Contra the gaslighting mendacity from meritless midwits that Pan-Europeanism is “Imperialism” or “White Imperialism” I argue that from the perspective of intra-European relations, Pan-Europeanism can be an anti-imperialist force. Indeed, ethnonationalism is what has in the past, is today, and can in the future promote intra-European imperialism.
A Pan-European state superstructure can mediate disputes among European nations and intervene in cases in which exploitation or other bad behaviors disrupt intra-European relations, disturbing White comity, and corroding the organic solidarity of our Race-Culture. In contrast, ethnonationalism has a sorry history, not only including the various wars between European peoples including two devastating world wars that wrecked the White world, and not only German ethno nationalist attempts at imperialist hegemony during the second of those world wars, but also today’s ethnoimperialist behavior. Thus, so-called “ethnonationalists” of certain types of ethnic provenance believe they have the innate right to live in other (White) people’s countries, violating the ethnic homogeneity of those others. The use of Budapest has a crash pad and flop house for “ethnonationalists” of Northwest European ancestry is a prime example of this tendency. We can project the same in the future; a Europe, a White world, of ethnonationalisms will no doubt see attempts of Whites to exploit other Whites in the same ethnoimperialist manner.
It is therefore no surprise that today’s “ethnonationalists” are vehemently opposed to a Pan-Europeanism that has the potential to curb ethnoimperialist behavior.
Putting aside cheap rhetoric and looking at actual behavior, it is clear that “White Imperialism” is an apt description for White ethnonationalism, and that Pan-Europeanism stands firm as a force opposed to that imperialism.
How to balance genetic (ultimate) interests with more proximate interests? At what point is a proximate interest compelling enough to justify sacrificing genetic interests? Can that ever be justified? Can a short-term sacrifice of genetic interests for some compelling proximate interest actually have the long-term effect of boosting genetic interests when all the costs and benefits are calculated? Let us consider together; however, first, let us get some definitions established.
Proximate interests – all other interests (e.g., culture, preferences, aesthetics, economics, moral standards, etc.). High proximate interests are things like High Culture, civilization, high-level science and technics, strategic interests, particular human phenotypic traits – things that are essential to a Race-Culture and that may be able to enhance Net EGI. Low proximate interests, such as economics, civil rights, and other more “plebian” concerns are those that often decease EGI.
Gross ethnic genetic interests (Gross EGI) – the immediate effects on adaptive fitness of any decision of action, the (naïve) optimization of genetic interests, the measure of genetic interests without balancing costs and benefits and without considering of what the later effects on genetic interests would be.
Net ethnic genetic interests (Net EGI) – the long-term effects on adaptive fitness of any decision of action, the measure of genetic interests based on a balancing of costs and benefits and with careful considering of what the later effects on genetic interests would be.
Discussion about the glossary:
An example I give of gross vs. net EGI would be the size of the nation state. Following the “smaller is better” theory, and the ethnonationalist ideal of balkanizing nations into “impotent little statelets,” one might say that ethnic genetic interests are being optimized by creating a nation state with the most highly concentrated ethnic genetic interests of the most closely related peoples. That would be gross genetic interests. But what if the division of nations and peoples in this manner breaks the organic solidarity of a larger ethny, what if the states become so “impotent” that they cannot effectively defend themselves, what if the power and status of the group is so weakened that their adaptive fitness is decreased? The long term result of all of this, when all the costs and benefits are balanced, may well be a decrease in adaptive fitness, a decline in the group’s genetic interests. These later result would be the net genetic interests, the outcome after all of the plusses and minuses are applied to the original gross genetic interests.
Of course, one can have gross vs. net genetic interests at other levels of genetic interests, such as family. Gross familial genetic interests would be maximized by having as many children as possible, but if that decreases their competitiveness, and in the long run means fewer grandchildren and other descendants, then the net familial genetic interests may be best achieved by a moderate family size with a more reasonable number of children.
End glossary and the discussion of the glossary.
Main points:
It would be useful to have easy-to-use computation programs that can be used to process autosomal human genetic data to calculate genetic kinship and “child equivalents” comparing individuals to individuals, individuals to groups, and groups to groups. This can be done by the typical “beanbag genetics” and also after analysis of genetic integration, according to the Gillet and Gregorius method.
Having these data would allow us to calculate kinship and child equivalents for various biopolitical scenarios, so as to allow the EGI Firewall to prevent maladaptive scenarios. In this way, we will always know, for each biopolitical possibility, what the costs and benefits would be with respect to EGI, which would assist in avoiding maladaptive choices.
It would also be useful to attempt to determine a measurement of proximate interests so as to compare to calculated ultimate genetic interests. Of course proximate interests are relatively subjective but this exercise would still be useful. Again, the objective would be comparing individuals to individuals, individuals to groups, and groups to groups, but instead of evaluating genetic distance, the metric would be, e.g., various types of phenotypic evaluations, cultural distance, or any other characteristic of interest to Race-Culture other than genetic interests. One could even delve into areas such as economic value to satisfy those interested in less important proximate metrics. These data could be then put into something akin to “child equivalents,” we can call it non-genetic value equivalents (NGVE).
Using these data, could then then attempt to equate a given about of NGVE to a given amount of child equivalents. No doubt this is subjective, but again, it could be useful. How many child equivalents would one be willing to forego in exchange for a certain amount of NGVE? Think of this as ultimate-proximate opportunity costs, or akin to putting a monetary value on a human life.
Having some sort of measurement of proximate interests to compare to ultimate (genetic) interests would allow for a rational and (relatively) more objective approach for Salter’s mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MUA). In MUA, there are limits to which genetic interests are pursued; in this way, there are constraints. As one extreme example, one can argue that an ethny’s EGI can be maximized if they exterminate all other ethnies and then populate the entire world territory themselves. Besides the practical problems with that, and the very real possibility of it backfiring and ending up harming the ethny that attempted it, thus sacrificing their long term net genetic interests for a delusional attempt to to optimize gross genetic interests, there are moral issues as well. MUA in essence follows “The Golden Rule” with respect to genetic interests; while competition and unequal outcomes are allowed (and expected), no ethny should face an existential threat to their existence, or even an extreme diminishment of their genetic interests in the context of minimal survival. Thus I wrote:
I have long been interested in melding the work of Salter on ethnic genetic interests – genetic interests being ultimate interests – with the ideas of Yockey, which, with its focus on High Culture, can be viewed as more proximate (issues other than [purely] genetic interests). For example, see this.
The relationship between ultimate and proximate interests can therefore inform approaches concerning the merger of the Salterian and Yockeyian paradigms. In my analysis of Salterian ethics, I endorsed Salter’s mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU):
Finally, while the MAU puts limits on the degree to which genetic interests can be pursued, people and ethnies must still have the freedom to advance (not merely defend) their interests within reasonable bounds…That this can be done via the MAU has been argued in Salter’s book and also in my comments above; I would promote a rather aggressive version of the MAU, but one that still incorporates limits and which respects certain proximate interests…in my case, I would value society-wide proximate interests, such as Yockey’s call to actualize a High Culture, over mere individual rights…
Note the mention of Yockeyism there. Thus, a prudent MUA, even one that is aggressive, is compatible with broad proximate interests, such as Yockey’s Imperium idea that is based on High Culture. Of course, there is a strong association between ultimate and proximate interests in this case. After all, a Yockeyian Imperium could safeguard the interests, including the ethnic genetic interests, of the constituent European ethnies constituting that Imperium. On the other hand, a focus on ultimate interests can lead to Yockey’s (proximate) Imperium, with the explanation for that stated above. In the last analysis, the reason that the various European ethnies belong to the same High Culture is their membership in the same continental race, hence the fact that those ethnies have related racial ancestries (genetic kinship leading to overlapping ultimate interests). It is therefore difficult to untangle ultimate from proximate interests in this case. And that entanglement is important for what follows in my analysis.
Of course, those who adopt what Salter calls the “pure ethic” with respect to EGI would reject any exchange of child equivalents for NGVE, but those who favor “mixed adaptive utilitarianism” may be more flexible. Then we get into my concept of gross vs. net genetic interests. What may seem at first a sacrifice of (gross) genetic interests for proximate interests may turn out to boost net genetic interests, if the proximate values that are being prioritized end up, in the long run, boosting the fitness of the group.
As regards prioritizing net over gross genetic interests, this is not only common sense – one wants to optimize the final outcome after costs and benefits are taken into account – but also tries to avoid the “bounded rationality” problem that can occur with an over-zealous focus on gross genetic interests:
Salter notes that “bounded rationality” – our inability to ever know everything necessary about a problem or issue – is a good reason not to advocate for the pure ethic of unbridled pursuit of genetic interests…dividing a larger nation into smaller micro-states of more concentrated kinship may be seen as maximizing EGI, but if this division weakens the ability of the populations involved to defend their interests against aggressors (or achieve some other beneficial goal that requires a certain size threshold), then net adaptive interests would suffer. Maximizing EGI, trying to squeeze every last drop of genetic interest from a situation, may backfire. In addition, the possibility of kinship overlap between populations is another reason not to be too radical in the pursuit of EGI, particularly within continents, since some people on “their side” may be more genetically similar to you than those on “your side”…The bounded rationality problem, coupled to the possibility of kinship overlap, therefore suggests that a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of EGI is optimal, since errors in interpreting kinship and the best methods for pursuing adaptiveness may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests…
Given kinship overlap between Europeans, the extreme ethnonationalism championed by the petty nationalists “may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests.” Of course, one can question whether these petty nationalists have any rationality at all, forget about “bounded rationality.” This also relates to my distinction between a pursuit of “gross genetic interests” – attempting to maximize genetic interests without consideration of costs and benefits and what the ultimate outcomes are – and “net genetic interests” – pursuit of optimizing benefits vs. costs with respect to genetic interests so as to provide the best final outcome when all factors are properly considered.
Of course, “bounded rationality” can be a problem for any analysis, even the more balanced one promoted in this post; however, it seems to me it is more of a problem one when focuses on a single metric to the exclusion of all other considerations.
I also previously wrote:
I have long been interested in melding the work of Salter on ethnic genetic interests – genetic interests being ultimate interests – with the ideas of Yockey, which, with its focus on High Culture, can be viewed as more proximate (issues other than [purely] genetic interests). For example, see this.
The relationship between ultimate and proximate interests can therefore inform approaches concerning the merger of the Salterian and Yockeyian paradigms. In my analysis of Salterian ethics, I endorsed Salter’s mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU):
Finally, while the MAU puts limits on the degree to which genetic interests can be pursued, people and ethnies must still have the freedom to advance (not merely defend) their interests within reasonable bounds…That this can be done via the MAU has been argued in Salter’s book and also in my comments above; I would promote a rather aggressive version of the MAU, but one that still incorporates limits and which respects certain proximate interests…in my case, I would value society-wide proximate interests, such as Yockey’s call to actualize a High Culture, over mere individual rights…
Note the mention of Yockeyism there. Thus, a prudent MUA, even one that is aggressive, is compatible with broad proximate interests, such as Yockey’s Imperium idea that is based on High Culture. Of course, there is a strong association between ultimate and proximate interests in this case. After all, a Yockeyian Imperium could safeguard the interests, including the ethnic genetic interests, of the constituent European ethnies constituting that Imperium. On the other hand, a focus on ultimate interests can lead to Yockey’s (proximate) Imperium, with the explanation for that stated above. In the last analysis, the reason that the various European ethnies belong to the same High Culture is their membership in the same continental race, hence the fact that those ethnies have related racial ancestries (genetic kinship leading to overlapping ultimate interests). It is therefore difficult to untangle ultimate from proximate interests in this case. And that entanglement is important for what follows in my analysis.
Note the statement that it is difficult to untangle ultimate and proximate interests. That is an issue for the decision matrix analysis below. There, I have separate categories for genetic interests (net and gross) as well as high and low proximate interests, even though high proximate interests can boost net genetic interests (even if they may, in the short term, modestly depress gross genetic interests), while low proximate interests often depress both net and gross genetic interests. So, there may be a type of “double counting” going on, at least in part. My argument is that this is not a highly quantitative scientific analysis or some sort of engineering project where an exact and accurate answer is crucial. Instead, we are modeling biopolitical alternatives and comparing projected outcomes, so we need to take a broader view and worry about details and exact numbers. We are trying to model a complex system in a manner that is understandable, and some “coarse-graining” is inevitable.
In summary, I would favor ultimate interests over proximate interests all else being equal but if some degree of proximate focus serves net ultimate interests then proximate needs can be given a high priority in certain contexts. And if we follow the MUA, there needs to be reasonable constraints with respect to the pursuit of EGI, constraints that likely would in fact enhance long term net genetic interests. With all of that, we still must remember that, in general, overall genetic interests can be objectively determined but proximate interests will always be somewhat subjective. Therefore, and given that the genetic interests are the “ultimate” interests from the standpoint of adaptive, all else being equal, genetic interests should usually be given priority. But reality is complex, and “all else” is often not equal, so additional considerations come into play. In particular, if it can be shown that a short-term sacrifice of some gross genetic interests in favor of some major proximate interest can in the long run enhance net genetic interests, then favoring a proximate interest can in fact enhance genetic interests, and thus the ultimate interest of adaptiveness is promoted. But one must be careful. First, the sacrifice of immediate gross genetic interest should be small, certainly nothing that would include racially alien immigration or anything of that sort; instead it could involve relations between closely related peoples of the same race. Second, the proximate interest must be something absolutely fundamental, something very important. Third, there must be some strong and reasonable determination that promotion of this proximate interest can serve long term (net) genetic interests. So, in general, genetic interests should be prioritized over proximate interests, but in certain cases the proximate can a priority, but only of a strong case can be made that long term genetic interests will be promoted (or at least not harmed).
Let us assume that we have some reasonable approach to quantify proximate interests. What next? How can we decide between alternative biopolitical choices, each of which have different effects on genetic (ultimate) interests (net and gross) as well on various types of proximate interests?
Tools such as the decision matrix, weighted decision table, etc. can be used as the theoretical basis for strategic decision making approaches with respect to ultimate (genetic) and proximate interests. The more objective genetic interests can serve as a baseline ranking and then various proximate interests can be ranked related to the genetic interests, all being appropriately weighted. Proximate interests that can be reasonably seen as having the capacity to enhance (net) genetic interests would naturally be weighted more, and thus ranked higher, than those neutral to genetic interests, which would in turn be weighted/ranked to higher than proximate interests whose effect on genetic interests, including net genetic interests, would be negative. Iterative utilization of these processes, evaluated with computer modeling (artificial intelligence type programs may be useful), and perhaps coupled with ideas from game theory, can assist in developing a more robust and dependable decision making process for these issues.
As an example consider a decision matrix – specifically for White racial interests – that has as its choice comparisons (“X axis”) Pan-European Racial Nationalism, Ethnonationalism, Civic Nationalism, and Multiculturalism. These are ranked according to the following weighted characteristics, with weights in parentheses – Net EGI (10), Gross EGI (7), High proximate interests (5), and low proximate Interests (2). For Net EGI, Pan-Europeanism gets the highest rank (4), since I see that scenario as most optimal for boosting the adaptive fitness of all Whites over time. Next would be Ethnonationalism (3), then Civic Nationalism (2) and finally Multiculturalism (1), which is destructive of White EGI. For Gross EGI, which switch the rankings of Ethnonationalism (now 4) and Pan-Europeanism (now 3), with the others being the same. The rationale here is that short-term superficial maximization of EGI can be obtained with smaller, more genetically homogeneous territories. High proximate interests have the same rankings as Net EGI. Pan-Europeanism (4) is best, as it pools together the best of White groups and has economy of scale and the possibility of cooperative synergy. Ethnonationalism (3) is better than the other choices since at least it is homogeneous; Multiculturalism (1, with Civic Nationalism at 2) is the worst for obvious reasons. As regards Low proximate interests, this is even more subjective than the others, but perhaps Civic Nationalism (4) would allow for the most optimal pursuit of raw economic objectives and other such concerns, following by Multiculturalism (3); among the racialist options, I would put Pan-Europeanism (2) above Ethnonationalism (1), since the former would have economy of scale, more synergy, and fewer obstacles commerce, etc. Adding all together gives Pan-European Racial Nationalism 85 points, Ethnonationalism 75 points, Civic Nationalism 52 points, and Multiculturalism 28 points.
Do not take the numbers given – the rankings and weights – too seriously; this is meant to illustrate how a decision matrix can be used in biopolitics, so I am presenting a simplified version with numbers that I have subjectively plugged in. For example, one can reasonably conclude that net genetic interests should be weighted to a greater extent than shown, and one can argue about all of the rankings and weights, as well as include more categories on the X and Y axes. Also, since the High Proximate Interests can influence Net EGI in a positive sense, and, often, the Proximate Interests damage all EGI, there is overlap in these categories, but it is still useful to separate them since do measure separate things, even if not independently. One could also argue that only Net EGI should be considered and that Gross EGI is redundant, but I believe there is utility in looking at them separately; while they overlap to a considerable degree, they are not the same thing, and there is a difference between Pan-Europeanism and Ethnonationalism for both form of EGI. I can also be accused of bias for arranging the rankings and weights to make my favorite of Pan-European Racial Nationalism come out on top, with the other scenarios also in the scoring correlated to my preferences; however, this is my decision matrix and others can do differently, although we can hope for some consensus on basic principles. There are many caveats. However, the point is made regarding how the concept can work in principle. These preliminary ideas can and should be expanded on in the future.
White nationalists and White separatists often strongly object to being labeled as “White supremacists” by the System/Left and their objection is perfectly justified. Why should the term “White supremacism” be rejected by White nationalists/separatists? What is wrong with the term “White supremacism” in this context?
It is inaccurate, as it ascribes supremacist beliefs to those who do not hold such views.
It is unjust, since people have the right to label their own ideological beliefs, as long as those labels are consistent with their ideology and can be defended as such. The clear distinction between nationalism (as well as separatism) and supremacism has been made, explained, and defended time and again, and the distinction is consistent with the stated ideology of White nationalists/separatists. Therefore, pro-White activists are perfectly justified in objecting to illegitimate labels while embracing legitimate ones; further, others, if they are arguing in good faith, should accept the self-described legitimate labels of the relevant pro-White individuals and groups.
It is malicious, since the term “White supremacism” has a pejorative connotation, and therefore the use of the term to inaccurately describe those who reject it is intentionally defamatory, and is done to blacken the target’s reputation to the public, put pro-White activists on the defensive, and obfuscate real White nationalist ideology, thus preventing others from properly understanding that ideology.
It is dishonest. Given that it is inaccurate, unjust, and malicious, and that the targets of the smear continuously object to it, those who use the term are dishonest and arguing in bad faith.
Faced with such dishonest tactics, and being put on the defensive, some activists surrender and abandon the perfectly legitimate labels of White nationalist or White separatist, and instead clumsily grope for awkward substitutes, like “White advocate” – which doesn’t really help because they still get labelled as “White supremacists.”
Instead, White nationalists should continue to forcefully push back against the illegitimate and intentional “White supremacist” mislabeling. But that’s not enough; that is merely defensive. They need to go on the offensive and strongly denounce those who use the term “White supremacist” as fundamentally dishonest manipulators of low character who are arguing in bad faith. Such dishonest people should be deconstructed, delegitimized, ridiculed, and, to the extent possible, shunned.
All of the above applies to the illegitimate use of “White Imperialism” or plain “Imperialism” to describe the ideology of Pan-European White nationalism. It is inaccurate; it is unjust and rejected by those labeled in this manner; it is malicious since it is being used to attack those targeted and put them on the defensive, so they adopt awkward labels like “White Unionist.” Therefore, it is dishonest and those who use such labels are arguing in bad faith and should be deconstructed, delegitimized, ridiculed, and, to the extent possible, shunned.
What about the term I use to describe certain ethnonationalists – “ethnoimperialists.” Is that equally dishonest? I say no. I note that those so labelled have heretofore not objected to it, nor have they explained why it is not accurate; indeed, they haven’t explained how living in someone else’s country and violating that someone else’s ethnic homogeneity is consistent with ethnonationalist principles. Until they effectively argue against “ethnoimperialist,” as others have argued against “White Imperialist,” the term will stand.
That is my longest podcast so far; I encourage you to listen to the whole thing. This post constitutes my EGI Notes contribution for this weekend, so take the time to ponder the message of this podcast.
It is crucial that we define White nationalism appropriately and that we develop a optimal core ideology. I realize that at one level these disputes are somewhat ludicrous in the sense that the Far Right has no power whatsoever, so that in a practical sense these debates are akin to arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But, as stated above, we need to get these definitions cleared up. We will continue to disagree, but we should at least all be on “the same page” concerning what precisely we are disagreeing about.
And as regards certain people ducking my debate challenges, and activists being, in general, uninterested in appearing on Western Destiny Radio, I have already said or written my opinions on those subjects. The situation is, in a word, pathetic. It is what it is.
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