Words have meaning.
Long time readers know that I agree with Roger Griffin’s definition of fascism as palingenetic ultra-nationalism and that I also agree with his careful distinction of genuine fascism from para-fascism such as that of Franco, Salazar, Antonescu, etc. Further, I oppose the mindless expansion of the designation of fascism to include not only para-fascists but even more absurd examples, such as Latin American military dictators, Donald Trump, etc. My readers also know that I strongly object to Greg Johnson’s attempt to redefine “White nationalism” to merely mean a collection of individual European and European Diaspora ethnonationalisms, as opposed to the more traditional definition, that I accept, of an Our Race Is Our Nation generalized racial nationalism that transcends (but not necessarily replaces, and can co-exist with) the aforementioned more narrow ethnonationalisms. Further, there are specific definitions of National Socialism that I adhere to that others may disagree with, etc.
It is obvious that political definitions and categories cannot be viewed as purely objective, empirical entities. When defining beliefs and ideologies, some subjectivity is involved, but of course it cannot be absurdly subjective; for example, trying to define National Socialism in terms of liberal multiracial universalism would be ludicrous. That said however, one cannot define political ideologies with the same level of empiricism as one can certain STEM-related entities.
Ultimately, what is likely is that political definitions will be determined by how they are actualized in reality through the beliefs and actions of those who profess adherence to those beliefs. I call this “actualized definitions.” Let us use “White nationalism” as an example. If my definition, the traditional definition, of White nationalism is that which is accepted, believed in, and practiced (including attempting to achieve this form of White nationalism in real world political state entities), then that definition will be the one that is associated with White nationalism and the adherents of Johnson’s view will need to eventually accept the use of, say, “ethnonationalism” to define their views. Thus, White nationalism would no longer be practically associated with the Johnsonian worldview. In contrast, if the Johnsonian definition of White nationalism is (unfortunately, tragically, destructively) widely accepted and practiced by those who identify as White nationalists, then the term “White nationalism” would be actualized into a new definition, and as a result of this redefinition, those who adhere to the older form of White nationalism would need to term it, say, “Pan-European racial nationalism” or something else that distinguishes it from a term that merely means a collection of individual narrow ethnonationalisms. The principle of “actualized definition” can apply to fascism or to any other creed.
Some will argue that this is meaningless, that we should adopt Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other name” attitude and not worry at all about labels and definitions. I disagree, because I do not see that approach as practical with respect to real world politics and to human behavior. Like it or not, the language we use shapes our perception of reality; therefore, our labels and definitions of political ideologies can shape our perception of the political world, and may even modify, even radically change, people’s belief structures (in some cases, unconsciously). If people identify as “White nationalists,” some of them, perhaps most of them, those who are more conformist, may shape their beliefs around what the most commonly accepted definition of “White nationalism” is at a given time, rather than (as they should), independently adhering to a belief system purely on the basis of the merits of its underlying ideas. This is what makes attempts to redefine commonly accepted terms so (potentially) dangerous. For example, see the idea of “linguistic relativity” –
The idea of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (/səˌpɪər ˈhwɔːrf/ sə-PEER WHORF), the Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language influences its speakers’ worldview or cognition, and thus individuals’ languages determine or shape their perceptions of the world.
The following quotes from Gene Wolfe’s The Book of the New Sun (coming from its protagonist Severian) are of relevance here. Please note that Wolfe was a strong Catholic (convert) traditionalist whose work reflects his beliefs; despite (or because of?) being an engineer by trade, Wolfe apparently valued Faith over scientific Materialism. Therefore, these quotes must be viewed with that in mind; however, they have meaning even for those who reject Wolfe’s specific Catholic worldview. First:
Certain mystes aver that the real world has been constructed by the human mind, since our ways are governed by the artificial categories into which we place essentially undifferentiated things, things weaker than our words for them.
Here Wolfe is saying that the labels, the definitions, the categories we use to “bin” real entities are not only “artificial” but that they are harder, more concrete, more distinct and differentiated, and stronger than the real world entities themselves. The real world entities are weaker, more undifferentiated, than the words, labels, and categories we use for them, and that by giving concrete differentiated labels to “essentially undifferentiated things,” we are mentally constructing the “real world.” Whether Wolfe actually believed that, or is just engaging in the type of philosophical speculation common in this work, I do not know. We can argue about the extent to which this describes reality as a whole. But it does partially describe political reality. While I do not believe that political ideologies are “essentially undifferentiated things,” I do believe they are relatively weaker and more undifferentiated than the more distinct and differentiated categories – mental constructs (as are the ideologies themselves) – that we use to define them. Thus we help construct political reality by how we define ideologies.
Then:
We believe that we invent symbols. The truth is that they invent us; we are their creatures, shaped by their hard, defining edges. When soldiers take their oath they are given a coin, an asimi stamped with the profile of the Autarch. Their acceptance of that coin is their acceptance of the special duties and burdens of military life—they are soldiers from that moment, though they may know nothing of the management of arms. I did not know that then, but it is a profound mistake to believe that we must know of such things to be influenced by them, and in fact to believe so is to believe in the most debased and superstitious kind of magic. The would-be sorcerer alone has faith in the efficacy of pure knowledge; rational people know that things act of themselves or not at all.
Here Wolfe is saying that we as people are shaped by the symbols we follow, they invent us, rather than the other way around. Again we can debate the extent that this is literally true in general reality, but it does have some believability in the world of politics (broadly defined), where the “hard, defining edges” of these symbols, these labels, these definitions, these constructs helps shape weaker and more undifferentiated people into manifestations of those symbols, followers of the symbols, true believers who attempt to actualize the meaning of those symbols into reality.
The symbols we use to represent our beliefs, our goals, the myths and artifacts that are put forward as representing our ideals, all of these can shape and mold us in the real world. They invent us. And whether we define a term as “X” or as “Y” therefore has profound significance. The name of the rose is indeed important it if influences how we perceive its smell.
Long time readers of my work may accuse me of inconsistency here. Long ago, at Majority Rights, I engaged in frequent debates with John Ray. The conservative Ray, if I recall correctly, dogmatically defined “right-wing” according to his own beliefs – a mix of classic liberalism, free market capitalism, libertarian individualism, civic nationalism, neoconservative foreign policy, spiced with “HBD race realism” (smart Jews and Asians good, stupid Negroes bad), and so forth. If someone, like me, opposed that view, and instead promoted racial nationalism and National Socialism, Ray would label them as being “leftist.” My impression was that Ray thought those he labeled “leftist” would start weeping and groveling, begging to be called “rightist” (*) and pleading that they would agree with Ray’s kosher conservatism just so they can be “right-wing.” My own response to being called a “leftist” was “OK, so I’m a leftist” and that “I’m more concerned with ideas than with labels.” It is that last thought that some may find inconsistent with the themes of the current post.
However, I make three counter-arguments. First, stating that ideas are more important than labels does not logically imply that labels are unimportant, merely that ideas are more important. Second, not everyone agrees with my more enlightened attitude on this subject; many (most?) people may pay lip service to the idea of the preeminence of ideas but in reality actually care more about labels. Third, in order to effectively discuss ideas, we need to have agreed upon common definitions of those ideas; therefore, words, definitions, and labels have innate importance for that reason. Therefore, there is no inconsistency.
To summarize, it is important to properly define words, terms, and phrases, and to appropriately use labels to describe political ideology. I will continue to fight for what I believe is that proper use of terms such as “White nationalism, and urge you to do the same.
Notes:
* This book describes the same phenomenon from a radical National Socialist perspective, of people having so much invested with respect to their personal identity in being perceived as “right-wing.”
I believe there is much to be said for the various forms of fascism, including National Socialism, to be views as syncretic political forms that transcend tradition designations of “right” vs. “left.”
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