgeons, taxi drivers, or airplane pilots, regardless of how “unfair” that is. Homosexuals need to accommodate the needs of the larger society in exchange for tolerance. They are abnormal regardless of how one wants to define that – either based on frequency or biological fitness.  But if they defend their family and ethnic genetic interests, that is all to the good. One can argue that homosexuals (and anyone who does not personally reproduce) have a relatively greater interest in their race’s genetic continuity (as well as that of their family), because that is all they have to work with to improve their inclusive fitness.  They also need to understand that many heterosexuals find the idea of homosexual relations repugnant and would – especially if they value genetic continuity – be greatly displeased if their children were homosexual and did not find some way to reproduce (as opposed to adopt). Of course, childlessness of heterosexual children would have the same negative effect on their parents’ fitness, but without the aesthetic disgust toward homosexual acts.

Having said all of that, better a homosexual racist than a heterosexual liberal.  Better gay than a race mixer.  I’ll take Ernst Rohm as a comrade over John Derbyshire any day.

Obviously, I’m now questioning that nonchalant attitude and will now examine Salter’s arguments.

That is odd because some categories, to be discussed, are noticeably absent from that list. Possible reasons for excluding them include the law, aesthetics, and morality. Legality can be immediately ruled out. Homosexuality’s illegality until recently has not prevented agitation for gay rights. Aesthetics can also be ruled out, because LGBTQI-rights activists have been pushing back against popular revulsion for decades. If they cited legality or aesthetics to justify excluding selected types of sexuality, consistency would demand immediate cessation of their own activities. No sexual or gender category can be credibly excluded from the LGBTQI fold for legal or aesthetic reasons.

Note that last sentence.  Salter makes the argument that the LGBTQI crowd has no legal or aesthetic rationale to exclude even the most horrific perversions from the fold – incest, bestiality, pedophilia (which some of them openly embrace), etc.

Morality is different. Morality is the only conceivable principled reason that some sexualities are excluded from the fold. Whether or not one accepts the morality of the alternative sexuality and gender movement, there are nevertheless some ethical principles associated with it. These include the rights to free expression and association. It is asserted that gender and sexual expression should be unconstrained when harmless and when entered into by mutual consent.

Free association?  Can gays be legally excluded from society?  Or must we bake wedding cakes for them?

These principles are sufficient to explain the exclusion of pedophilia from the LGBTQI platform. It seems the great majority of individuals of all orientations reject it. 

Well, “great majority” isn’t all. Interesting that most (all?) pedophiles among Catholic priests are molesting boys and not girls.  Coincidence?

Mary De Young has documented attempts by paedophile activists to normalize sex between adults and children from at least the 1980s in “The indignant page: Techniques of neutralization in the publications of pedophile organizations” (Child Abuse & Neglect, 1988).[i] A more recent study by O’Halloran and Quayle in “A content analysis of a ‘boy love’ support forum: Revisiting Durkin and Bryant” found that the trend has remained uninterrupted (Journal of Sexual Aggression, 2010). These attempts have failed to convince many people that children are able to give informed, prudent consent to sexual contact. It is true that educational packages such as the Safe Schools program sexualise children but that is not the same thing as advocating the legalization of paedophilia.

The fact is that some of these types have been trying to normalize pedophilia.

LGBTQI morality is not a credible reason for excluding all of the sexualities missing from that acronym. Consider polygamy, often called plural marriage. This was opposed by the Medieval Church and before that the Romans and Ancient Greeks, making Europe the only monogamous stratified society until the modern era.[ii] The law that enforces monogamy necessarily restricts the free choices of adults to participate in consensual polygamous relationship. If polygamy does not contravene LGBTQI moral principles, why is there not a ‘P’ in ‘LGBTQI? As Brendon Wynter noted recently on our public broadcaster (ABC Religion & Ethics, 24 March 2017) attempts to find a moral distinction between plural and same-sex marriage can lead to illiberal claims, such as that polygamy but not homosexual marriage is “bad or at least, trivial”.[iii]

A ‘P’ should be added to ‘LGBTQI’.

Very well.

Incest is also missing from the LGBTQI heading. From an LGBTQI moral perspective, why ban sex or marriage between any consenting adults? As the actor Jeremy Irons commented a few years ago, genetic disorders in the children of incestuous unions are only an issue with heterosexual pairs.[iv] LGBTQI advocates are not in a position to complain about incest on the basis of its being gay or lesbian. From their perspective, love and lust between consenting adults should never be condemned.

That last sentence follows from the gay agenda and can and will eventually lead to all sorts of grotesqueries – situations incompatible with the sort of healthy racialist state most WNs envision.

On what grounds could LGBTQI advocates object to marriages between mother and daughter or father and son, or object to them adopting? One ground that has been raised is a supposed categorical difference between those sexually attracted to close kin and those sexually attracted to members of the same sex. The former, it is claimed, do not belong to a distinct class of individuals but the latter do.[v] In the case of same-sex attraction, it is proposed, accurately, that homosexual orientation is sometimes inborn, and that as a result these individuals cannot change their same-sex attraction. Preventing them from marrying the same sex is therefore discriminatory. Incest is held to be different on the basis of the claim that it is a matter of free choice. For that reason, banning incestuous marriage does not constitute discrimination, and is therefore consistent with liberal ethics. This argument breaks down with the second premise, that incestuous desire is not inborn. The Finnish sociologist Edward Westermarck discovered that incest avoidance is a universal inborn trait that is triggered by close proximity during childhood. De Smet, van Speybroeck and Verplaetse investigated this theory in Evolution and Human Behavior (2014) and found that children raised together are usually averse to sexual contact during and after puberty.[vi] It follows that sexual desire for a sibling or offspring is in part or whole due to genetically-programmed developmental processes. The fact that incestuous motivation is produced when these processes go awry does not make them any less inborn. Thus incestuous motivation is not always a matter of free choice and in such cases, according to LGBTQI ethics, it is a right when consensual and harmless.

An ‘I’ should be added to ‘LGBTQI’.

Thus, according to Salter’s argument, the homosexual agenda has an ethical underpinning that would justify incest.

Bestiality also presents difficulties for the brevity of ‘LGBTQI’. On which grounds can advocates condemn sex with animals? As already noted, legal and aesthetic distinctions are unavailable. The rule against cruelty is also unavailable most of the time. Cruelty is wrong, and sex with animals can be cruel but so can sex with humans. The fact that animals cannot consent is not relevant because they do not, as a rule, possess human rights. In Australia and many other countries animals are protected against cruel treatment, but that does not include protection against being killed and eaten. Apart from militant vegetarians and vegans, most feel justified eating animals, so it is not obvious why, without invoking traditional moral or aesthetic standards, sexual contact that does not inflict suffering can be considered immoral.

The bestiality category is not an empty hypothetical. A recent academic study by Earls and Lalumiere titled “A case study of preferential bestiality”, published in the journal Archives of Sexual Behavior (2009), indicates that it is not as rare as previously thought, and shares many of the characteristics of other atypical sexual interests.[vii] Likewise, a recent report in the Australian online edition of The Guardian by Mona Chalabi, “Bestiality: which animals are most at risk” (22 June 2017), describes the online zoosexual movement that advocates the rights of the bestially inclined.[viii] The most preferred species appear to be dogs and cows, but cases are reported involving horses and even snakes. Woody Allen might add sheep.[ix]

There is a human dimension to the issue. Members of what we might reluctantly call the zoosexual community feel they are treated unfairly by the mainstream, which includes the LGBTQI movement. Some feel trapped in human relationships, such as the man who felt that sex with his (human) wife was “wrong” and during marital acts closed his eyes to better pretend she was a horse. Earlier this year an article in The Independent reported that animal sex tourism became such a problem in Denmark that in 2016 the country criminalized bestiality.[x] The journalist hinted that bestiality usually conforms to the harm principle: “[T]he studies published over the last 15 years using non-clinical samples report the vast majority of zoophiles do not appear to be suffering any significant clinical[ly] significant distress or impairment as a consequence of their behavior.”

Surely most LGBTQI people will share the generally-held opinion of bestiality. Many will be disgusted by the very thought and wish it never to be depicted or praised in public. They will wish that it never be part of their social environment and certainly not that of any child’s.

However, if LGBTQI activists believe the position they urge on the public, consistency demands they not only tolerate bestiality but treat it as possessing equal rights to human-centric sex. Otherwise they are guilty of the illiberal prejudice of claiming that their kind of love is superior to others they deem deviant. And if even the proponents of LGBTQI rights were to admit the legitimacy of privileging one sexual or gender orientation over another, then their main defence against hetero-normativity would collapse.

An extra ‘B’ should also be added to the acronym.

Thus, according to Salter’s argument, the homosexual agenda has an ethical underpinning that would justify bestiality.

Other initials could be added. Why not an ‘R’ for love of robots and dolls? Blow up dolls and simple silicone mannequins with recorded voices are primitive compared to the pleasure model “replicants” depicted in the science fiction classic Blade Runner. Nevertheless, they are beginning to compete for men’s affections.[xi] This is a rapidly growing industry feeding insatiable demand. The Third International Congress on Love and Sex with Robots is to be held in London in December 2017.[xii] Professor Noel Sharkey, chairman of the Foundation for Responsible Robotics, points to guilt-free threesomes as a potential use of sex robots.[xiii] He and colleagues predict that many humans will have sexual relationships with robots. Evidence is already emerging of men feeling embarrassed about seeking sex and companionship from artificial women.[xiv] Women might also suffer embarrassment when robot gigolos become feasible. From the perspective of LGBTQI morality it is wrong to shun or mock people just because they are turned on by machines.

An ‘R’ should be added to ‘LGBTQI’.

Gays should therefore welcome their new robotic sexual overlords.

One suspects that pragmatism is a big reason why LGBTQI activists want to keep polygamy, incest, bestiality and sex robots in the closet. Activists do not want to openly associate with these categories because that would increase opposition. The public might wonder about the implications. If exotic gender identities and same-sex marriage are to be taught in schools as equal to the heterosexual types, why not polygamy, incest, bestiality, and sex dolls? Citizens would be more likely to resist demands for full legal equality until the slippery slope were shown to have principled limits.

LGBTQI campaigns assert that love is equal, yet they help marginalize attachments and acts they find repugnant or inconvenient. The activist community should acknowledge all types of sexuality and marriage that meet their professed moral standard. They should not deceive the public by selectively applying their morality.

Here, Salter is essentially accusing the LGBTQI community of hypocrisy and cherry-picked moral standards. This is not necessarily a problem for LGBTQI White activists, unless they openly promote some or all of the LGBTQI agenda.

Alternatively, activists should abandon their artificial solidarity and the morality they deploy to justify it. They should admit that not all sexual desire and acts and types of marriage are equal. Many will join with the straight binary community in rejecting the appropriateness of polygamy, incest and bestiality. In so doing they might view their own orientation with humility and ponder whether insisting on complete normalisation is good for society.

That includes attempts to normalize this agenda within the confines of White racial nationalism; people who prioritize the interests of their sexual preferences over the good of the race, and who use pro-White activism as a vehicle to promote a particular sexual agenda.  To actually use racialist meetings as homosexual pick-up opportunities, with same-sex sexual harassment, is obviously completely unacceptable. There shouldn’t even be heterosexual activity of that nature at meetings, that is unprofessional and uncalled for, but at least such activity would be consistent with the majority’s normal and reproductively sound healthy sexual preferences.  To promote abnormal sexuality at meetings, to defend it, laugh it off, and/or minimize it in any way, is beyond the pale.

Until LGBTQI activists admit the radical implications of their morality, the spelling of ‘GBTQI’ and its variations should be contested. Rearranging the extra letters discussed, consistency demands an extra ‘B’, ‘I’, ‘R’ and ‘P’ (at least). In addition, the rainbow flag deserves a jarring additional stripe standing for the arbitrarily excluded categories as well as the hypocrisy of LGBTQI activists. Such as honest inclusive symbol would also serve to inform the public of where the arguments of the radical sexuality and gender movement logically lead.

Once again, Salter labels members of the gay movement as hypocrites who arbitrarily draw lines for acceptability to include their own preferences, but excluding those of others who, by LGBTQI ethics and logic, should have the same fundamental rights.  

Let us add ‘BIRP’ to ‘LGBTQI’ until activists apply their arguments consistently. When they do, they also will adopt the extra letters and perhaps some other besides.

“Others besides.”  The mind boggles.

So, at this point, what do we have?  It depends if you accept the legitimacy of Salter’s arguments. I essentially do so accept them and all they imply about the ethics of the hmosexual agenda, which is of course directly relevant to the issue of homosexuality in the “movement.”  Is this essay by Salter necessarily incompatible with what he previously wrote in On Genetic Interests? I do not believe it is, although it may be an evolution in thinking, based on various factors, including perhaps the increased “in your face” militancy of gay activists. The compatibility between the two works would be if one accepts a baseline of tolerance for homosexuality predicated on practitioners of that preference respecting core features of an EGI-based approach to society: heteronormalization, marriage for heterosexuals only, pro-natalism, respect for traditional family formation and values, as well as the usual interests in immigration control and racial preservation.

At this point, my fundamental viewpoint of minimal tolerance, as outlined at the beginning of this essay, and which existed before this Salter essay, remains, but with some important clarifications.

Thus, at this point, I would still maintain that homosexuals can play a role in the racial activism, providing:

1. They are not in the top leadership. They can be prominent members and important contributors, but not at the top of the hierarchy, as all of the various moral, social, ethical, etc. issues outlined by Salter and others come into play at the highest level.  

2. Homosexuals in the “movement” who are playing an important (albeit not top leadership roles, as stated above) need to be open about themselves and their preferences.  This will prevent blackmail and other pressure from the System/Left and avoid unpleasant “surprises” for the rank-and-file later on.

3. Most importantly, homosexuals in the “movement” should, as explained above, respect “key features of an EGI-based approach to society: heteronormalization, marriage for heterosexuals only, pro-natalism, respect for traditional family formation and values, as well as the usual interests in immigration control and racial preservation.”  They should not be pushing homosexual apologia, promoting homosexuality in general, defending gay marriage, or enabling and/or condoning homosexual harassment/pickups at pro-White meetings.

While the points above can allow for minimal tolerance, it does not seem like they have been followed.

In Part II, we will look at Andrew Joyce’s objections to tolerance and consider if the viewpoint I promote here needs to be adjusted based on Joyce’s arguments.

Rackete is Guilty of Crimes against Humanity

And what did they to such criminals at Nuremberg?

First Norwegians were doing it, now Germans (emphasis added):

German captain Carola Rackete, who sparked international headlines by forcibly docking in an Italian port with rescued migrants, faces questioning by an Italian prosecutor on Thursday over allegedly aiding illegal immigration.

The captain of the Sea-Watch 3 is expected to be questioned in the southern Sicilian town of Agrigento from 10 am (0800 GMT).

Rackete was arrested on June 29 for entering Italy’s Lampedusa port despite a veto imposed by far-right Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, and knocking a coast guard boat out of the way to land 40 migrants after over two weeks blocked at sea.

If this scum was so worried about the poor delicate migrants, she could have taken them to Libya or, perhaps more fittingly, instead of floating in the Mediterranean for two weeks, sailed past Gibraltar, up the Atlantic coast, then around to the North Sea, and disembarked at Hamburg.  Why not? 

Really, when is the rest of Europe finally going to stand up to these endlessly pushy, arrogant, and annoying Germans? First, they wrecked Europe with their fanatical hegemonic ultra-nationalism, and now they are doing it with their fanatical, hegemonic, pathological altruism. Enough is enough. That entire nation is in dire need of psychotherapy.

And can you imagine if this was the reverse? The fetishists of Der Movement would be screeching about an “omnidominant Med plot” – but with this, it is “move on, move on, there’s nothing to see here.”

Rackete should be put on trial for crimes against humanity – promoting genocide against the Italian people through the forced settlement of alien invaders. Since she is obviously guilty – no one (even Rackete herself) disputes what she has done as described above – after a guilty verdict, she should be publicly hanged in Rome by Italian officials.

The sheer arrogance of these types is incredible and no different in its fundamental origin than the behavior of Deasy, Munro, and Farrell. Deasy is traumatized by Bulgarian faces (“they take getting used to”) – in Bulgaria. Munro oozes with racial contempt for Romanians – while living in Romania with sexual access to a Romanian woman.  Farrell, while living in Italy with an Italian woman, mocks what he perceives as Italian ineptitude. You see, your NW Euro “ethnonationalist” lords and masters will live where they damn please, in your countries, with your women, while mocking you, defaming you, and criticizing the way you look (again, in your own country). Just like Norwegians and Germans who view Italy as a dumping ground for their migrant pets.

I know I have some readers from Italy.  Can someone there please – please – get Salvini to read Frank Salter’s On Genetic Interests?  Or at least read this.  If you can make a better translation of the original, please do so.

How about someone in Italy inviting Salter to give a talk about EGI and migration – and make sure Salvini is in the audience?  These guys need to know what’s really at stake, and they need to know why scum like Rackete are guilty of crimes worthy of the supreme penalty.

A Duel of Wits

Between unarmed opponents.

See this.

There is some good here, but also considerable nonsense. If the characterization of Richard Spencer’s racial views is correct, then Johnson’s racial views are sounder from an empiricist-materialist standpoint. However, there is much lacking here from a more hardcore scientific standpoint (the wages of “Traditionalism” I suppose). 

The whole “transplanted brains” scenario is absurd and meaningless intellectual masturbation.  What could one do? There are racial – and subracial (cue Durocher’s heavy breathing) – differences in brain structure that can be identified via imaging methodology.  If one were really determined to obtain a definitive identification, a small brain biopsy can yield DNA to assay for genetic ancestry and thus prove whether or not the brain tissue was of Negro origin. As far as the ridiculous question as to why build a community on race instead of other characteristics, I point both interviewer and interviewee to Salter’s On Genetic Interests. Adaptive fitness is the ultimate interest of evolved organisms (such as humans), and any group that promotes their ultimate interests will outcompete and replace those who do not. And, after all, one can always form these narrower communities within your racial group while preserving EGI, but the opposite is not possible.  One can form your little group of Tolkien fans among Whites in an all-White ethnostate, but a multi-racial Tolkien group that is not stratified by race (by definition, if it is multiracial and stratified only by Tolkienism, it will not be stratified by race) will constitute a loss of genetic interest.  Smaller groups within a White ethnostate will retain the advantages of a concentrated EGI; on the other hand, smaller groups of Whites in, say, a multiracial Tolkien Fanboy state, will suffer as a result of a loss of EGI, itself a consequence of the multiracialism of such a state. In the latter case, the situation can be retrieved only by racial separation – so why not  divide on the basis of race to begin with?

Stupidity about gender-specific nations also fails – I remember Bowery writing (correctly) long ago that gender/sex is not a genetic interest.  A man has more genetic commonality with female relatives and co-ethnics than with male non-ethnic strangers. One could subdivide a racially pure state by gender (for what purpose?) but the racial stratification must come first if one is concerned with biological fitness. If you are not concerned with fitness, fine, but that’s not an evolutionarily stable situation. You’ll end up in the dustbin of genetic history, replaced by more ethnocentric others. These are reasonably obvious arguments.  I would also point out that sexual reproduction has evolutionary advantages via increased genetic diversity. No doubt that a sufficiently advanced technology could artificially impose independent assortment and recombination on a single-sex artificial reproduction regimen, but, again, for what purpose?  While eliminating the yeastbucket requirement would no doubt be advantageous in many ways, what would be the sexual outlet for such an all-male society?  Widespread homosexuality?  I’ll take a pass on that. There are probably some things best left unchanged in human nature and the division between two sexes for reproduction is likely to be one of those.

And what’s with this obsession with Rushton and Lynn?  Look, the broad theories of both of them are likely true, but that’s as far as it goes. R-K theory on race (that I independently came up with in the 1980s after reading an ecology textbook) is undoubtedly true on the general level of – Blacks and Browns have more offspring and invest less in them; Whites and Yellows have fewer offspring but invest more in them. And, as well, Blacks and Browns have faster life histories (earlier maturation and reproduction and earlier death) than do Whites and Yellows. If Rushton had stuck with that, instead of trying to shoehorn every racial characteristic (including penis size) into the formulation, he’d be more respected today. Likewise, Lynn is likely correct that there is a general association between national IQ and economic productivity (as measured by GDP) and general accomplishment; the problem occurs when he falls too much in love with his theory (as did Rushton with his ideas) and tries to fit every data point into the pattern, with ludicrous “estimates of IQ,” racial history fairy tales about admixture, and hand waving “just so stories” to explain anomalies. The problem, I suppose, is that the broad theories are a bit too obvious and common sense, plain to any reasonably intelligent and honest observant individual, and so there isn’t much “intellectual prestige” in merely stating the obvious.  Therefore, ego-driven “intellectuals” have to build castles of sand to demonstrate how very clever they are.

Counter-Currents commentary:

Posted July 1, 2019 at 8:07 am | Permalink
Yang was a joke who never should have had any support from the Dissident Right in the first place. Those who did have made public fools of themselves.

Craig, meet Greg Johnson. And Richard Spencer. And many more.

Also, what’s the big deal about Gabbard? Oh she’s good on foreign policy. But so is Trump. He not once, but twice, averted war by outmaneuvering the warhawks in DC. First with Syria and now with Iran. He’s the peace candidate you should be voting for.

There’s no reason to pay attention to any of these clowns with a (D) in front of their name.

Craig, meet David Duke.  And Richard Spencer.

Then there’s John Morgan:

John Morgan
Posted July 1, 2019 at 6:33 am | Permalink
Rep. Gabbard seems to be the least bad (notice I’m not saying good) of all these people. It’s also worth mentioning her connections to/support of Hindu nationalist groups in India like the BJP and RSS (since she is a practicing Hindu herself). This doesn’t necessarily equate to sympathy for nationalism for white people, but it suggests she may at least have the vision to not be completely averse to it. In practice that may not mean much, however. But as Mr. Hampton wrote, she has no chance of getting the nomination this time around, anyway.

You know she supports reparations for Negroes, right?

A one, a one, a one two three….

Ted Cruz at least spoke up about this.  Antifa Don Trump, The God Emperor?  Silence.

MAGA!  Pepe! Kek!

Readers of this blog know that I am no apologist for homosexuals (of either sex) but I’m no apologist for hypocrisy either.  I mean, really….  Apparently, “homophobia” – “vile” or otherwise – is perfectly acceptable in the service of “movement” feuds.  Perhaps, Antifa can be critiqued in other ways than their penchant for sending gay Asians to the hospital.