Ultimate-Proximate Decision Matrix

Making fundamental decisions.

How to balance genetic (ultimate) interests with more proximate interests? At what point is a proximate interest compelling enough to justify sacrificing genetic interests? Can that ever be justified?  Can a short-term sacrifice of genetic interests for some compelling proximate interest actually have the long-term effect of boosting genetic interests when all the costs and benefits are calculated?  Let us consider together; however, first, let us get some definitions established.

Brief glossary:

Ultimate interests – genetic interests. EGI = ethnic genetic interests.

Proximate interests – all other interests (e.g., culture, preferences, aesthetics, economics, moral standards, etc.).  High proximate interests are things like High Culture, civilization, high-level science and technics, strategic interests, particular human phenotypic traits – things that are essential to a Race-Culture and that may be able to enhance Net EGI. Low proximate interests, such as economics, civil rights, and other more “plebian” concerns are those that often decease EGI.

Gross ethnic genetic interests (Gross EGI) – the immediate effects on adaptive fitness of any decision of action, the (naïve) optimization of genetic interests, the measure of genetic interests without balancing costs and benefits and without considering of what the later effects on genetic interests would be.

Net ethnic genetic interests (Net EGI) – the long-term effects on adaptive fitness of any decision of action, the measure of genetic interests based on a balancing of costs and benefits and with careful considering of what the later effects on genetic interests would be.

Discussion about the glossary:

An example I give of gross vs. net EGI would be the size of the nation state.  Following the “smaller is better” theory, and the ethnonationalist ideal of balkanizing nations into “impotent little statelets,” one might say that ethnic genetic interests are being optimized by creating a nation state with the most highly concentrated ethnic genetic interests of the most closely related peoples.  That would be gross genetic interests.  But what if the division of nations and peoples in this manner breaks the organic solidarity of a larger ethny, what if the states become so “impotent” that they cannot effectively defend themselves, what if the power and status of the group is so weakened that their adaptive fitness is decreased?  The long term result of all of this, when all the costs and benefits are balanced, may well be a decrease in adaptive fitness, a decline in the group’s genetic interests.  These later result would be the net genetic interests, the outcome after all of the plusses and minuses are applied to the original gross genetic interests.

Of course, one can have gross vs. net genetic interests at other levels of genetic interests, such as family. Gross familial genetic interests would be maximized by having as many children as possible, but if that decreases their competitiveness, and in the long run means fewer grandchildren and other descendants, then the net familial genetic interests may be best achieved by a moderate family size with a more reasonable number of children.

End glossary and the discussion of the glossary.

Main points:

It would be useful to have easy-to-use computation programs that can be used to process autosomal human genetic data to calculate genetic kinship and “child equivalents” comparing individuals to individuals, individuals to groups, and groups to groups. This can be done by the typical “beanbag genetics” and also after analysis of genetic integration, according to the Gillet and Gregorius method.

Having these data would allow us to calculate kinship and child equivalents for various biopolitical scenarios, so as to allow the EGI Firewall to prevent maladaptive scenarios. In this way, we will always know, for each biopolitical possibility, what the costs and benefits would be with respect to EGI, which would assist in avoiding maladaptive choices.

It would also be useful to attempt to determine a measurement of proximate interests so as to compare to calculated ultimate genetic interests. Of course proximate interests are relatively subjective but this exercise would still be useful.  Again, the objective would be comparing individuals to individuals, individuals to groups, and groups to groups, but instead of evaluating genetic distance, the metric would be, e.g., various types of phenotypic evaluations, cultural distance, or any other characteristic of interest to Race-Culture other than genetic interests. One could even delve into areas such as economic value to satisfy those interested in less important proximate metrics. These data could be then put into something akin to “child equivalents,” we can call it non-genetic value equivalents (NGVE).

Using these data, could then then attempt to equate a given about of NGVE to a given amount of child equivalents.  No doubt this is subjective, but again, it could be useful.  How many child equivalents would one be willing to forego in exchange for a certain amount of NGVE?  Think of this as ultimate-proximate opportunity costs, or akin to putting a monetary value on a human life.

Having some sort of measurement of proximate interests to compare to ultimate (genetic) interests would allow for a rational and (relatively) more objective approach for Salter’s mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MUA). In MUA, there are limits to which genetic interests are pursued; in this way, there are constraints. As one extreme example, one can argue that an ethny’s EGI can be maximized if they exterminate all other ethnies and then populate the entire world territory themselves. Besides the practical problems with that, and the very real possibility of it backfiring and ending up harming the ethny that attempted it, thus sacrificing their long term net genetic interests for a delusional attempt to to optimize gross genetic interests, there are moral issues as well. MUA in essence follows “The Golden Rule” with respect to genetic interests; while competition and unequal outcomes are allowed (and expected), no ethny should face an existential threat to their existence, or even an extreme diminishment of their genetic interests in the context of minimal survival. Thus I wrote:

I have long been interested in melding the work of Salter on ethnic genetic interests – genetic interests being ultimate interests – with the ideas of Yockey, which, with its focus on High Culture, can be viewed as more proximate (issues other than [purely] genetic interests).  For example, see this.

The relationship between ultimate and proximate interests can therefore inform approaches concerning the merger of the Salterian and Yockeyian paradigms. In my analysis of Salterian ethics, I endorsed Salter’s mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU):

Finally, while the MAU puts limits on the degree to which genetic interests can be pursued, people and ethnies must still have the freedom to advance (not merely defend) their interests within reasonable bounds…That this can be done via the MAU has been argued in Salter’s book and also in my comments above; I would promote a rather aggressive version of the MAU, but one that still incorporates limits and which respects certain proximate interests…in my case, I would value society-wide proximate interests, such as Yockey’s call to actualize a High Culture, over mere individual rights…

Note the mention of Yockeyism there. Thus, a prudent MUA, even one that is aggressive, is compatible with broad proximate interests, such as Yockey’s Imperium idea that is based on High Culture. Of course, there is a strong association between ultimate and proximate interests in this case. After all, a Yockeyian Imperium could safeguard the interests, including the ethnic genetic interests, of the constituent European ethnies constituting that Imperium. On the other hand, a focus on ultimate interests can lead to Yockey’s (proximate) Imperium, with the explanation for that stated above. In the last analysis, the reason that the various European ethnies belong to the same High Culture is their membership in the same continental race, hence the fact that those ethnies have related racial ancestries (genetic kinship leading to overlapping ultimate interests). It is therefore difficult to untangle ultimate from proximate interests in this case.  And that entanglement is important for what follows in my analysis.

Of course, those who adopt what Salter calls the “pure ethic” with respect to EGI would reject any exchange of child equivalents for NGVE, but those who favor “mixed adaptive utilitarianism” may be more flexible.  Then we get into my concept of gross vs. net genetic interests. What may seem at first a sacrifice of (gross) genetic interests for proximate interests may turn out to boost net genetic interests, if the proximate values that are being prioritized end up, in the long run, boosting the fitness of the group.

See this.

As regards prioritizing net over gross genetic interests, this is not only common sense – one wants to optimize the final outcome after costs and benefits are taken into account – but also tries to avoid the “bounded rationality” problem that can occur with an over-zealous focus on gross genetic interests:

Salter notes that “bounded rationality” – our inability to ever know everything necessary about a problem or issue – is a good reason not to advocate for the pure ethic of unbridled pursuit of genetic interests…dividing a larger nation into smaller micro-states of more concentrated kinship may be seen as maximizing EGI, but if this division weakens the ability of the populations involved to defend their interests against aggressors (or achieve some other beneficial goal that requires a certain size threshold), then net adaptive interests would suffer. Maximizing EGI, trying to squeeze every last drop of genetic interest from a situation, may backfire. In addition, the possibility of kinship overlap between populations is another reason not to be too radical in the pursuit of EGI, particularly within continents, since some people on “their side” may be more genetically similar to you than those on “your side”…The bounded rationality problem, coupled to the possibility of kinship overlap, therefore suggests that a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of EGI is optimal, since errors in interpreting kinship and the best methods for pursuing adaptiveness may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests…

Given kinship overlap between Europeans, the extreme ethnonationalism championed by the petty nationalists “may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests.” Of course, one can question whether these petty nationalists have any rationality at all, forget about “bounded rationality.” This also relates to my distinction between a pursuit of “gross genetic interests” – attempting to maximize genetic interests without consideration of costs and benefits and what the ultimate outcomes are – and “net genetic interests” – pursuit of optimizing benefits vs. costs with respect to genetic interests so as to provide the best final outcome when all factors are properly considered.

Of course, “bounded rationality” can be a problem for any analysis, even the more balanced one promoted in this post; however, it seems to me it is more of a problem one when focuses on a single metric to the exclusion of all other considerations.

I also previously wrote:

I have long been interested in melding the work of Salter on ethnic genetic interests – genetic interests being ultimate interests – with the ideas of Yockey, which, with its focus on High Culture, can be viewed as more proximate (issues other than [purely] genetic interests).  For example, see this.

The relationship between ultimate and proximate interests can therefore inform approaches concerning the merger of the Salterian and Yockeyian paradigms. In my analysis of Salterian ethics, I endorsed Salter’s mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU):

Finally, while the MAU puts limits on the degree to which genetic interests can be pursued, people and ethnies must still have the freedom to advance (not merely defend) their interests within reasonable bounds…That this can be done via the MAU has been argued in Salter’s book and also in my comments above; I would promote a rather aggressive version of the MAU, but one that still incorporates limits and which respects certain proximate interests…in my case, I would value society-wide proximate interests, such as Yockey’s call to actualize a High Culture, over mere individual rights…

Note the mention of Yockeyism there. Thus, a prudent MUA, even one that is aggressive, is compatible with broad proximate interests, such as Yockey’s Imperium idea that is based on High Culture. Of course, there is a strong association between ultimate and proximate interests in this case. After all, a Yockeyian Imperium could safeguard the interests, including the ethnic genetic interests, of the constituent European ethnies constituting that Imperium. On the other hand, a focus on ultimate interests can lead to Yockey’s (proximate) Imperium, with the explanation for that stated above. In the last analysis, the reason that the various European ethnies belong to the same High Culture is their membership in the same continental race, hence the fact that those ethnies have related racial ancestries (genetic kinship leading to overlapping ultimate interests). It is therefore difficult to untangle ultimate from proximate interests in this case.  And that entanglement is important for what follows in my analysis.

Note the statement that it is difficult to untangle ultimate and proximate interests. That is an issue for the decision matrix analysis below. There, I have separate categories for genetic interests (net and gross) as well as high and low proximate interests, even though high proximate interests can boost net genetic interests (even if they may, in the short term, modestly depress gross genetic interests), while low proximate interests often depress both net and gross genetic interests.  So, there may be a type of “double counting” going on, at least in part. My argument is that this is not a highly quantitative scientific analysis or some sort of engineering project where an exact and accurate answer is crucial. Instead, we are modeling biopolitical alternatives and comparing projected outcomes, so we need to take a broader view and worry about details and exact numbers.  We are trying to model a complex system in a manner that is understandable, and some “coarse-graining” is inevitable.

In summary, I would favor ultimate interests over proximate interests all else being equal but if some degree of proximate focus serves net ultimate interests then proximate needs can be given a high priority in certain contexts.  And if we follow the MUA, there needs to be reasonable constraints with respect to the pursuit of EGI, constraints that likely would in fact enhance long term net genetic interests. With all of that, we still must remember that, in general, overall genetic interests can be objectively determined but proximate interests will always be somewhat subjective. Therefore, and given that the genetic interests are the “ultimate” interests from the standpoint of adaptive, all else being equal, genetic interests should usually be given priority.  But reality is complex, and “all else” is often not equal, so additional considerations come into play.  In particular, if it can be shown that a short-term sacrifice of some gross genetic interests in favor of some major proximate interest can in the long run enhance net genetic interests, then favoring a proximate interest can in fact enhance genetic interests, and thus the ultimate interest of adaptiveness is promoted.  But one must be careful. First, the sacrifice of immediate gross genetic interest should be small, certainly nothing that would include racially alien immigration or anything of that sort; instead it could involve relations between closely related peoples of the same race.  Second, the proximate interest must be something absolutely fundamental, something very important.  Third, there must be some strong and reasonable determination that promotion of this proximate interest can serve long term (net) genetic interests. So, in general, genetic interests should be prioritized over proximate interests, but in certain cases the proximate can a priority, but only of a strong case can be made that long term genetic interests will be promoted (or at least not harmed).

This is also relevant.

The decision matrix.

Let us assume that we have some reasonable approach to quantify proximate interests.  What next? How can we decide between alternative biopolitical choices, each of which have different effects on genetic (ultimate) interests (net and gross) as well on various types of proximate interests?

Tools such as the decision matrix, weighted decision table, etc. can be used as the theoretical basis for strategic decision making approaches with respect to ultimate (genetic) and proximate interests. The more objective genetic interests can serve as a baseline ranking and then various proximate interests can be ranked related to the genetic interests, all being appropriately weighted.  Proximate interests that can be reasonably seen as having the capacity to enhance (net) genetic interests would naturally be weighted more, and thus ranked higher, than those neutral to genetic interests, which would in turn be weighted/ranked to higher than proximate interests whose effect on genetic interests, including net genetic interests, would be negative. Iterative utilization of these processes, evaluated with computer modeling (artificial intelligence type programs may be useful), and perhaps coupled with ideas from game theory, can assist in developing a more robust and dependable decision making process for these issues.

As an example consider a decision matrix – specifically for White racial interests – that has as its choice comparisons (“X axis”) Pan-European Racial Nationalism, Ethnonationalism, Civic Nationalism, and Multiculturalism. These are ranked according to the following weighted characteristics, with weights in parentheses – Net EGI (10), Gross EGI (7), High proximate interests (5), and low proximate Interests (2). For Net EGI, Pan-Europeanism gets the highest rank (4), since I see that scenario as most optimal for boosting the adaptive fitness of all Whites over time.  Next would be Ethnonationalism (3), then Civic Nationalism (2) and finally Multiculturalism (1), which is destructive of White EGI. For Gross EGI, which switch the rankings of Ethnonationalism (now 4) and Pan-Europeanism (now 3), with the others being the same. The rationale here is that short-term superficial maximization of EGI can be obtained with smaller, more genetically homogeneous territories.  High proximate interests have the same rankings as Net EGI. Pan-Europeanism (4) is best, as it pools together the best of White groups and has economy of scale and the possibility of cooperative synergy.  Ethnonationalism (3) is better than the other choices since at least it is homogeneous; Multiculturalism (1, with Civic Nationalism at 2) is the worst for obvious reasons. As regards Low proximate interests, this is even more subjective than the others, but perhaps Civic Nationalism (4) would allow for the most optimal pursuit of raw economic objectives and other such concerns, following by Multiculturalism (3); among the racialist options, I would put Pan-Europeanism (2) above Ethnonationalism (1), since the former would have economy of scale, more synergy, and fewer obstacles commerce, etc. Adding all together gives Pan-European Racial Nationalism 85 points, Ethnonationalism 75 points, Civic Nationalism 52 points, and Multiculturalism 28 points.

Do not take the numbers given – the rankings and weights – too seriously; this is meant to illustrate how a decision matrix can be used in biopolitics, so I am presenting a simplified version with numbers that I have subjectively plugged in. For example, one can reasonably conclude that net genetic interests should be weighted to a greater extent than shown, and one can argue about all of the rankings and weights, as well as include more categories on the X and Y axes. Also, since the High Proximate Interests can influence Net EGI in a positive sense, and, often, the Proximate Interests damage all EGI, there is overlap in these categories, but it is still useful to separate them since do measure separate things, even if not independently. One could also argue that only Net EGI should be considered and that Gross EGI is redundant, but I believe there is utility in looking at them separately; while they overlap to a considerable degree, they are not the same thing, and there is a difference between Pan-Europeanism and Ethnonationalism for both form of EGI.  I can also be accused of bias for arranging the rankings and weights to make my favorite of Pan-European Racial Nationalism come out on top, with the other scenarios also in the scoring correlated to my preferences; however, this is my decision matrix and others can do differently, although we can hope for some consensus on basic principles. There are many caveats.  However, the point is made regarding how the concept can work in principle. These preliminary ideas can and should be expanded on in the future.

Table:

	Pan-Europeanism	Ethno nationalism	Civic Nationalism	Multiculturalism
Net EGI (10)	4 (40)	3 (30)	2 (20)	1 (10)
Gross EGI (7)	3 (21)	4 (28)	2 (14)	1 (7)
High Proximate (5)	4 (20)	3 (15)	2 (10)	1 (5)
Low Proximate (2)	2 (4)	1 (2)	4 (8)	3 (6)
Totals	85	75	52	28

Two Text to Speech 2/24

Two summaries.

First on EGI:

Listen here. That is a shortened version of this, edited to within 2500 characters (including spaces).

Second, against Johnson’s ethnonationalism:

Listen here. That is derived from this.

Insurgent Supremacists

Book review: Insurgent Supremacists: The U.S. Far Right’s Challenge to State and Empire, by Matthew N. Lyons.

See this. There’s a mention of your humble blog author in that book, so let’s examine Lyons’ trashy work.

It is described on Amazon thus:

In this book, Matthew N. Lyons takes readers on a tour of neonazis and Christian theocrats, by way of the patriot movement, the LaRouchites, and the alt-right. Supplementing this, thematic sections explore specific dimensions of far-right politics, regarding gender, decentralism, and anti-imperialism.

A major study of movements that strive to overthrow the U.S. government, that often claim to be anti-imperialist and sometimes even anti-capitalist yet also consciously promote inequality, hierarchy, and domination, generally along explicitly racist, sexist, and homophobic lines. Revolutionaries of the far right: insurgent supremacists.

Intervening directly in debates within left and antifascist movements, Lyons examines both the widespread use and abuse of the term “fascism,” and the relationship between federal security forces and the paramilitary right. His final chapter offers a preliminary analysis of the Trump presidential administration relationship with far-right politics and the organized far right’s shifting responses to it.

About the Author

Matthew N. Lyons has been writing about right-wing politics for over 25 years. He writes regularly for Three Way Fight, a radical anti-fascist blog, and his work has also appeared in The Guardian, New Politics, Socialism and Democracy, teleSUR, Upping the Anti, and other publications. He is co-author Right-Wing Populism in America and author of Arier, Patriarchen, Übermenschen: die extreme Rechte in den USA.

Over 25 years – they’re obsessed with us.

Hmmm…”radical anti-fascist blog.”  Consider the definition of terrorism:

Terrorism, in its broadest sense, is the use of intentional violence and fear to achieve political or ideological aims.

The well-known actions of anti-fascists are, therefore, by definition, terrorism. Support for anti-fascists is, therefore, by definition, support for terrorism. So, when are such people going to be held accountable for supporting domestic terrorism? Do you need more evidence of the close association between the System (including global capitalism) and the so-called “anti-capitalist Marxist and Anarchist anti-fascist” Left? The latter are the running dogs of the former; thus, they are allowed to be terrorists with impunity. Nevertheless, the Right should continue to press for anti-terror laws to be applied to anti-fascists and their supporters. The leftist paradigm of “rightist speech is violence and leftist violence is speech” must be exposed and opposed. I also dislike when rightists praise leftist authors because “he/she/it took my ideas seriously and wrote about them.” Supporters of leftist terrorism belong in prison, not being praised by idiotic rightists who get an ego boost seeing their names in print.

By the way, the close association of the System with the Radical Left is why the latter concentrates on the negative of opposing our side rather than promoting any positive plan of their own. Since the System is doing the Left’s work for them, all the leftists need to do is stop the Far Right from opposing the System-Left agenda. Global Capital and the Radical Left are two heads of the same monster. 

I note that Lyons, in this book, makes clear that from his perspective the Far Right should be studied so it can be more effectively opposed, and that the anti-fascist fight is part of a larger struggle for “human liberation” (apparently Whites are either insufficiently human to be liberated and/or too excessively “dominant” to require “liberation” – more on this hypocrisy below). That he labels White nationalists “supremacists” demonstrates that he is a biased ideologue whose has lost any right to have his work considered “legitimate,” and his bizarre spin about the oppressive nature of the USA against his favorite groups – who are actually a favored caste both de jure and de facto – is laughable.  

Even more ludicrous are assertions of connections between the System and the Far Right, and that the former sometimes makes use of the latter.  If you substitute “Left” for “Right” then that would be more accurate.  The System uses “Marxist” and “anarchist” anti-fascist domestic terror groups (the kind Lyons apparently supports) as private militias to suppress the only genuine dissent against the System, that coming from the Far Right. Observe how the System treats the Far Right – or even just civic nationalist right-wing populists (that I do not consider Far Right, although Lyons seems to do so) – compared to the Far Left.  Far rightists are subject to criminal and civil lawfare attack, while violent radical leftists get a slap on the wrist, if even that. Compare the persecution and prosecution of Jan. 6 protestors to the complete lack of investigation and prosecution of the 2020 Floyd rioters (including murder and attempted murder [including the attempted mass murder of Portland police], arson, assault and battery, besieging the White House, threatening Senators, and the full-scale insurrection of establishing an “autonomous zone” in a major American city). Compare lawfare against rightists involved in Unite the Right vs. the lack of response to violent anti-fascists who instigated the trouble on that day.  Compare the deplatforming of rightists vs. the coddling of the Left – who does “capital” support?  Who do major corporations donate to – BLM or the Dissident Right?  The idea of any positive association of the System with the Far Right is mendacious pure projection.  Global Capital is in bed with the Far Left, which is supported by objective observation of the on-the-ground reality.

If Lyons had any self-awareness, he’d compare his own status as an overt Far Left activist vs. those on the Far Right. People on the (American) Far Right are deplatformed, subjected to lawfare, are physically attacked with impunity, and/or hide their identities. Insofar as I know, Lyons, a leftist activist, has not been deplatformed, subject to lawfare or any sort of attack, etc.  So how is America tacitly manifesting White supremacism?  How are Whites “dominant?” How is the System cooperating with the Far Right in any way?  I won’t even mention the open legal persecution of the Far Right in Europe via criminal prosecution, banning of political parties, “hate speech” laws, etc. Reality is completely inverted by the Left.

Further, the bias of Lyons is demonstrated by his outrageous labeling as “myths” the idea that Whites are oppressed (instead the “fact” is that people of color are “oppressed,” despite his admission of the reality of civil rights and affirmative action) and the idea of White genocide. Further, after stating that a characteristic of “White supremacy” is the desire to rule over other groups, he then states that White nationalism is a form of “White supremacy,” despite admitting that a defining characteristic of White nationalism is a Whites-only state. So, wishing to live apart from others, each having their own nations, is somehow a “supremacist” desire to rule over others?  Leftism must be akin to a form of mental illness, because the lack of logic here, the utter lack of self-awareness to write such nonsense, is simply astonishing. That is the sort of trashy nonsense this book is full of. I note that Lyons also describes the idea of male victimhood as a “false belief.” Lyons is simply a knee-jerk, dogmatic, garden-variety leftist, simply of a more radical persuasion. Coloreds and women are “oppressed;” Whites and men are oppressors.  White men are the worst. To repeat myself – the Left has nothing new to say, nothing new and/or interesting to offer. They can simply only oppose those on the Far Right who do.

The sections of the book are as follows. 

Section one is composed of a survey of various entities that Lyons considers part of the American Far Right. I list on the left his naming of these entities and on the right is my own translation.

• Neonazis – Type I Nutzi freaks
• Theocrats – Christards
• The Patriot Movement – Alt Lite civic nationalist Amnat Patriotard idiots
• The Alt-Right – Beavis and Butthead White nationalism
• The LaRouche Network – tin foil hats

Section two is “Neglected Theses” – Gender and Sexuality, Anti-Imperialism, and Decentralism. Note that “Decentralism” feeds into the author’s thesis that the American Far Right has moved away from advocacy of a strong central state and now promotes decentralized local structures – a thesis that suggests to me that Lyons may be too foolish to distinguish a temporary expedient from an actual political philosophy and/or he focuses too much on Christards, MAGA types, patriot freaks, and the like, instead of on authentic White nationalists (many of who still promote the idea of state power – of their future projected racial nationalist state).

Section three is “Partners, Rivals, Opponents” (Feds, Leftists, Trump, blah, blah, blah). That is followed by a conclusion “Disloyalty in Motion” (a bit too revealing as it tacitly exposes the Left’s loyalty to multiculturalist Global Capital), and an Appendix “Two Ways of Looking at Fascism.”                                                                                                                                     

Lyons defines the Far Right has consisting of those who believe in the fact and desirability of human inequality and who reject the current political system as illegitimate.  Indeed, he thinks a “turning point” occurred in the 1970s and 80s in which significant numbers of (American) rightists “began to withdraw loyalty from the U.S. government.” Well, “significant” is the important word here, since there were those earlier who had withdrawn such loyalty, Yockey prominent among them, but I suppose he’s talking about rank-and-file activists and most of their leaders. Of course, one could look at it the other way around – the American government withdrew any loyalty it ever had for the White majority, so a reaction to that was inevitable.

In the Appendix, he attempts to define fascism. After considering ludicrous Marxist “definitions” (fascism as a reactionary tool of capitalism, blah, blah, blah) and Roger Griffin’s views, he concludes with “Fascism is better understood as an autonomous right-wing force that has a contradictory relationship with capital and that draws mass support largely by advocating a revolution against established valued and institutions.”  In the Introduction, he provides the following: “Fascism is a revolutionary form of right-wing populism, inspired by a totalitarian vision of collective rebirth, that [sic] challenges capitalist political and cultural power while promoting economic and social hierarchy.”  That is a reasonable definition.

He asserts that Marxists have failed to consider actual fascist ideology and that Griffin does not properly consider fascism’s “scope and prospects today.”  He thus considers his own view of fascism as a superior synthesis of previous definitions. Further, he proposes that the political reality is not the Manichean Marxist view of a two-way battle between “liberation” and “oppression” but a three-way battle between fascism, global capital, and leftists. 

There is some utility in his Appendix. I’ll give him credit for recognizing that elements of the American Far Right are currently trying to appeal to non-Whites. While I critique (see below, my conclusion) Lyons and other leftists for misunderstanding the Far Right and being years behind in being up-to-date with Far Right reality, in this one case Lyons was actually prescient, foreseeing the emergence of WN 3.0 multiracial “White nationalism.” 

I note that there is no mention of “genetic interests,” ”ethnic genetic interests,” etc. in this book; unfortunately that reflects Der Movement’s stupid disregard for the work of Salter on those topics. Salter was the one who promoted democratic multiculturalism, and despite me always giving the proper credit and despite Lyon’s concerns about this strategy, Salter is still not mentioned by Lyons. That Salter is not American is irrelevant, as his work is important for us, and, anyway, people like Dugin are referenced, so being American has nothing to do with it.  Salter’s ideas have been sadly neglected, and if I hadn’t been championing them, would have been quickly completely forgotten (even more than it actually is now), shortly after the publication of On Genetic Interests.

As far as neo-Nazis go, Lyons’ chapter is a superficial historical summary, full of leftist bias (Far Right claims and ideas are all “phony”), coupled to the usual lack of self-awareness. Lyons truthfully underscores that the Nutzis have failed and failed utterly, and mentions how their ideas are unpopular and marginalized in society, how they are denounced by everyone, and how they have been subjected to legal persecutions and prosecutions. Yet, they are a “danger.” Further, the same America that marginalizes and persecutes neo-Nazis and other elements of the Far Right is somehow characterized by a “dominant” White population and a system that cooperates with the Far Right; indeed, America is really an implicit hidden-occult “White supremacist” country that persecutes Coloreds. That is why, of course, Farrakhan can hold a “million man march” with impunity, but Dickie Spinster got elbowed upside his head whenever he dared show his face in public. What an inane boob this Lyons is.

The sections on the Christards and Patriotards were tiresomely boring and mostly irrelevant to the areas of interest to this blog. After noting that these types often disavow racism, Lyons claims these groups sometimes have “common ground” with dastardly White nationalists. So, having common interests is apparently evidence of a dangerous association when it is the Right; for the Left it would simply be another step toward “liberation.” Lyons is not satisfied with people disavowing racism, not only because of their “common ground” with racists, but because color blind ideology enables “structural racism.” You just can’t win Patriotards, you just can’t win.

Then there’s the Alt-Right, the part of the book of most interest to me since it is most relevant to today’s “movement” and it is the part of the book where I am mentioned. Thus, on page 77, there is a mention of your humble blog host, the dastardly Theodore:

One approach has been to propose working within the system in order to weaken it, advocating changes that sound reasonable but require radical change—a right-wing version of the Trotskyist transitional demand strategy. Ted Sallis, for example, urged White nationalists to “demand a seat at the multicultural table, represented by real advocates of White interests, not groveling patsies.” This would involve using the language of multiculturalism to complain about “legitimate” cases of discrimination against Whites or members of other dominant groups. The aim here would not be “reforming the System. It is instead using the contradictions and weaknesses of the System against itself…

Note scare quotes around “legitimate.” How dare Whites complain about discrimination!  More importantly, note how the democratic multiculturalism strategy bothers these types, a sure sign that it is something they fear and for good reason – it can work, and it is something that can practically be done in the real world. And how dare rightists adopt useful methods from leftists!  Also note “dominant.”  If Whites were really “dominant” in America, as opposed to the reality of being an oppressed subaltern group, then many of our problems would not exist, would they?  Also, categorizing me as Far Right is correct, but if there is the idea here that I am of the Alt-Right, that is absolutely incorrect. In any case, Lyons cited this. That is what he was concerned about.

The Alt-Right collapsed after he wrote the book (published in 2018); the disintegration started as early as 2017. From the perspective of 2024, Lyons’ Alt-Right chapter is painfully out-of-date and I would argue that even at the time it was published it painted an incomplete picture of the American Dissident Right (that Lyons mistakenly conflated with the Alt-Right subspecies).  Lyons stresses some things (e.g., decentralization, minor and stupid characters) more than other ideas and figures (I could have been given more analysis than a single brief mention about democratic multiculturalism). There’s nothing in the book about the pan-European, ethnonationalist, Nordicism debates, the ethnic question, and so many other important things are left out. The chapter on the LaRouche group is completely irrelevant.  

The “Neglected Themes” sections for the most part are both leftist bias and Lyons’ personal bias.  As I say, once again, he overemphasizes the extent to which the American Far Right stresses decentralization – although of course maybe I’m biased because the area of the Far Right I focus most of my interest in is not decentralizing (I argue that the part I focus on is the most important). Further, with all of his emphasis on decentralization, Lyons could have devoted an entire chapter to Roger Griffin’s Rhizome/Slime Mold hypothesis and the concept of groupuscules, and my own thoughts on the matter could have been analyzed. Griffin’s thesis revolves around political and metapolitical decentralization on the Far Right, which seems to be more relevant and important than a bunch of retards “larping” as Jeffersonians or (right-wing) anarchists.

On sex and gender, Lyons asserts that the Far Right chooses between one of four models: patriarchal traditionalism, demographic nationalism, male bonding through warfare, and quasi-feminism.  To put these in the language that we can better understand, this would be the traditionalists, adaptive-minded racial nationalists, the “smear yourself with ashes and go on a moot” crown and the homosexual “bonding” “Mannerbund” crowd, and the right-wing simps. A lot of this, particularly the first group (obviously not so much the third), revolves around a more traditional militant Christianity. One of the arguments of the quasi-feminists is that, according to Molly Gill, if you “ride herd too hard” then “she’s likely to slip in a little miscegenation.”  It’s the fault of overbearing men, you see, that poor persecuted White milady lies in bed with DeShawn. Another “empowered” right-wing female, Lee Ann Callear, said “If men are a problem, just go around them like a brick wall.”  I have no doubt that it is White men who are meant. Andrew Yeoman criticized the “constant litany of abuse and frequent courtship invitations from unwanted suitors” that milady faces in the “movement” and that “We need women’s help, now more than ever.” Yeoman apparently has no problem with right wing e-thots exploiting their sexuality and their attractiveness for men for the purpose of attention-seeking and grifting. Milady does whatever milady wants, and don’t you forget it! 

There’s a mention of Johnson’s pro-homosexual writing here as well; further comment by me here is superfluous. There is of course mention of the manosphere, as well as “macho man” homosexual Donovan. With respect to anti-imperialism and decentralization, Lyons contrasts the “bad” Far Right versions of these with the “good” leftist versions (and Lyons increasingly uses “we” to describe leftists, dropping any pretense of the slightest degree of objectivity). With respect to anti-imperialism, Lyons grossly overestimates the influence (positive or negative) of Dugin in the American Far Right, and he also stupidly describes Yockey’s ideology as akin to “National Bolsevism,” misinterpreting Yockey’s “lesser of two evils” strategy of cooperation with the Soviet Bloc as some sort of “Nazi-Communist” synthesis. In the decentralization chapter, Lyons not only overestimates (as I stress here) decentralizing trends in the American Far Right, but ludicrously smears mainstream libertarians as facilitating “oppression” because they fail to buy into the Neo-Marxist “race/sex replacing class” dogma of the modern Left.

The “Partners, Rivals, Opponents” section of the book is particularly boring and inane. The section on Feds describes Timothy McVeigh as “neonazi,” which I find completely ludicrous. Lyons admits that anti-fascism can lead to societal repression (do you have a mirror handy, Matt?) and also discusses counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, including infiltration and disruption, targeted toward the Right. The piece ends with an interesting quote by someone named Kristian Williams: “As a matter of realpolitik the authorities have to respond in some manner to popular demands; however, COIN allows them to do so in a way that at least preserves, and in the best case amplifies, their overall control. The purpose of counterinsurgency is to prevent any real shift in power.”  The part about “respond in some manner to popular demands” fits into my (and Salter’s) advocacy of democratic multiculturalism, and also to my strategic approach centered on Suvorov’s Law of Revolution – revolutions tend not to occur at the time of greatest repression but when that repression is suddenly relaxed.  Forcing the System to respond in some positive conciliatory manner to right-wing popular demands is one way of pushing toward that relaxation.  What about COIN and the System objective of controlling the effect of any response on their part to our demands?  That is why we must infiltrate the System and have some people on our side with at least some influence over the levers of power, and we need to be wary of System attempts to channel dissent into useless dead-end cul-se-sacs. Instead, we need to channel dissent into even greater dissent.

The leftists mentioned in this section are even more dysfunctional (from a Bioleninist and irrationality standpoint) than is the Far Right, although from the standpoint of practical success and getting things done in the real world, the Left has so far proven itself to be superior to the Right. Lyons more aggressively unmasks himself here as a subjective political actor studying the Right in order to better oppose it.  He does reveal leftist stupidities and hysterias, such as labeling “Dubya” Bush as “fascist,” although Lyons himself makes ludicrous comments about “commonalities” between fascism and historical mainstream American politics and social policies.

Lyons overemphasizes the role (if any) of the Far Right in Trump’s 2016 electoral victory (Lyons apparently believes that the Alt-Right played a key role; this is ludicrous). Lyon asserts that, at the time of the writing of the book, the Trump-Russia collusion scenario is still possible; how did that all work out in the end?  I am amused that Lyons says that Alt-Righters believed that the Trump Presidency would give them “breathing room.” If so, they certainly didn’t act upon it, drawing attention to themselves via destructive stupidity, rather than taking my advice (given at that time) to use the “breathing room” to quietly build in depth behind the scenes, with the major overt activity being superficially more “mainstream” electoral politics, focused on extending right-wing populism as far as it could go. Lyons does expose the silliness of considering the useless, “all talk and no action” Trump as a fascist and underscores Trump’s lazy do-nothing attitude. Lyons emphasizes that Trump’s ostensible MAGA agenda was obstructed by elements within his administration, as the Trump governing structure contained incompatible elements both supportive of and opposed to mainstream conservatism.  Added to the “disorganization and confusion,” the result was an unfulfilled agenda.  

Lyons outlines the contrasting view of the Alt-Right to Trump’s Presidency, but the book was written before Trump “jumped the shark” in 2020, responding to mass leftist insurrection with “LAW AND ORDER!” tweets, followed by The Platinum Plan for Negroes. On the other hand, the Jan. 6 “insurrection” would no doubt have led to heavy breathing on Lyons’ part if it had occurred at a time that it could have been included in this book. I note that Lyons asserts that “neo-Nazis” not part of the Alt-Right “tended to be more skeptical of Donald Trump from the beginning,” but there is no mention of the dastardly Ted Sallis, who critiqued Trump as early as the 2016 campaign. I think that Lyons is, or at least was, aware of Sallis only insofar as Terrible Ted was featured in Counter-Currents in the past; I am skeptical that Lyons is or was aware of my work as an independent groupuscule.  

According to Lyons, the grand dilemma for the Far Right, re; Trump is “To what extent and under what circumstances should you support a system-loyal politician who shares many of your politics?  How do you balance the importance of holding fast to political principles against the value of expanded visibility, legitimacy, and influence?” There are many things wrong with these two questions. As a start, let me say this – first, it is questionable that Trump actually “shares many of [our] politics;” second, Far Right support is currently meaningless in the grand scheme of things given how laughably inept Der Movement is; and third, does Der Movement have any “principles” other than bizarre dogma and grifting for donations?  Further, someone in the Far Right can pragmatically endorse Trump (not that it means anything in the real world) because he brings chaos and balkanization to America, while realizing he is a fraud and a weakling, which has consistently been my position. I agree with Lyons that the emergence of Trump as a political figure (not what he actually is, has done, or will do, but what he represents) is indicative that the American political system is in crisis.  Unfortunately, the moronic American Far Right has so far proven itself incapable of capitalizing on this crisis.  Indeed, it is worse off now than it was when Trump ride down that elevator.

As regards the Appendix, I have already discussed it above, and his Conclusion is useless and inane. He complains in the latter that the Far Right is learning “street fighting.”  Sure they are – if by “street fighting” you mean getting attacked by anti-fascists with impunity and then those attacked – not the attackers – are subjected to legal persecution, and those attacked abandon the public space, yeah, that certainly is some hardcore “street fighting.”  Lyons is upset in this book that the violence by anti-fascists is “exaggerated.” Sure it is.  We certainly saw that in 2020, didn’t we? He concludes that the American Far Right is defined by withdrawal of loyalty to the state, as opposed to the attitude of the Mainstream Right.  Perhaps, but who cares?  What is the current effect on the System of that withdrawal? Nothing. Lyons concludes with “The conflict between the far right and the existing system of power is real, but a politics of liberation calls on us to defeat both.” To which I respond with: “The conflict between the (Far) Left and the existing system of power is an illusion, as they are both two wings of the same entity, and a politics of White liberation calls on us to defeat all of our enemies.”

My Conclusion:

It is always good to check up what the other side is saying about us, and since I was mentioned, that was added incentive.

To summarize, I take the following from this book.  As I’ve stated many times, the Left has nothing new to offer.  The whole meaning of the Far Left today is so-called anti-fascism, a defensive left-reactionary counterpart to the right-reactionary anti-communism and anti-liberalism of the Mainstream Right.  Since the System and the Far Left are de facto allies against the Far Right, the Left is most concerned about a merely negative effort to stop Far Right activity, to “run out the clock,” and let the gradualism of the System’s inherent leftism achieve the Far Left’s goals. Also, as I have written before, the Left really does not understand the Far Right very well.  Even the self-proclaimed “experts” like Lyons, the academics, and the watchdog groups misunderstand much, emphasize the wrong things, and are years behind actual developments.  They also cannot see past their own biases; all of these weaknesses of theirs are of benefit to us. They are of course incredibly deluded and hypocritical, and, although they are wrong about much concerning the Far Right, they are still dangerous given their fanaticism and, especially, their close alliance with the organs of state power, as part of their alliance with Global Capital. Sorry, Lyons, it really is a two way fight, but the opposite of what the Left thinks.  It is in reality the System/Global Capital allied with the Left against the only real opposition – the Far Right.

I also note that – to the extent that people like Lyons actually do understand something about the Far Right, however misinterpreted, biased, and (sometimes) outdated it may be – these leftists are very revealing as to what it is they really fear. They do NOT really fear Nutzi freaks, Christards, idiots acting out, and all the rest. They ARE afraid of serious political actors on the Far Right who take several pages out of the Left’s playbook and promote democratic multiculturalism (see the quote about me, above), reach out to the White working class and offer novel solutions to the problems of globalization and run-away capitalism, make use of populism, make use of cultural critiques, make use of deconstructing the flawed ideology of opponents, and make use of the legal system and of electoral politics. The more the Far Right gibbers about nonsense and does nothing of practical political use, the happier people like Lyons are, but the more our side learns from the likes of Trotsky and Alinsky, the more worried the leftists become. And most of all they fear that the illusion of “the Far Left against the System” will be exposed as the fraud that it is, and the reality that the Far Right is the only real opposition to the System, and has supplanted the Far Left as the real revolutionary force in what used to be the West, will be recognized for the truth that it is.

It says a lot about the Left, and their insecurity, that Lyons felt it necessary to write a book analyzing what, for the most part, is a failed “movement,” full of freaks, grifters, addicts, fetishists, and lazy procrastinators. The Left becomes hysterical about the slightest Far Right presence; it is like a tall, powerful martial artist being frightened because he’s getting kicked in the shins by a small, weak, spastic, five year old retard.

Don’t worry Lyons – The Grand Secret of the American Far Right is that no one wants to do anything. It’s an entertainment brand, a grift, a hobby, there’s no serious political activity there, looking at it in its entirety. When someone emerges in that milieu who is serious and has some useful ideas, they’re ignored, banned, and blacklisted. In his Appendix, he quotes some who say that leftists underestimate the potential of fascism to attract mass support in the USA and abroad. Perhaps, but it is only potential, and the Far Right with their “we’re winning” nonsense genuinely or cynically (for donations) overestimates their influence.  Potential without actualization is historically meaningless.

In any case, we can at least praise Lyons for trying to understand the Far Right while we at the same time ridicule the pathetic mess he made of it. Maybe we should analyze the Left, and do a better job of it, but then we are not obsessed with them as they are with us. I suppose we should be thankful that they are so biased, misinformed, and irrational that their “learn about the Far Right so we can oppose them” analyses are so substandard.

Finally, Lyons and his ilk have a fundamental flaw in their professed ideology.  If they believe in “liberation” why does that not include Far Right Whites, who wish to be liberated from multiculturalism and form a separatist state of their own? If some Whites want their own nation, why can’t they have it, particularly if they grant the same right to others, in accord with Salter’s principal of Universal Nationalism?  Why must these Whites be forced to live with those that they do not wish to live with; why must they be coerced into multiculturalism?  Don’t Whites have the same rights of demographic and cultural survival and integrity as other groups?  Why does the Left oppose the right of some Whited to live the life they wish to live?  That the Left disapproves of Far Right preferences should have nothing to do with it, especially from the moral and ethical “liberation” standpoint. The Left routinely tells the rest of us that we need to respect the rights of others whose preferences we may disagree with. How come we must accord these rights to others if we are not allowed to enjoy them ourselves?  These are not rhetorical questions – the Left should be made to answer them.  Or, perhaps I can answer these questions by stating that the Left’s purported support for “liberation” is a sham; the Left’s ideology is based on a totalitarian messianic vision of humanity and humanity’s future that is inimical to White interests, and all must be forced to comply with this vision, regardless of their own beliefs, desires, and preferences. Thus, Far Right Liberation Ideology must oppose the Left’s Messianic Totalitarianism.

Also see this.

See this.

See this.

WDR38: Look In The Mirror

Yes, have a long hard look.

Listen here.

The EU article.

I don’t care if I have “followers.”  This is what Nietzsche said about followers:

“What? You search? You would multiply yourself by ten, by a hundred? You seek followers? Seek zeros!”

― Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

I do not want followers. Instead, I want partners in a common endeavor. I want to induce people to take positive political action.  It’s the Quota Queens who want the followers, so the Quota Queen bank accounts can be multiplied by added zeroes to the end of the fiscal number.

So, what?  People are going to be offended?  I don’t care. It’s not my objective to make people feel good.  If that’s what you want, go to the grifters who’ll tell you “we’re winning” in exchange for a few shekels.