Category: Salter

The Ethnic Genetic Interests of Imperium

Optimizing European EGI

By Imperium, I obviously mean Yockey’s overarching idea, not his book. In the debate between “Big Europe” pan-Europeanism, as exemplified by Yockey, and atomized ethnonationalism, where do ethnic genetic interests (EGI) fit in?

First, let us clear up misconceptions about Yockey, misconceptions that assert he advocated a complete European panmixia in which all distinctions between Europeans would disappear.

English, German, French, Italian, Spanish — these are now mere place-names and linguistic variations. Like all of the other rich products of our great Culture, they will continue but they are no longer political terms. Local cultures in Europe may be as diversified as they wish, and they will enjoy a perfect autonomy in the European Imperium, now that the oppression of vertical nationalism is dead. Anyone who seeks to perpetuate petty-statism or old-fashioned nationalism is the inner enemy of Europe. He is playing the game, of the extra-European forces, he is dividing Europe and committing treason.

Treason now has only one meaning to Europe: it means serving any other force than Europe. There is only one treason now, treason to Europe. The nations are dead, for Europe is born.

“Local cultures in Europe may be as diversified as they wish, and they will enjoy a perfect autonomy…” – hopefully that clarifies the dishonest “Yockey wanted to eliminate all intra-European particularisms” argument.

We also need to keep in mind that Yockey wrote this several years after the end of WWII; faced with the undisputable poisonous fruit from the ethnonationalist tree, Yockey championed a militant pan-Europeanism, an ideal which he would likely have championed anyway (even without the war and its aftermath) – although perhaps with less stringent rhetoric – because he saw a United Europe as the next step in the organic evolution of the West. But no doubt his ill-concealed rage toward those who questioned, in any way, his vision was in part due to the devastation he saw around him – although I must say I agree with him that those who continue to try and divide Europe are indeed traitors (intentionally or not).

Small-minded and short-sighted “activists” today, who have forgotten the lessons of two world wars, instead look at the EU and recoil at any idea of European unity.  One cannot just look at what’s right in front of them, but also look toward the ages. That’s something that today’s “movement” pygmies are incapable of doing. In any case, Yockey suggests eliminating European nations as political entities, with Europe itself being the only political entity with real sovereignty; on the other hand, Yockey allows for local autonomy in this scheme, preservation of local cultures and, presumably then, preservation of the ethnic stocks actualizing those cultures.

There are of course EGI costs and benefits to Yockey’s imperial scheme.  Let’s consider EGI, in a qualitative sense, along the ethnonationalist/pan-European continuum.  What are the options? We need to find the “sweet spot” where maximum genetic interest can be obtained at the ethny level by balancing interests and investments at both the racial and ethnic levels.  Of course, there is not (as of now) any calculable metric to give us any definitive answers here, even if we accept that answers may change in a context-dependent manner.  As noted above, the arguments will necessarily have to be, at least for now, qualitative rather than quantitative.

Now, Yockey’s vision (and the somewhat similar ideas of Mosely) are not the most extreme manifestation of pan-Europeanism   Probably von Hoffmeister’s ideal would be classified as such; read this:

The mixing of different European nationalities should therefore be encouraged. We must support sexual unions between Russian women and German men, Spanish men and Swedish women. Only by radically breaking down the artificial barriers dividing Europe can we create the new breed of man…

(Constantin von Hoffmeister, “Our Motherland: Imperium Europa,” in Norman Lowell, Imperium Europa: The Book that Changed the World (Imperium Publishing, 2008), 24)

One can envision then a continuum in which at one end we have von Hoffmeister’s panmictic vision of pan-Europeanism; on the other end we have the Counter-Currents scheme of extreme ethnonationalism, in which balkanized European nations and regions guard their sovereignty from their neighbors, and are ready to go to war – including ethnic cleansing! – against fellow Europeans who in any way offend them.  So, the endpoints of the continuum are here:

CC——————–CvH

…and I’ll fill in some other viewpoints in a qualitative, impressionistic fashion.

Key:

CC = Counter-Currents

CvH = Constatin von Hoffmeister

FPY = Francis Parker Yockey

TS = Ted Sallis

NL = Normal Lowell

C = Center

OGI = On Genetic Interests discussion of “civilizational blocs” as one political approach to EGI (this is not meant to be a comprehensive and/or current summary of Salter’s views, which may well be slightly more in the ethnonationalist direction, although I cannot speak for him)

BSS = “Black” SS – as per Coogan, the more Nordicist and Germanocentric portion of the SS 

WSS = “Waffen” SS – as per Coogan, the more pan-European faction of the SS (not necessarily the same as the Waffen SS proper)

AH = Adolf Hitler

MC = Montreaux Conference of 1934

Thus:

CC -AH/BSS——WSS/MC-C-OGI—TS/NL—FPY—CvH

Note that is not the final word, it is my interpretation, and things may certainly change with more data.  But that is a reasonable starting point for discussion.

Thus, Mosely may be around where Yockey is, or perhaps a bit toward the left, Spencer the same. 

Note two things.  First, this is a Far-Right continuum along the ethnonationalist/pan-European axis.  The Far-Left EU is discussed below.  Second, as this is a two-dimensional spectrum, the fact that two points are near each other does not mean they agree on other issues.  For example, I (TS) favor the pan-European approach, but one that allows for national/local sovereignty to some extent, and the definitive preservation of ethnicities and their cultures.  Lowell, with his Imperium vs. Dominion dichotomy (large-scale Imperium vs. local rule Dominion) is similar, although we may disagree on other issues.  I favor an authoritarian national socialist regime; Lowell favors libertarian capitalism.

Is it fair to describe Counter-Currents as more extreme than Adolf Hitler and the “Black” SS? The Nazis wanted to dispossess the Slavs and reduce them to the level of serfs; Counter-Currents publicly endorsed the idea of European nations ethnically cleansing each other in particular circumstances.  As genocide is more extreme than enslavement, the placement on the continuum is in my opinion justified.  

The “Waffen” SS and the Montreux conference is on the ethnonationalist side of the equation: although these SS men were more pan-European, they were still Germanocentric followers of Hitler, and they promoted the idea of a Europe of nations (led by Germany of course).  The Montreux conference promoted a Fascist International ideal of pan-European cooperation, but cooperation amongst ethnonationalist movements, each retaining their full sovereignty.  In OGI, Salter discussed the idea of civilizational blocs that are fairly permeable internally but closed to the outside, yet EGI is fully compatible with ethnonationalism and no clear cut definitive recommendations were made there.  Thus, that discussion in OGI is slightly to the pan-European side of center.  Those further to the right on the continuum have already been discussed.

Where would the EU fit in this scheme?  Actually nowhere, as this continuum is for pro-White, rightist planning, while the EU is orthogonal to all of this an anti-White, leftist creation of globalist elites. If we were to judge, however, strictly on the criterion of relative sovereignty, then the EU would be in between my ideal and that of Yockey.  The EU is less extreme than Yockey in that in retains European nations a political entities, but it is more extreme than my vision in that it dictates even local matters, it promotes migration between EU nations, and essentially today the entire enterprise can be summarized by the vision of the harridan scold Merkel, standing astride Europe holding a rolling pin, grinding down opposition to her radical race replacement agenda.  I would certainly suggest more national independence than that!

Extreme ethnonationalism would attempt to maximize EGI at the ethnic level, while foregoing racial European EGI as a whole in the global context.  Extreme pan-Europeanism would do the opposite: maximize racial EGI of Europe vs the Colored World, while sacrificing ethnic EGI, which would be significantly degraded through the proposed process of panmixia.  Of the two, I would argue that extreme ethnonationalism is actually more self-contradictory, since extreme ethnonationalism can actually damage the specific ethnic group practicing it.  Salter talks in OGI how Hitler’s extreme ethnonationalism damaged the German people as a result of his wars, and the reaction of other nations against him.  Also, since European ethnic groups are relatively similar genetically (some more than others)  with some kinship overlap between neighboring states, an extreme ethnonationalism would harm the people practicing it, from an EGI standpoint, because they would be in opposition to people fundamentally similar to themselves, while more alien peoples of other continents may well benefit from intra-European strife.  Extreme ethnonationalism, by attempting to maximize narrow gross genetic interests, can backfire on those practicing it and result in a net loss of genetic interest.  The Germans had Hitler; now they have Merkel.  Their extreme ethnonationalism boomeranged into suicidal Universalist altruism.  Perhaps if Hitler was a dedicated pan-Europeanist, and one without a “zero sum game” ethnonationalist attitude, the German people –and all Europeans – would be better off today.

That said, both extremes are sub-optimal for European EGI.  For example, I cannot see a logical argument as to why a European panmixia is necessary to actualize an Imperium capable of safeguarding the interests – ethnic genetic and otherwise – of all European peoples.  If it is not necessary, then the foregone ethnic-specific EGI is wasted for no reason.  Indeed, one can argue that the prospect of a panmixia that eliminates ethnic-specific particularisms would spark an ethnonationalist backlash as groups attempt to safeguard their uniqueness through a “narcissism of small differences” campaign against their fellow Europeans.  Occam’s razor for civilizational planning: do not multiply complexities beyond necessity.  In the absence of a convincing argument in favor of panmixia (if there is such an argument I would like to see it produced and fairly evaluate it), it is an unnecessary complication.  But those who would critique that threat to European ethnic diversity are hypocrites if they do not equally denounce the “ethnic cleansing” of Europeans promoted by the extreme ethnonationalists.  Such genocidal lunacy obviously is detrimental to the EGI of all Europeans.

One can envision charting on the x-axis the ethnonationalist-pan-European continuum (ethnonationalist on left, pan-European on right) and on the y-axis the net effects on both ethnic-level EGI and racial-level EGI as two distinct lines.  In general, the ethnic-level EGI line would start highest at the ethnonationalist side of the continuum, although I argue (see above) that extreme ethnonationalism is corrosive of even narrow ethnic interests; however, for the sake of argument, let’s consider a simple downward slope moving from left to right on the graph (from ethnonationalist to pan-European).  On the other hand, the racial line slopes upward as one moves rightward in the pan-European direction.  Of course, things are not that simple even here, given how ethnic and racial interests overlap; the racial is composed of the ethnic, and kinship overlap confuses ethnic interests with that of other ethnies in the racial.  But again, for the sake of argument, we can consider a simple mode.  We can then envision a graph like this.

Envision the ethnic line as blue and the racial line as red.  There will be a point of intersection – the “sweet spot” – in which there is an optimized balance of ethnic and racial genetic interests (and, likely, interests in general, including the important proximate interests, particularly High Culture). The question remains, where is this spot, and or course it is unlikely we will agree on an answer, although most people would likely agree that the spot is not at either of the extremes (although, theoretically, it could be). Again, this is a qualitative, impressionist argument (similar to Salter’s genetic interest plots in OGI), but one needs to consider it nevertheless, even knowing that without the (impossible) option of side-by-side testing of alternatives, we are making educated guesses, or, more optimistically, informed and logical estimates.

There is always going to be a trade-off between narrower and broader genetic interests.  Of course, it goes without saying: context is important.  The “sweet spot” is obviously going to change based on context and circumstances.  If the overall race is secure, but your particular ethnic group is threatened then, obviously, the cross-over point at which the genetic interest lines intersect will fall closer to the ethnonationalist direction.  On other hand, race-wide crises would necessitate shifting the intersection point in the pan-European direction.  In particular, if your ethnic group is relatively secure, but the race as a whole – that includes ethnic groups relatively similar to your own, for whom you share some (somewhat more diluted, but still substantial – particularly given the numbers involved) genetic interest – is threatened, then the intersection point needs to be far to the pan-European direction.  If both race and ethnic group are secure, more investment in self and family is prudent’ if humanity as a whole is threatened, one must look toward that (while still giving preference to your own people, so defined).  In the current situation, both ethnic group and race are threatened for all Europeans, so a balanced approach is best.  What’s optimal then?

I would propose that my vision of a balanced pan-Europeanism, formulated with EGI in mind, in which local sovereignty is retained and intra-European differences are preserved, while enfolding all the peoples of Europe in an Imperium to safeguard their existence, actualize a High Culture, and reach the stars, is the sweet spot” between the extremes.  Lowell’s Imperium Europa has many of the same advantages.  Although we cannot know this for sure, without an actual side-by-side testing of schemes that is impossible, it is logically reasonable to conclude that a balanced approach would preserve European EGI than both panmixia as well as lunatic ethnonationalist schemes in which atomized Europeans ethnically cleanse each other in bloody warfare.  Although the OGI point, not far away from mine, may also serve.

Again, a balance is needed, which I believe my scheme exemplifies.  Ethnic and local particularisms (biological and cultural) are preserved, intra-European borders are preserved, intra-European demographic flows are restricted, but, at the same time, one has an Imperium, which cuts off all flow from the outside, and sufficiently integrates Europe – for defense, foreign policy, racial matters, top-level cultural and science/technics issues, etc. – so as to safeguard the entire and prevent EGI-corroding intra-European feuding.  There’s no ethic cleansing in my scheme, nor any panmixia.  It is certainly a reasonable and viable candidate for the “sweet spot.”  The bulk of both ethnic and racial genetic interests are conserved, some compromises are made, and political mechanisms would need to be put in place to ensure the long-term maintenance of the balance between ethnic and racial level interests.

This is the beginning of the analysis, and I see it a good start.


And what about Yockey’s Imperium idea?  Assuming he was serious about the commitment to local autonomy and preservation, then his authoritarian Western state could do a reasonably good job at balancing ethnic and racial European EGI, although other ides may be more optimal (or not).  We do need to remember Salter’s warning that a permanent solution to preserving and defending EGI is likely impossible.


We do the best that we can.

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Genetic Structure and Altruistic Self-Sacrifice

A more precise accounting is required.

We are all aware of Haldane’s oft-quoted assertion that he would lay down his life for two brothers or eight cousins, the genetic payoff of such altruistic self-sacrifice being the equivalence – as measured by ”bean-bag” genetics – of the numbers of gene copies between these sets of relatives.

In general, I am in broad agreement with the sentiment, although as we shall see, it requires modification.  Even more broadly, those on the Far Right invoke this paradigm to support the idea of altruistic self-sacrifice in favor of larger numbers of an ethny, in defense if ethnic genetic interests.  Likewise, I support that as well, with the proper modifications as with the smaller-scale examples of familial relatives.

Even though at first glance, Haldane’s reasoning seems sound, likely most people would be hesitant to follow that advice.  In large part, this is the natural impulse of self-preservation, but there are other reasonable objections that can be made.

One could argue, all else being equal, that judging between two sets of equivalent genetics, it’s better to preserve yourself for reasons of control.  A person concerned enough with genetic continuity that they would consider such altruistic self-sacrifice is someone likely to start a family, care for children, and properly actualize the continuity. Can you be sure your two brothers would do the same?  Why are they in the position that they need your sacrifice to begin with?  Are they stupid?  Reckless? Are you sure they’ll act in support of your (in this case indirect) genetic continuity with the same vigor you would do for yourself?  So, to be safe, maybe you need to raise the bar for self-sacrifice to three brothers or ten cousins?

A more important reason, and one that may be intuitively sensed by most people even though they wouldn’t be able to explain it, or likely even articulate their feeling about it, is that there is more about kinship than mere numbers of gene copies.  Genetic structure is important – what genes are coinherited and, to the layman’s eye, what phenotypic traits (derived from those genes) are inherited together.  Of course, family is going to be more similar here than (co-ethnic) strangers, but similarity is not identity.  Even with siblings (apart from identical twins, which are a special case), recombination and independent assortment will ensure that your brothers will have a distinct genetic stricture from you.  Now, granted, these same processed, even with a co-ethnic mate, will ensure that your children will also have a different genetic structure than you, but, all else being equal, your brothers’ children will be more unlike you, with respect to genetic structure, than your own children, as the “starting point” (you vs. your brothers) is already different. So, when genetic structure is taken into account, two brothers are not really your genetic equivalent.  Apart from an identical twin, you have no genetic equivalent, just degrees of relative similarity and difference, even after numbers of gene copies are accounted for.  Then how many brothers are sufficient for self-sacrifice?  This requires a more rigorous analysis, which will be dependent upon accurate measures of genetic structure, and that’s not something we can expect SJW population geneticists are likely to do. However, while the overall Haldane argument – and its Salterian extension – makes sense the numbers given based on “bean bag” genetics is going to be an underestimation of where you need to draw the line in sacrificing yourself for others.  On the other hand, the reverse is true – if you have to choose between your brothers and strangers, or between co-ethnics and non-ethnics, taking genetic structure into account means that helping your brothers and your co-ethnics is even more important than before, because in comparison to more genetically alien peoples, genetic structure amplifies how much more close you are to your brothers and your co-ethnics.  It’s a double-edged sword: it makes your own preservation a bit more important, but it also makes the preservation of those more similar to you more important than those more distant.

Now, one can argue that after several generations of recombination and independent assortment – even assuming endogamous mating within the ethny – genetic structures derived from your posterity and those of your brothers will be more or less the same, converging on the common pool of ethny-specific genetic structures.  So, while in the first generation, your offspring and that of your brothers may be distinct with respect to genetic structure, that difference would be attenuated over time and, as long as endogamous mating is maintained, your posterity and theirs would reflect similar genetic structures.  But there are problems here.  First, a rigorous analysis is required; perhaps some differences would continue over at least several generations; even if these differences are small, they nevertheless would need to be accounted for.  Second, if it is true that familial genetic strictures would tend, over time, to converge on more generalized ethny-specific structures, then why bother favoring two brothers over two random co-ethnics?  The brothers would share more of your genes, yes, and be more similar as far as genetic structure, but if one invokes “long term intergenerational effects” with respect to questioning the need to account for structure in modifying Haldane’s argument, then one can use the same “intergenerational effect” to directly question Haldane’s original premise.  The answer I believe is that one must do the best they can at a given time in maximizing their genetic payoff, and hope that subsequent generations do the same. In the absence of the required analysis, one can simply argue that looking to the next generation, differences in genetic structure are important and, hence, two brothers are not quite the genetic equivalence of yourself.  Your structure is different from theirs and the genetic payoff of your reproduction is greater for your than both of theirs combined.  So, maybe you need to hold out and sacrifice for three (or more) brothers instead, including for the other reason outlined above. Note that these fine points deal with very close genetic similarity.  When we are talking about racially alien peoples, the genetic distance becomes even more amplified with genetic structure, and in the absence of panmixia, ethny-specific patterns of genetic structure are broadly stable over evolutionary time (we can see that the Iceman is genetically more similar to Europeans than to, say, Asians  of Africans, as one example).

In the absence of the sort of careful quantitative analysis that population geneticists won’t do, from a qualitative standpoint, it would be prudent to require more of a genetic payoff before engaging in Haldane-style altruistic self-sacrifice.  On the other hand, when considering a choice in investing between two genetic entities, picking the group genetically closer to you is even more important when considering genetic structure.  So, when the choice is between self vs. family or family vs. ethny, genetic structure will require a larger genetic payoff before agreeing to sacrifice the interests of the former for the latter. However, when considering a relative choice between ethny one vs. ethny two, genetic structure means that choosing the more similar-to-you ethny is even more important than with “bean-bag” genetics.  

The overall Salterian imperative remains the same as before, once these adjustments are made.

Two Maxims

Some things I’ve discussed before, but which are worth emphasizing.

The first came to my attention from the work of the defector “Viktor Suvorov.”

Maxim One: Revolutions typically do not occur during the period of greatest repression; instead, they take place after that repression is suddenly relaxed.

Examples: The French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, Glasnost leading to the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe.

The System/Left knows this, if only instinctively.  Hence, they are doubling down on all their anti-White, SJW narratives and repression after Trump’s victory.  They refuse to concede an inch, refuse to take White concerns seriously; they understand that if they start compromising, they are (eventually) finished.  And they correct to believe that; however, we must create a situation in which they simply will not have a choice but to attempt compromise; the alternative for them being, in the long-term, even more untenable.  That’s why I advocate in favor of Salter’s strategy of Democratic Multiculturalism, a form of sociopolitical ju-jitsu that forces the System to either compromise with the White Right (eventually dooming them) or openly admitting that their entire worldview is morally illegitimate (eventually dooming them as well, particularly as that would increase White demands for the Democratic Multiculturalism option, bringing the System back to square one).  But the nitwit Type I activists of the “movement” reject that strategy in favor of their Turner Diaries fantasies and other stupidities.

Maxim Two: For any dissident force – guerrilla armies in the field, underground dissidents, racial nationalists and other fringe political movements – maintaining your existence in the face of System oppression, surviving, continuing Fabian tactics and strategies, still being there, that is itself a victory.  As long as you exist, the System has not won; as long as you exist, you prove that you could win, you place doubt in the minds of your opponents and of the masses, and if you can outlast your foe, eventual victory may very well be yours.

Thus, the importance of prioritizing survival, for not directly engaging with a superior foe, for using ju-jitsu and Fabian strategies; hence, the value of continued existence in the face of a seemingly overpowering adversary.

This applies to the “movement” as a whole, as well as dissident groupuscules within the “movement” such as EGI Notes.

Salter Critiques the LGBTQ Lobby

Gay hypocrisy?

The key conclusion (emphasis added):

LGBTQI campaigns assert that love is equal, yet they help marginalize attachments and acts they find repugnant or inconvenient. The activist community should acknowledge all types of sexuality and marriage that meet their professed moral standard. They should not deceive the public by selectively applying their morality.
Alternatively, activists should abandon their artificial solidarity and the morality they deploy to justify it. They should admit that not all sexual desire and acts and types of marriage are equal. Many will join with the straight binary community in rejecting the appropriateness of polygamy, incest and bestiality. In so doing they might view their own orientation with humility and ponder whether insisting on complete normalisation is good for society.

EGI Notes does not say we must hate homosexuals, and it does not say that homosexuals should be completely excluded from racial activism merely based on their sexual preferences (leadership positions are another matter entirely).  But is it too much to ask that they are honest about it (hiding it only makes it worse if and when it is uncovered) and, more importantly, that they admit that their preferences are abnormal?  Put it this way: there is a big difference, an almost existential difference between a racial activist who just happens to be homosexual and who has their sexuality as a secondary and incidental part of their identity and a homosexual who just happens to be a racial activist with their sociopolitical/racial views merely being a secondary and incidental part of their identity.  The former person – if they are upfront about what they are and if they accept the abnormality of it – can be a useful and effective racial activist.  The latter person – using racialism as a front to push a homosexual agenda – is part of the problem, not part of the solution.  Particularly if such a person – of the latter type – attempts to normalize homosexuality and, even more so, if they promote markedly maladaptive memes such as anti-natalism, then then they are agents of racial degeneration, not racial progress.  

Are there representatives of the former type in the “movement?”  Potentially so, potentially since they are still “in the closet” as there are no openly identified (and thus honest) homosexuals who clearly prioritize race and civilization above their sexual identity. The latter type?  Yes, they exist in the “movement” and they would profit I believe in reading Salter’s piece and reflecting on the phrase: “they might view their own orientation with humility and ponder whether insisting on complete normalisation is good for society.”

A thought experiment: if a safe and effective cure for homosexuality was devised, so that all such people could be reprogrammed to be heterosexual just by, for example, taking a pill, what would be the attitude of homosexuals in racial activism?  Would they welcome the opportunity to divest themselves of their abnormality, or would they protest that this is an affront to “gay identity” and “authenticity?”  

The other conundrum is if for some activists their sexual identity is of importance then why are they still officially “in the closet?”  Now, as stated above, I believe everyone should be open and honest about these issues and if they are homosexual should just come out and say it.  However, if they believe that it is a private issue that is wholly incidental to their identity, then one would expect that they would never promote, or in any way attempt to normalize, homosexuality in any way.  It has to be one or the other.  

The Ethics of EGI

The ethics of pursuing genetic interests.

In On Genetic Interests (OGI), Salter devotes the last third of the book to a discussion of the ethics of pursuing genetic interests, including ethnic genetic interests (EGI).  This has been the most ignored, and undervalued, section of the book by both “friend” and foe alike.  The “movement” is unsurprisingly relatively uninterested in ethics so they ignore it; while the anti-EGI mainstream pretend that Salter proposes wild ideas of rapine and pillage, so any acknowledgment that there is serious and morally sound ethical discussion there is ignored because it conflicts with the mendacious narratives of the left.

We on the other hand can look at this section of the book, consider the arguments, and take those arguments seriously (whether we agree with them or not).  In my previous writings, I had first concentrated on the population genetics aspect (first third of OGI) – of which there is not much more to say until if and when we get global genetic kinship data and data on human genetic structure/integration (at which point there will be much new to say – and then, more recently, have started evaluating the political aspects (second third of OGI), of which no doubt there will always be more to say, but I have relatively neglected ethics, a deficit I will now begin to correct.

Salter defines “adaptive utilitarianism” as the paradigm in which “a good act is one that increases or protects the fitness of the greater number.”  Salter then examines this in the light of different ethical schemes and in the context of individual and group rights.  What can we make of all of this?

Salter stresses that genetic continuity is certainly compatible with peace between ethnies and with equality of opportunity within ethnies, but not with equality of fitness outcomes, since the latter is evolutionarily unstable.  One cannot “force” equal outcomes with respect to biological fitness, there should be no “affirmative action” with respect to equal genetic representation across generations (*).  Evolution is about unequal fitness outcomes, selection, and, contrary to those who misread Salter, he is NOT calling for any sort of “genetic stasis” – there is, and should be, unequal outcomes in the biological sense, but that does not mean that entire groups should have their fitness radically lowered. Unequal outcomes can be tempered with preservation of genetic diversity (which is good for those preserved but also good for us all, since we cannot predict when this genetic diversity may one day be need/useful for the entire humanity).  Thus, just like competition between individuals in society has its limits – one is not allowed to murder one’s rivals to increase one’s personal fitness – so too does the completive struggles between ethnies have limits in which every group is assured its genetic continuity, but not necessarily at predetermined perfectly equal outcomes assured by some sort of powerful genetic arbiter.

Talking about ethics – what do we mean?  In other words, what are the major types of ethical frameworks from which to view EGI?

Teleological ethics – also known as consequentialist ethics – judge an act right depending on its effects; as Salter points out, circular reasoning (e.g., “an act is moral because it increases moral behavior”) is avoided by examining the non-moral consequences of the act, such as increasing well-being.  Utilitarianism – the greatest benefit for the greatest number – is therefore teleological.   Deontological ethics ae those that are judged based on its “intrinsic characteristics”- as established by “intuition or religion” – rather on its consequences.  It is more “rule based.”  Note that as Salter rightly points out, teleological ethics have a deontological components, since some consequence (e.g. increased well-being) is judged to be more based on an intrinsic understanding of the worth of that consequence.

Of course, one can judge pursuit as EGI as both teleological as well as deontological.  It is definitely teleological if we consider the consequence of enhancing fitness for the greatest number (at least of our on ethny); however, it is deontological to the extent that – if we eschew the “is/ought problem” – we are defining adaptive behavior as an intrinsically good moral value (and others may disagree).  So, it is a teleological ethic with strong deontological undertone, as many (all?) teleological ethics are. Note that when I above specify “our own ethny” this implies that teleological ethics must consider exactly who we are talking about – whose well-being are we concerned with?  Or as Sailer would harp on: who? Whom? 

One can therefore view pursuit of EGI as fundamentally being, at its core, teleological, with possibly – or possibly not, depending on how this pursuit is actualized – some deontological aspects as well.  It is utilitarian in that sense. 

We can ask though – should pursuit of EGI, and of genetic interests in general, actually be the focus of any utilitarian teleological ethic?  How about “happiness?”

If utilitarianism is about “maximizing the greatest good,” then what should the “greatest good” mean?  Happiness?  Salter points put that people in objectively bad conditions (drug addicts getting a “fix”) may be “happy,” the mentally deranged may be “happy,” and then we have the problem: does utilitarian benefit have to be based on conscious preferences?  If someone is unaware of an interest, does that mean it does not exist?  A muskrat has, from the biological perspective, an interest in its own genetic continuity, and will behave from instinct to preserve itself, and presumably a mother muskrat will protect is young using the same instinctive impulse, but there is no conscious preference involved.  The muskrat does not so act because acting in this way “makes it happy.”  Looking at how evolution works, looking at the innate instincts of life, we as evolved organisms may decide – and this is admittedly a conscious preference, but the interests remain whether or not we are aware of them – that adaptive behavior can be a criterion for utilitarian benefit.  Is this the naturalistic fallacy them?

There is the Is/ought problem, of which the naturalistic fallacy is a part – “something is good because it exists, because it is found in nature” (anti-Salterians accuse Salter of this, although he is clear that making adaptive fitness a desirable goal is a conscious choice for humans); on the other hand, the moralistic fallacy (often characteristic of leftist thinking) – “something must be true and exist in reality/nature because it is good” – is typically more prevalent in today’s society, but typically never identified as such (perhaps because it is so widespread none of the hypocrites who ant about the “naturalist fallacy” are aware of their own logical inconsistencies).

So, no, we are not saying we MUST accept adaptiveness as the criterion; however, if we decide that genetic continuity is better than not, that existence is better than non-existence, ten adaptive utilitarianism is a prudent choice – note it is a choice, a scientifically informed choice, but still a choice.  We are not “mandated” by nature to choose to act adaptively (although I note that those who act adaptively will replace those that do not, whether you consider that as a “naturalistic fallacy” is a topic for the philosophers). The point is that we can decide to pick the adaptiveness criterion, it has many arguments in its favor, it is self-perpetuating in the sense that those who so choose will be more likely to have continuity of their existence, but, once identified as a legitimate interest by anyone (and this has obviously already occurred!), we can state that the interest exists for all humans (indeed, for all evolve life forms) whether they are aware of it or not.  This seems to be a rather long-winded and complicated argument in favor of a somewhat obvious point, but it is necessary, since enemies of White survival engage in the most outrageous sophistry, and denial of objective fact and clear logic, as well as basic fairness and fundamental human rights, to deny Whites their rights of existence, preservation, and group interests. [I’ll pass over Salter’s arguments about Singer and “animal liberation.”  The targeted readers of this essay hopefully not only value their genetic interests over that of other humans, but over non-human animals as well].

So what we have is: adaptive utilitarianism: we choose to value adaptive fitness as the good to be maximized.

But should the pursuit of EGI (and genetic interests in general) be purely teleological?  Should we engage in pure adaptive utilitarianism in pursuit of genetic interests – concerned with ends only, with no concern for means whatsoever?  Do rights and justice count for nothing?

Salter provides a hypothetical example illustrating the limits of pure utilitarianism from the standpoint of standard notions of justice.  I’ll paraphrase a bit.  Consider a town, with an economy heavily based on tourism and its image as a “good” place.  Some horrific (and we can assume heavily publicized) murder takes place there, endangering the town’s image.  A vagabond petty thief – a constant troublemaker who has been harming the town’s image and damaging its tourist industry – is suspected of the murder.  The townspeople are howling for “justice” – they want the vagabond tried, convicted, and hanged, and their town’s reputation restored.  However, the sheriff discovers the vagabond is innocent – the murder was actually committed by the town’s mayor, a person of previously impeccable character and high standing, the very image of the town ad its “goodness.“ Further, this murder was a “one-time crime of passion” – it is almost certain that the mayor would never do anything like this again.  Arresting the mayor for the murder would, as Salter rightly points out, ravage the town’s social order, ruin its image, harm its tourist industry, and damage its economy, putting people out of work.  A pure utilitarian view – the greatest benefit for the greatest number – would suggest letting the vagabond hang and letting the mayor go free.  But Salter points out this would offend our sense of justice, a common weakness for pure utilitarian schemes.  Even if you would be willing to bend the rules here, what if this scenario was extended and expanded to a decision involving millions of people?  Entire ethnies?  Nations?  Is justice so easily foregone?  The “hard men” of the “movement” may bluster that they would sacrifice everything for their EGI, and who knows maybe they are right, but Whites in general, with their intense sense of Universalist justice, would be unlikely to go along.  Utilitarianism must be tempered by fairness and justice to create a long-term, evolutionarily stable system amenable to Whites.  Thus, one must introduce concepts of justice – procedural justice according to establish protocols – based on the concepts of fairness, morality, and individual rights, all of which have a strong deontological component and which conflict with the “pure ethic” of unrestrained (teleological) utilitarianism.  In this specific case, the vagabond is set free, and the mayor is arrested, “consequences be damned.”  Note there is no utilitarian justification for this, unless one invokes as a possible teleological argument that the concept of justice benefits everyone since who knows when any individual will one day be faced with a situation similar to the vagabond.  Although justice for the individual in the face of “greater good utilitarian arguments would seem to be pure deontological argumentation, of one argues that, since we are all individuals, a doctrine of individual rights benefits the greatest number (all of us) in the greatest number of possible circumstances (almost infinite), then we come full circle and are faced in a sense by conflicting utilitarianisms: the greatest good for the greatest number, with “number”  as viewed as a collective vs. the greatest good for the greatest number, with “number” viewed as a collection of autonomous individuals.  Collectivists may favor the first, individualists, the second; a “mixed ethic” favors both, by weighing the relative merits of each case (in a manner inevitably deontological).

Salter therefore supports a form of adaptive utilitarianism restrained by a respect for individual rights and for the rights of other ethnies to have the same preservationist opportunities (‘the mixed ethic”) – which is consistent with “universal nationalism”.  Some Nutzi types – who fantasize about “nature red in tooth and claw” and pine away for visions of genocide of “the other” mock Salter’s mixed ethic and claim it is inconsistent with the logical conclusions of EGI (anti-Salterians make similar arguments from an anti-White perspective).  But, Salter I think understands the difference between gross and net genetic interests, and that attempts to maximize genetic interest to an extreme extent (gross calculations) will backfire and end up costing more than any potential benefit (net loss of genetic interest).  The mixed ethic is likely more stable over time, less risky, less of a gamble of an ethny’s precious genetic interest.  One need not “go for broke” with respect to genetic interests.  At times, prudent restraint yields the greatest payoff over time.

Salter admits the possibility of “incoherence” with the mixed ethic – one that interjects rights into the adaptive utilitarian scheme – bit I have argued against it by pointing out that since we are all “others” to someone else, we all benefit by putting limits to the extent that both we  and that someone else can pursue their adaptive interests.  I note that Salter himself makes a similar argument, more on individual and family lines, in that the rule of law provides the stability for everyone to “raise a family and acquire resources” as opposed to an arbitrary law free-for-all where every hand is raised against another.  Thus, the mixed ethnic allows for competition and the core pursuit of genetic interests (equal opportunity but not equal outcomes), but puts limits on this pursuit through a “mantle of rights” that would restrain excesses.  Salter also points out the problem of “bounded rationality” (**) for “classic utilitarianism” – how can we really know, really predict, the ultimate consequences of our acts?  Getting back to my previously states (in other posts) principle of net vs. gross genetic interests, how do we know that a “free-for-all” grasping for maximizing gross genetic interests wouldn’t backfire and harm ourselves, diminishing the final, net accounting of genetic interests?  One could invoke the Hitler case here.  The mixed ethic, by retraining adaptive utilitarianism within reasonable limits, would reduce the risk of wild gambles that place net genetic interests in extreme jeopardy.  Salter’s Table 9.1 summarizes some of these differences. Both pure adaptive utilitarianism and the mixed ethic consider EGI to be morally good, while a rights-centered ethic has no opinion on the subject.  Do ends justify the means for EGI?  The pure adaptive ethnic says yes, the mixed says yes, BUT “constrained by rights,” and the ethic concerned only by rights says no.

It should be clear that I generally support the mixed ethic, and make my own argument in its favor (a variation of Salter’s argument) above.  That said, I am a bit more toward the “pure” side of the spectrum than is Salter. The mixed ethic is good in the vast majority of circumstances, but if one is faced with an existential crisis of genetic interests, then rights must go out the window and the pure ethic applied (whether the current racial crisis for Whites currently merits designation as such an existential crisis I will for now leave to the reader to decide).  Now, one can point out a problem here; going back to my “we’re all in the same boat” argument, what if another group decides that they are in an existential racial genetic interest crisis, and then applies the pure ethic in competition against us Whites?  Two replies.  First, we should always be prepared to defend ourselves against any eventuality (realistically, apart from ourselves and our own tendencies for self-destruction, including ethnonationalist lunacies, the only real long-term threat comes from certain Asiatics); second, if we practice universal nationalism, then we shouldn’t provoke other groups into viewing us as pushing them into an existential crisis (these other groups should have equal awareness not to push us, but they do not seem to have that awareness, taking advantage of current White [mental] weakness to bully our genetic interests).

Let us move on. Salter then considers three important questions, the answers to which are summarized in his Table 9.2, and can thus be discussed with equal brevity here.  Can it be moral for EGI to frustrate other interests?  The pure adaptive utilitarian ethic says yes.  The mixed ethic says yes, but only in defense of EGI or in a competitive expansion that preserves the existence and the genetic continuity of the competitor.  The rights-centered ethic says no.  Should genetic interests, including EGI have absolute priority? The pure ethic: yes. Mixed: no, if EGI conflicts with individual rights (here a compromise needs to be made; this does not mean foregoing EGI, but pursuing EGI, and other genetic interests, in a manner reasonably constrained by other considerations).  The rights ethic: no (only “means” matter, not the consequences). What is the right action when genetic interests conflict?  Pure adaptive utilitarianism: compete within adaptive limits; tights can be ignored, but do not engage in conflict that would destroy yourself as well (net genetic interests!).  Mixed ethic: compete but respect rights. “Live and let live.”  Rights: stop competing, because you are causing harm.  Salter then considers freedom and EGI: the ultimate freedom is that of being allowed to pursue genetic interests, including EGI, equal opportunity, not equal outcomes.  This last part is important, as, again, some of Salter’s critics lie about his alleged support for “genetic stasis” – here Salter agrees with Hamilton’s blunt statement that equality of fitness is impossible.  That of course does not entail genocide against others, or allowing genocide to your own group, or engaging in wild transhumanist schemes to radically change genomes over short time periods, but some genetic change, including eugenics, is consistent with EGI, and completion between groups, constrained by adaptive limits and by basic right, is also legitimate.  If we then accept adaptive utilitarianism, we must accept competition, unequal outcomes, and the fact that, unlike some utopian and non-biological versions of utilitarianism, we realize that “not all utilities are in harmony.”

But we must have the freedom to pursue genetic interests, including EGI, and resist those who would deny us that freedom.  After all, it’s ethical to so pursue, and it is ethical to resist those who would prevent that pursuit.

Notes:

*Likewise, a fair society would have equality of opportunity for education and career advancement, but should not force equality of outcome (which racial and sexual affirmative action attempts); this attempt at social engineering is incompatible with real social and technical progress.  The same principle applies, in evolutionary terms, with attempts to engineer equal fitness outcomes.

**While Salter frames his arguments within the framework of rationality and the Anglosphere empiricist tradition, he also approvingly quotes D.S. Wilson, who concludes:

“It is the person who elevates factual truth above practical truth who must be accused of mental weakness from an evolutionary perspective.”  

That comes after Wilson stated: “Adaption is the gold standard against which rationality must be judged, along with all other forms of thought.”

Indeed, if “irrational’ calls to “national greatness,” palingenetic ultra-nationalism, or Yockey’s “actualizing a High Culture” and Imperium idea motivates for defense of EGI, so be it.  We cannot at the same time praise Wilson’s comments and then, for example, criticize aspects of “fascism” for not always following “objective truths” in ever nitpicking detail.

EGI and National Socialism, Part II

Further analysis of this issue.

In On Genetic Interests, Salter makes some comments about National Socialism, and fascism more generally, from the standpoint of EGI.  It’s worth looking at those.

Salter has some positive things to say about National Socialism: “…a revitalized social policy, full employment, rapid economic growth, an egalitarian class structure, and the salvaging of national pride…” as well as “economic and health benefits” that flowed from its “biological orientation.” But the “crimes” of National Socialism are such that OGI suggests that “an ethnicised constitution” should be abandoned if it necessarily led to such “crimes.”

National Socialism is criticized by Salter for having a sort of “mystical” conception of ethnic and racial differences, a non-scientific and non-statistical belief of completely disjunctive ethnic distinctions – considering (closely related) groups akin to different species.  Thus, Germans are Aryan supermen while Poles are subhumans, even though, particularly on the global scale, these two groups are actually quite similar (albeit not identical, there are differences at the group level – albeit with individual overlap).  Salter instead suggests a “demystified set of propositions based on objective truths revealed by science, truths concerning group identity and group interests, equally valid for all ethnies”  While I essentially agree with Salter, three points: (1) the “movement” as it currently exists really does not care much for such scientific “objective truths;” (2) related to point one, people are often motivated to act – including in their genetic interest  by more irrational ideals; and (3) noting stops an enlightened fascism from incorporating scientific objective truths, if it has the right leadership (although irrational emotion may also be used to motivate the masses…and perhaps the elites as well).

Salter criticizes fascism in general had having defective political institutions, which failed to prevent elite free-riding or constrained ethnic mobilization.  Thus, fascist elites used the escalation of ethnic and national tensions to consolidate their own power, selfishly putting the long-term genetic continuity and social stability of their people at risk for personal gain – or so Salter asserts. That fascist – especially National Socialist – regimes perhaps went too far with ethnic mobilization, overshooting the mark and starting wars with genetically similar neighboring ethnies, is a historical fact.  Salter considers fascism to be a “mass strategic blunder” – a “misdirected and overblown investment by citizens in their ethnies that forced other nations to unite against them.”  There’s some truth to that, but it’s really particularly rue only of Hitler’s Germany, not of fascist movements in general. Salter criticizes Hitler’s quixotic and destructive military adventures, to steal land from others to recreate some sort of Aryan medieval peasant society; without, as Salter asserts, democratic restraints, Hitler was able to force through his vision to the long-term detriment of his own people (and closely related European ethnies).

Essentially, Hitler’s regime was, according to Salter, a genetic interest over-inflated “bubble” (just like an over-heated stock market “bubble”) that burst, leaving Germans (and all other Europeans) worse off than before.  Salter writes: “an economic analogy is the speculative bubble, which can occur anywhere in the fitness portfolio, though risk rises steeply as fitness concentration declines.”  Salter identifies the historic manifestations of fascism in Germany and Italy as such bubbles: “Fascism is an over-investment in national interests at the cost of individual and foreign group interests.”

Salter’s graphs of alternative fitness portfolios shows National Socialism as sacrificing individual and human interests for an inflated investment in ethny; radial Christianity and communism sacrifice all for “humanity” – while of course we know that multiculturalism sacrifices the majority for minority interests.

Thus, while Salter criticizes fascism, he of course has perhaps even more harsh words for Marxism, which sacrificed the blood of its peoples not even to pursue group ethnic interests, but in the service of an anti-biological crazed humanism gone beyond any sane and reasonable limits.  It’s that same impulse that is destroying the West and tis peoples today.  And of course Salter would disapprove of a radical Christianity that ignores EGI; his opposition to multiculturalism as it is practiced by the System is of course well known.

There is some truth to Salter’s criticisms.  However, there is more to “fascism” than the bellicose policies of a Hitler or Mussolini. Other fascisms were more concentrated on improving native interests on the home front, without grant military adventuress abroad.  One could cite Codreanu’s movement in Romania, or fascist manifestations in, say, Spain, Ireland, Hungary, Norway, and the Baltic States.  Even the fascist movements of France and Britain more, at most, concerned with preserving already existing empire built by non-fascist (and even democratic) regimes; those fascisms had no grand schemes of fresh foreign conquests, particularly not against closely related European ethnies.  Thus, one need not correlate fascism with any speculative bubble defined by over-investment in narrow ethny resulting in individual sacrifices in wars to despoil other peoples.  I also note that democracies are not shy about mobilizing individuals to fight for the greater glory of both “principles” (typically humanistic) as well as the class interests of the wealthy.  One can find speculative bubbles in many ideologies, and, indeed as Salter states, throughout the fitness portfolio.

One could easily envision “fascism” that is scientifically accurate, based on objective truths (perhaps spiced up with some mass-mobilizing “irrationality”), so that’s not a major impediment to actualizing such regimes in a manner consistent with long term stability of genetic interests.  More to the point is the problem of defective political institutions, manifested in elite free-riding and runaway ethnic mobilization unrestrained by so-called “democratic checks and balances.”

Democratic institutions, which are favored in OGI, are hardly immune to some of the other defects attributed to fascist regimes.  Elite free-riding is a permanent fixture in liberal democracies, and is in fact one major driving force for the dispossession of Western peoples.  The elite Right globalists want cheap labor at the expense of the majority ethny, while the Left globalists essentially want to “elect a new people” based on mass immigration, so as to consolidate their own hold on power. In multicultural democracies, minority groups free ride on the majority; in more homogenous democratic nations, elite free-riding is both political and socioeconomic.  Runaway ethnic mobilization?  Certainly for minorities in multicultural states.  When the same elites – both native and alien – control all major political parties and control all the major levers of power, then “democratic institutions” are useless.  One could speculate that an “ethnic constitution” could obviate some of these difficulties – but good luck getting that done in the current “democratic” System.  Even so, if there is something fundamentally corrupt about democracy that causes elite free-riding (mendaciously masked as “free elections”), then perhaps an “ethnic constitution” or an “ethnic culture” (another option in OGI) would not be sufficient.

Getting back to national socialist-style fascist regimes, one can ask: can the problem of defective political institutions be solved?  I think yes, if we presume that the “fuhrer principle” is not an essential feature of such regimes.  One could them consider authoritarian/totalitarian political structures that can have checks and balances (e.g. the Soviet regime had power split between Party, KGB, and Army –with Stalin being an aberration) and be responsive to the (properly informed) will of the people.  I have always been intrigued by Fest’s talk of “totalitarian democracy” in his book on Hitler; point is, we can consider “fascism” broadly conceived as a flexible, living ideology and not as a fossilized, history artifact.  In this way, national socialist political structures can be envisioned that can control elite free-riders and constrain ethnic mobilization within reasonable limits. One need not resort to democracy – which has been discredited with the destructive evil of multiculturalism and mass migration – to ensure the stability of any future EGI-based regime.

The Alt Fail

Navel-gazing ideological contortions.

One wonders how Andrew Joyce squares his recent series on homosexuality (*) with this expression of tolerance.

It would seem that AltRight.com’s current crusade against homosexuality is to a large extent informed by their feud with Counter-Currents.  But let’s give the other side equal attention.  Greg Johnson’s crusade for ethnonationalism, and crusade against pan-Europeanism, which came as an unpleasant surprise to me (who considered him to have been a pan-Europeanist), mysteriously coincided with the deterioration in his relations with Richard Spencer.  Memes in the service of personal animus, it seems.

Feuds between “movement” leaders is a “grand tradition” – one can remember Pierce-Carto and Pierce-Covington, but in those cases, the disagreements were personal/tactical.  The situation in which “movement leaders” actually take ideological stands on important issues merely to spite each other is totally unprecedented.  Yes, it seems that “youth culture” is indeed a key component of the Alt Right scene: narcissistic, feckless, and juvenile.

On a related note (emphasis added):

However, more important is understanding how a far-right movement operates, organizes and functions. This is invaluable for finding the most effective strategies for opposing and undermining them. I spent hundreds of hours with these people and came away with a real understanding of what drives their activism, the tactics they seek to use, and what they were planning to do. This allows Hope Not Hate to always be one step ahead, and to plan responses and opposition earlier than anyone else.

But don’t forget…the problem is not with the outrageously irresponsible, feckless, imprudent, failed leadership that allowed an effeminate homosexual anti-racist infiltrator to joyride through the “movement” for a year with a tragicomically flimsy cover story while legitimate activists were frozen out of meetings because of “extreme vetting.”  No, the problem is with anyone who states that there should be some accountability for this pathetic failure of common sense and good judgment – or so say our “betters” among “movement leadership.”  I guess when faced with the possibility of the panhandling donations running dry, hysteria ensues.  Too bad they weren’t more hysterical with basic operational security.

*Before someone accuses me of being “queer,” I’ll say I’m in general agreement with Joyce (excepting the Christian apologetics and the idea that Tacitus was a historian in the modern sense, instead of in the ancient sense – a story-telling propagandist), but more nuanced.  However, my view remains that if someone is homosexual but is pro-White, and if they acknowledge that homosexuality is a defect, and if they “stay in the closet,” then tolerance could be given.  In On Genetic Interests, Salter asserts that homosexuals should actually be very pro-extended family and pro-ethny, given they have a greater genetic interest investment in broader circles of relatedness, as most of them do not have children of their own.  If a homosexual actually behaved in that fashion (most do not, including some “anti-natalists” masquerading as WNs), then some degree of societal tolerance could be acceptable.  That doesn’t preclude personal disgust and the acknowledgment that overt homosexuality, celebrated by society, has the pernicious effects described by Joyce.